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1 General Introduction
1.1 An old discourse and a new debate
Private relationships are governed by many different rules, ranging from 
open-textured standards of general application to detailed rules aimed at 
specific situations. It is not unusual for a single set of facts to fall within the 
ambit of multiple rules nor is it uncommon that, on the face of it, several 
rights and duties arise concurrently. At first glance, a contracting party may, 
for instance, be entitled to demand specific performance of the obligations 
under the contract, to rescind the contract for pre-contractual misrepresenta-
tion, to terminate the contract for breach, and to recover the losses resulting 
from the breach. In some jurisdictions, moreover, the contracting party may 
also be entitled to claim damages for losses resulting from a violation of one 
or more tortious duties by the other contracting party.
Such a concurrence of rights and duties does not give rise to problems as 
long as the application of the underlying rules produces the same outcome. 
Yet the rules may vary in certain ways, both in terms of their conditions 
and in terms of their consequences, which may lead to different outcomes. 
In such situations, the question that arises is whether the law permits the 
interested party to elect the rule of his choice. This question can only be 
answered by considering the relationship between the underlying rules. 
Does one legal rule affect the scope of application of another legal rule? 
Can the rules be applied cumulatively, or must one of them be excluded in 
favour of the other? Does the law permit a choice between the rules?
These questions have kept scholars occupied for a long time. Early 
examples can be found in the works of medieval scholars who sought 
to systemise Roman law on the basis of the inherited Corpus Iuris Civilis. 
They wondered whether a person is permitted, after having instituted 
legal proceedings against another person, to abandon the actio he initially 
relied upon in favour of another, more advantageous, actio.1 The same 
question was examined again by German scholars in the course of the 19th 
and early 20th century. The works of Ernst Levy (1881-1968) stand out. He 
wrote several books about the relationship between a wide range of actiones, 
pushing historical research in this field to its doctrinal peak.2 At the time, 
1 See Bezemer 2007, who submits that Azo of Bologna († ca. 1220-1230) was the fi rst to 
examine this question under the header cumulatio actionis. The quotation referred to by 
Bezemer can be found in Dolezalek 1985, p. 600 (no. 338).
2 Levy 1918; Levy 1922; Levy 1962.
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Roman law had already disappeared as a source of applicable law on the 
continent, due to the adoption of the national codifications of civil law in 
the course of the 19th and early 20th century. Henceforth, scholars increas-
ingly devoted their attention to the relationships between the statutory 
rules collected in these codifications.
Over the past decades, their questions have acquired a new dimension 
as the result of the proliferation of the laws of the European Union and their 
increased impact upon the legal relationships between private parties. In a 
long line of leading cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union has 
established that individuals are under a duty towards other individuals to 
comply with certain provisions contained in the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, and with certain general principles of Union law. Rights 
and duties have also been laid down by the Union legislature in directives 
and regulations governing areas as diverse as social policy, consumer 
protection, competition law, transport, public health, and the internal 
market more broadly. It is not unusual for a single set of facts to fall within 
the ambit of multiple Union rules nor is it uncommon that, on the face of it, 
national laws may provide protection as well.
The concurrence of these rules is often understood and explained on the 
basis of several fundamental assumptions. The first is that Union laws have 
precedence over national laws. In its famous ruling in the case Flaminio Costa 
v. ENEL, the Court of Justice rendered it impossible for the Member States 
‘to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal 
system accepted by them on the basis of reciprocity’.3 In subsequent cases, 
the Court has made it very clear that the validity of Union law cannot be 
challenged by relying upon national laws, regardless of their date of coming 
into force or their constitutional importance. In its view, any binding norm of 
Union law takes precedence over any provision of national law.4 This prin-
ciple of primacy is an essential feature of the European legal order.5 It safe-
guards the consistency and uniformity in the interpretation and application 
of Union law through the subordination of Member State law and through 
the concomitant duty imposed on the national courts to apply Union 
law in its entirety and to protect the rights that it confers on individuals.6
The second assumption is that harmonising measures replace national 
laws. One of the core objectives of the European Union is to establish an 
internal market in which goods, persons, services, and capital can move 
3 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.
4 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114; Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. 
Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49; Opinion 1/09 of the Court, [2011] ECR I-1137.
5 Opinion 1/91 of the Court, [1991] ECR I6079, at 21; Opinion 1/09 of the Court, [2011] ECR 
I-1137, at 65; Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, at 59.
6 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49, at 
14-16.
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freely between the Member States.7 One of the means to achieve this objec-
tive is to introduce Union legislation which removes barriers to economic 
integration originating from divergences in ‘the provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States’.8 Such harmoni-
sation or approximation is aimed at creating a ‘level playing field’ on which 
economic actors can compete under equal conditions.9 For this reason, it is 
assumed that directives and regulations adopted by the Union legislature 
introduce a uniform legal regime embracing all the Member States and pre-
empt Member State competence to maintain its own laws or introduce new 
provisions that might deviate from that regime.10
The third assumption is that specific rules have precedence over general 
rules. This maxim, well-known by the Latin phrases lex specialis derogat legi 
generali and specialia generalibus derogant, has become part of the established 
repertory used to interpret the laws of the European Union.11 It is assumed, 
for instance, that the treaty provisions concerning the free movement of 
persons and services set aside the general prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality,12 that provisions of primary Union law can be relied 
upon only in the absence of more specific harmonising measures adopted by 
the Union legislature,13 and that directives and regulations apply only in the 
absence of harmonising measures more specific in scope.14 Conway has even 
gone so far as to argue that the concurrence of Union rules is unwelcome 
and should best be avoided through a rational application of the lex specialis 
principle. In the interest of providing legal certainty, a specific rule should 
always prevail over a general rule if both relate to the same subject matter.15
Each of these fundamental assumptions has long been established. 
Libraries are filled with books about the relationship between Union laws 
7 Art. 26 (2) TFEU.
8 This formulation is used in Art. 114 (1) TFEU, the provision which forms the basis of most 
directives and regulations in the area of the internal market. Such barriers can also be 
removed through negative integration, that is through the removal of national laws that 
discriminate against goods, persons, services, and capital from other Member States or 
render market access more diffi cult. In such situations, however, national laws are not 
replaced by Union laws. See, on negative integration, Weatherill 2017, p. 5-10.
9 Weatherill 2017, p. 10-13.
10 See e.g. Dougan 2000, p. 854, who observes that the approximation of national law by the 
Union ‘is often stereotyped in terms of a model of “total harmonization”’.
11 Beck 2012, p. 222-223.
12 See e.g. Böhning 1973, p. 82; Davies 2003, p. 188; Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 121; Hartkamp 
2011, p. 164-165; Krenn 2012, p. 193; Veldhoen 2013, p. 370-371; McDonnell 2018, p. 438.
13 Known as the Tedeschi principle. In Case 5/77, Carlo Tedeschi v. Denkavit Commerciale, 
ECLI:EU:C:1977:144, the Court held that where directives provide for the harmonisation 
of objectives of general interest, recourse to nowadays Article 36 TFEU ‘is no longer justi-
fi ed’. On this basis, scholars have concluded that provisions of primary law apply only in 
the absence of more specifi c secondary legislation. See e.g. Mortelmans 2002, p. 1328; De 
Vries 2008, p. 575; Tobler 2013, p. 458; Koffeman & Rijpma 2014, p. 466; Cuyvers 2017, p. 299.
14 See e.g. Anagnostaras 2010, p. 153; Garde 2012, p. 137, on the scope of application of the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.
15 Conway 2012, p. 156.
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and national laws, and between general rules and specific rules. In fact, a 
host of examples shows that Union laws have the capacity to set aside or 
replace the provisions laid down by national laws, and that specific rules 
have the capacity to set aside general rules. However, a mode of analysis 
based exclusively on these fundamental assumptions will encounter 
certain difficulties when it seeks to understand and explain the relationship 
between concurrent rights and duties. For Union laws do not necessarily 
set aside or replace the provisions laid down by national laws, and specific 
rules do not necessarily trump general rules. The question as to whether one 
rule affects the scope of application of another rule, so this book aims to 
demonstrate, is a question of interpretation which cannot be answered on 
the basis of these fundamental assumptions alone.16
Inspired by the experiences gained from examining several national 
systems of private law, this book offers a different scheme of analysis. It 
starts from the premise that each applicable rule, however founded, should 
be realised to the greatest possible extent. In principle, then, each rule ought 
to have its intended legal effect once the necessary conditions have been 
established. Two exceptions must be made, however. An election between 
the available alternatives is required if cumulative application would lead 
to inconsistent outcomes which cannot exist concurrently. The underlying 
reason is that the objectives of one rule cannot be realised if the other rule is 
also applied. For the same reason, the law sometimes prescribes that one of 
the rules applies exclusively, so that no election can be made at all.
This scheme of analysis accepts and accommodates the situations in 
which Union laws replace or exclude national laws, and the situations in 
which specific rules set aside rules more general in scope. Crucially, the 
scheme also absorbs the many situations in which rules do apply concur-
rently and provides a model by which the questions which may arise as 
a result of their overlap can be debated and solved. By developing this 
scheme of analysis, the book purports to provide a complete and nuanced 
account of the impact of the laws of the European Union and their inter-
action with the national systems of legal protection.
1.2 Different visions of the structure of the legal system
This scheme of analysis offers a host of doctrinal issues and emerging novel-
ties, relevant to scholars and practitioners of private law and Union law 
alike. But they have not yet received the attention they deserve. Scholars 
specialised in private law, it is true, have taken some initial steps. But their 
16 Cf. Schütze 2006, p. 1023, who distinguishes between the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’, 
which determines whether a conflict between two norms exists, and the doctrine of 
‘supremacy’, which determines which norm prevails in the event of confl ict.
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contributions are either not written in English,17 or they use the national 
civil code as a point of reference and view the Union laws from this partic-
ular angle.18 Meanwhile, scholars specialised in Union law have built up a 
rich body of academic discourse which has flourished alongside unfolding 
case law and newly adopted directives and regulations. But this scholarship 
does not generally focus on the relationships between private parties, but 
on the division of competences between the Union and its Member States.
What is the reason that scholars of private law and Union law are 
talking at cross-purposes? One reason is that they tend to view the structure 
of the legal system from different angles. Many jurists specialised in private 
law, especially continental scholars, are thinking in terms of the so-called 
‘institutional’ model inherited from Roman jurists. By contrast, many 
scholars specialised in Union law are thinking in terms of the structure of 
the legal order conceptualised by Hans Kelsen (1881-1973). It is important 
to consider how these models differ from each other before determining the 
perspective which should be adopted in this book.
The ‘institutional’ model forms the foundation of the continental codi-
fications of civil law. Its basic structure originates from the works of the 2nd 
century jurist Gaius, who was the first to subdivide Roman law into the 
law of persons, things, and actions.19 His structure was later adopted by the 
writers of the Institutiones, the textbook which served as an introduction to 
the codification ordered by the 6th century emperor Justinian I.20 Book Four 
of the Institutiones dealt with different types of actions, such as the actiones 
in rem, which could be used to assert a property right, and the actiones in 
personam, which could be used to enforce a personal obligation. This summa 
divisio, between the laws of obligations and things, is a core feature still to 
be found in every modern codification of civil law, including the French 
Code Civil (1804), the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (1900), and the Dutch 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (1992). The distinction between personal rights and real 
rights has even found its way to the common law, through Hale’s The 
History and Analysis of the Common Law of England (1713) and Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69).21
What is important to understand, for present purposes, is that these 
works share a common objective. Contemporary codifications of civil law 
and the accompanying scholarship – but also certain commentaries on 
17 E.g. Baldus 1999; Huber 2001; Gruber 2004, p. 229-258; Lerche 2007; Goldie-Genicon 2009; 
Sieburgh 2009; Bachmann 2010; Hartkamp 2011; Veldhoen 2013; Castermans & De Graaff 
2013; De Graaff 2014b; Laroche 2014; Castermans & Krans 2019.
18 E.g. Baldus 1999 (who also examines Roman law); Huber 2001; Lerche 2007; Goldie-
Genicon 2009; Bachmann 2010; Hartkamp 2011; Castermans & De Graaff 2013; Veldhoen 
2013; De Graaff 2014a; Castermans & De Graaff 2014; Laroche 2014; Castermans & Krans 
2019.
19 Watson 1994, p. 5; Zimmermann 1996, p. 25-26.
20 Watson 1994, p. 8; Zimmermann 1996, p. 27.
21 Hale 1713; Blackstone 1765. The infl uence of the Justinianian model on the works of Hale 
and Blackstone is examined by Simpson 1981, p. 640-641; Watson 1988, p. 799-812.
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the common law22 – aim at covering the rules and institutions relevant to 
private relationships in a comprehensive and systemic way. They use a 
conceptual model to describe and classify the world of persons and things 
and define the relations between them. The precise contents of the resulting 
models may differ over time and across jurisdictions, but their common 
objective is to cover the relevant aspects of the factual reality, so as to enable 
the resolution of any legal dispute between private parties arising in the real 
world. Such institutional systems, Samuel summarises, aim ‘to create a legal 
image of social reality in such a way that legal rules – legal norms – can be 
meaningfully applied’.23
Hans Kelsen did not seek to provide a comprehensive theory which can 
be used to understand the world of persons and things. In fact, he wanted 
to emancipate his Pure Theory of Law from ‘alien elements’ such as theology 
and the natural sciences. To that end, he developed a model which can be 
used to assess whether a norm – that is ‘an act by which a certain behavior 
is commanded, permitted, or authorized’24 – is ‘valid’ in the sense that a 
person ought to behave in a certain way.25 How to determine whether an act 
produces such legal consequences? The answer to this question is straight-
forward: a norm can be valid only if it rests upon another norm which, ulti-
mately, must be validated by the ‘basic norm’ or Grundnorm, the validity of 
which is presupposed.26 It is clear that institutional models cannot be used 
in order to understand this vertical structure. Nor is the distinction between 
private and public law relevant as such. What matters is whether a norm 
– such as a rule contained in a civil code – can be validated, ultimately, by the
basic norm. It flows from this reasoning that any inconsistency between a 
higher norm and a lower norm will render the latter invalid.27
Union law can be viewed from this perspective. At the top of the 
pyramid, we encounter the constituent treaties: the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).28 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the same 
rank has been awarded to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.29 
The second tier is formed by the general principles of Union law, such 
as proportionality, legal certainty, and equality.30 The third tier is formed 
by the legislative acts adopted by the Union legislature pursuant to the 
relevant procedures.31 At the bottom of the pyramid, we find the delegated 
22 E.g. Burrows 2013.
23 Samuel 2014, p. 101.
24 Kelsen 1967, p. 5.
25 Kelsen 1967, p. 10.
26 Kelsen 1967, p. 193-195.
27 Kelsen 1967, p. 208 and 267-268.
28 Art. 1 TEU.
29 Art. 6 (1) TEU.
30 Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 111-113.
31 Art. 289 TFEU.
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and implemented acts adopted on the basis of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.32 
In fact, the very principle of primacy of Union law over national law can be 
considered a straightforward application of the monist theory developed 
by Kelsen, who regarded national and international law ‘as a unity’ and 
argued that the latter is superior to the former.33
Useful as the Kelsen model may be to understand the hierarchical 
structure (or Stufenbau) of the Union legal order and its primacy over 
national laws, it tells us nothing about the legal effects of these rules. This 
is unfortunate, for there is much more to Union law than knowing whether 
a rule is ‘valid’ or ‘invalid’.34 Union law also confers rights and duties, not 
only on public bodies but also on private parties. This becomes clear if we 
take a brief look at the doctrinal debate about the direct effect of Union 
law in the national legal orders. Although scholars quarrel about the exact 
definition,35 it is widely accepted that Union law may not only be applied 
as a standard to review the legality of national law, but may also serve as 
a source of rights and duties (often called obligations).36 The meaning of 
these terms changes accordingly. On the one hand, the term ‘right’ is used, 
not least by the Court of Justice itself,37 to refer to a general right to ‘rely 
on’ Union law, which corresponds to a duty on the courts to apply Union 
law and, if need be, to set aside conflicting national laws in the cases arising 
before them.38 On the other hand, the term ‘right’ is used to indicate a more 
specific entitlement of an individual against one or more others, such as 
restitution, specific performance or compensation.39
If the Kelsen model cannot provide us with an adequate picture of the 
rights and duties Union law confers upon individuals, should we then 
resort to the ‘institutional’ model? The question that immediately arises 
is which institutional model. As mentioned, all modern civil codes aim to 
provide a comprehensive and systemic overview of private law. But they 
do not necessarily adopt the same style or structure. In fact, comparative 
lawyers are used to dividing the world’s legal systems into legal families; 
two of which are of French and German origin.40 One important reason for 
distinguishing between these two systems lies in the differences between 
32 Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 114-120.
33 Kelsen 1967, p. 328-344.
34 This point has also been stressed by scholars specialised in private law, such as Hartkamp 
(e.g. in Hartkamp 2013, p. 194) and Sieburgh (e.g. in Sieburgh 2013, p. 1172-1173).
35 As will be discussed in section 4.2, scholars have constructed a narrow and a broad defi -
nition of direct effect.
36 See e.g. Prechal 2005, p. 241; Dougan 2007, p. 933-934, 937-938; De Witte 2011, p. 331; 
McDonnell 2018, p. 430-431.
37 E.g. in Case C-414/16, Vera Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:257, at 76 and 78; Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, ECLI:EU:C:2018:696, at 69.
38 Prechal 2005, p. 100.
39 Van Gerven 2000, p. 507; Prechal 2005, p. 97; Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 186.
40 Esmein 1900, p. 495; Arminjon, Nolde & Wolff 1951, p. 47; Schnitzer 1961, p. 189-248; 
Zweigert & Kötz 1992, p. 69-75; Van Hoecke 2015, p. 24-26. See also the overview of legal 
family classifi cations across time provided by Siems 2014, p. 76.
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the Code Civil and the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. The Code Civil is modelled 
on the system of Gaius,41 although it must be noted that its third book is 
not dedicated to actions but contains residual rules on a range of different 
subjects. The Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch is more abstract and technical in nature. 
It consists of five books: a general part containing the rules common to the 
whole of private law, and separate books about obligations, things, family 
law, and succession. This system, also known as the Pandektensystem, uses 
a ‘formal legal technique with extremely clear-cut concepts which, far from 
forming the basis of a thorough codification in France, whose traditions 
look more to the political and forensic spheres, had hardly any effect there 
at all’.42
Choosing one of these institutional models requires us to recast the other 
applicable laws in its terms. This surely is a task that is too complex and 
time-consuming to undertake. We would, moreover, immediately encounter 
a problem of comparative law methodology. For we risk imposing upon the 
other systems of private law and Union law a model which is not actually 
used to envisage the structure of the law in these systems.43 We face the 
same problem if we rely upon the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 
in order to understand the structure of the law. This is a comprehensive 
collection of principles, definitions, and model rules of European private 
law, compiled by a great number of jurists from far and wide over the 
course of several years.44 But it is a compromise text which does not reflect 
the state of the law in any system of private law currently in force, has not 
been adopted by the Union legislature, relies upon categories and concepts 
which arguably lack flexibility,45 and does not fully embrace the Union laws 
relevant to private parties,46 because its underlying purpose is to build a 
new institutional system of private law in its own right.47 Using the DCFR 
as a model may have the effect of causing us to lose sight of the very legal 
materials we wish to understand.
How to break this deadlock? How to understand the relationship 
between concurrent rights and duties without getting bogged down in a 
regression which ultimately leads back to the ‘basic norm’ or attempting 
to press the whole of the law into the moulds of yet another institutional 
41 Watson 1994, p. 17.
42 Zweigert & Kötz 1992, p. 70.
43 See, generally, Samuel 2014, p. 6, 9, 63, 78, 130, and 147, who warns against ‘legal imperi-
alism’.
44 For an overview of the history of the project and its contributors and funders, see Von 
Bar, Clive & Schulte-Nölke 2009, p. 47-56.
45 Consider the criticism voiced by Marchetti 2012, p. 1274.
46 The DCFR only includes provisions contained in certain directives existing at the time 
of drafting, such as Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
(II. – 9:401-410 DCFR).
47 Consider the criticism voiced by Ackermann 2018, p. 745-749, of the various collections of 
model rules and principles which have been produced by private-law scholars over the 
course of the past decades.
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structure? The answer lies in the question this book aims to answer. If we 
wish to understand the relationship between concurrent rights and duties, 
our focus should be on the legal relations between persons and not on the 
institutional or hierarchical structure of the legal system. In other words, we 
should view the law from the perspective of the individuals involved.
1.3 This book’s focus on legal relations
The theory developed by the American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld 
(1879-1918) can be helpful in order to express the questions we aim to 
answer and select the relevant cases and materials. Troubled as he was 
by the indiscriminate use of the words ‘rights’ and ‘duties’,48 Hohfeld 
proposed a structure of eight ‘correlative’ concepts which can be arranged 
in two groups.49 We will briefly explain these two groups by reference to 
their core concepts: claims and powers.
In its narrowest sense, Hohfeld argued, the term right (or claim) is used 
as the correlative of the term duty. If someone has a claim, another person 
is under a duty to behave in a certain way.50 Examples are the claim for 
specific performance, the claim arising from undue payment, and the claim 
for compensation. From an analytical perspective, such a claim must be 
distinguished from a power, that is the capacity of a person to unilaterally 
create, modify or extinguish a legal position or relationship, and so to create, 
modify or extinguish claims and powers.51 Examples are the termination of 
a contract for breach, the rescission of a contract for pre-contractual misrep-
resentation, and the possibility to extinguish a claim by setoff. The distinc-
tion between these core concepts – claims and powers – becomes apparent if 
we adopt the perspective of the person affected. Hohfeld demonstrated that 
this person is not under a duty to behave in a certain way, but is subjected 
to the liability that the power will be exercised. Hence, the correlative of a 
power is not a duty but a liability.52
Hohfeld’s correlatives have been put to lots of different uses. Indeed, his 
model has become famous because it can be used to analyse the concepts 
existing in any legal system in terms of legal relations.53 It does not come as 
a surprise, therefore, that the model has also been used by scholars special-
ised in Union law. They have relied upon Hohfeld’s model in order to better 
apprehend the different claims and powers conferred upon individuals and 
the corresponding duties and liabilities imposed on other individuals and 
48 Hohfeld 1913b, p. 28.
49 Lawson 1977, p. 2.
50 Hohfeld 1913b, p. 30-32; Hohfeld 1917, p. 717.
51 Hohfeld 1913b, p. 44-54.
52 As this is ‘a well-known legal term with long-settled meanings’, Pound 1959, p. 81, has 
suggested to use the term ‘risk’ instead.
53 Schlag 2015, p. 217-219.
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on the Member States.54 His model has also been valued by practitioners 
such as Advocate General Wahl, who used Hohfeld’s idea that claims and 
duties correspond in order to support his conclusion that Union law – and 
not national law – determines the persons liable to pay compensation for 
losses resulting from an infringement of EU competition law.55
Another virtue of Hohfeld’s scheme is that it allows us to examine the 
differences and similarities between legal systems without having to resort 
to the formal legal concepts used in those systems.56 Hence, it enables us to 
perform the task we have in mind: namely to compare the national systems 
of private law and to value these insights as a source of understanding of 
the laws of the European Union. The question may be raised, however, 
whether we are not at risk of imposing yet another model which is not actu-
ally used to envisage the structure of the law in the systems under consider-
ation.57 Prechal, for one, has submitted that Hohfeld’s analytical approach 
‘is only one school of thought, by origin Anglo-American’. In her view, his 
scheme ‘does not necessarily link up with the way matters are conceived on 
the continent and in legal practice’.58
The fact that Hohfeld was an American jurist, who used examples 
from the common law and from equity and whose concepts still attract 
significant attention in the English-speaking world, should not lead us 
to believe that his theory is of Anglo-American origin. His guiding thesis 
– legal problems can only be understood in terms of legal relations – can 
be traced back to Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861)59 and has also 
been embraced by Marcel Planiol (1853-1931).60 When carving out his 
fundamental legal conceptions, moreover, Hohfeld built on the works of 
John William Salmond (1862-1924),61 who adopted the distinction, made by 
Bernhard Windscheid (1817-1892),62 between claims and powers.63 The first 
54 Coppel 1994; Hilson & Downes 1999; Gilliams 2000; Prechal 2000, p. 1057-1058; Eilmans-
berger 2004; Bengoetxea & Jääskinen 2010; Aalto 2011, p. 162-176; Bengoetxea 2012, 
p. 738-746; Lock 2019.
55 Opinion A-G Wahl, Case C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions and
Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:100, at 61. The reference to Hohfeld 1913b can be found in 
footnote 28. The Court followed the Opinion on this point, see Case C-724/17, Vantaan 
kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, at 28.
56 Van Hoecke 1996, p. 194-197; Brouwer & Hage 2007, p. 5; Samuel 2014, p. 102-105; Van 
Hoecke 2015, p. 13-15.
57 Samuel 2014, p. 107.
58 Prechal 2000, p. 1058.
59 Von Savigny 1840b, p. 1: ‘Jedes Rechtsverhältniß besteht in der Beziehung einer Person 
zu einer andern Person.’ See also Von Savigny 1840a, p. 7.
60 Planiol 1928, p. 702: ‘Par défi nition, tout droit est un rapport entre les personnes.’
61 Salmond 1902, p. 217-238.
62 Windscheid 1862, p. 81.
63 We should not conclude, therefore, that ‘pandectist concepts are completely alien to 
England’, as Vaquer 2009, p. 489 does. See, about the roots of Hohfeld’s scheme, Kocourek 
1920, p. 25; Pound 1959, p. 76-77; Frydrych 2018, p. 329-331.
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concept has been developed by Windscheid himself64 and still forms the 
backbone of the German Civil Code, which defines the claim – the Anspruch –
as ‘Das Recht, von einem anderen ein Tun oder Unterlassen zu verlangen 
(…)’.65 The power of an individual to unilaterally create, modify or extin-
guish a legal position or relationship has been recognised as a separate legal 
concept ever since the contributions of Emil Seckel (1864-1924), who coined 
the term Gestaltungsrecht.66 This concept is not as established in other conti-
nental jurisdictions, although it is not unusual for a Dutch writer to refer to 
wilsrechten67 or for a French writer to refer to droits potestatifs.68
The basic components of Hohfeld’s scheme, so it appears, are familiar 
to scholars across Europe.69 Still, Prechal rightly observes that some matters 
are conceived differently on the continent. Importantly, views may differ as 
to the role of the courts. Do they enforce rights or do they award remedies? 
The traditional common law position is that a remedy is a ‘cure’ provided 
by a court of law. The court order reframes the right or even originally 
confers it: the remedy is said to precede the right (ubi remedium ibi ius). 
By contrast, civil lawyers assume that a judicial decision does not create 
a new right, but rather confirms its existence: the right is said to precede 
the remedy (ubi ius ibi remedium).70 This does not mean that English law 
always requires recourse to the courts, nor that continental systems never 
require the courts to step in. In fact, English law does recognise the concept 
of ‘self-help’ remedies,71 while some continental systems do attach more 
importance to judicial intervention than others.72 But the reader should be 
aware that even though Hohfeld himself remained neutral as to whether or 
not rights exist outside the courts, views may differ in practice.73 A common 
lawyer is used to the idea that the courts develop the law, whereas a civil 
lawyer traditionally assumes that the courts discover the law as it stands.74
64 Windscheid 1856, p. 3-7.
65 § 194 (1) BGB.
66 Seckel 1903. See about this development Hattenhauer 2011, p. 197 et seq., and about the 
distinction between Ansprüche and Gestaltungsrechte Neuner 2012, p. 219-223.
67 Rupke 1914; Drielsma 1940; Drielsma 1946; Meijers 1948, p. 266; Suijling 1948, p. 102-107; 
Drielsma 1975; Mellema-Kranenburg 1988, p. 8; Snijders 1999; Nieuwenhuis 2007a, p. 52-53;
Biemans 2011, p. 193-195; Bartels & Van Mierlo 2013, no. 2; Spierings 2016; Verheul 2017; 
Van Nispen 2018, p. 52-54, 59-61; Verheul 2018.
68 Najjar 1967, p. 100 et seq.; Bénac-Schmidt 1983, p. 114 et seq.; Pomart-Nomdedeo 2010; 
Lefer 2016. See also Vaquer 2009, p. 496-497, with references to Italian and Spanish law.
69 Van Gerven 1973, p. 90-94; Graziadei 2008, p. 84.
70 Dedek 2010 discusses the differences between these approaches from a historical and 
comparative perspective.
71 E.g. rescission for misrepresentation can be effected without a court order.
72 Hattenhauer 2011, p. 205 et seq.; Ebers 2016, p. 58-60. Until recently, for instance, the Code 
civil required the assistance of a court to nullify a contract because of mistake, fraud or 
duress (Art. 1117 CC). This requirement has been abolished by Ordonnance n° 2016-131 
du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des 
obligations (hereinafter: Ordonnance n° 2016-131).
73 Barker 2018, p. 25-28.
74 Dedek 2010, p. 29-30.
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One more point should be mentioned before we consider the ques-
tions and outline of this book. In line with Hohfeld’s guiding thesis, we 
will not only pay attention to the active side of legal relations, but also to 
their passive side – that is, to the persons affected by the enforcement of a 
claim or the exercise of a power. These persons may contest the assertion 
that a claim exists or that a power has been lawfully exercised. In Hohfeld’s 
words, they would argue that they are either entitled to a privilege or to 
immunity.75 In this book, the term defence will be used to cover both situa-
tions, because this term is tailored to the dynamics of legal dispute. After 
all, it is a well-established rule in all jurisdictions that if a matter is taken 
to court, it is up to the claimant to allege the elements of the relevant rule 
of law in order to obtain the result sought.76 He may not be required to 
mention the rule by its name, but he is required to demonstrate – by refer-
ence to the relevant standards of proof – that the facts that are necessary for 
a certain rule to become operative have occurred and that the court must, 
therefore, conclude that a claim exists or that a power has been lawfully 
exercised.77 In turn, the defendant may be able to rely upon a defence. And 
just as a single set of facts can, on the face of it, give rise to multiple claims 
or powers, so too may several defences arise in a given case.78 Their rela-
tionship should be considered in this book.
1.4 Questions and outline
The previous sections have explained why this book focuses on legal 
relations and have informed the reader about the kinds of rules – claims, 
powers, defences – which will be examined. However, this is only one part 
of our enquiry. Although Hohfeld’s scheme may help us towards defining 
the basic categories, it does not tell us whether a right exists, let alone 
whether rights may exist concurrently. Such questions of interpretation 
cannot be answered by using his conceptual model.79 Hohfeld was well 
aware of this: ‘Whether there should be such concomitant rights (or claims)’, 
he wrote, ‘is ultimately a question of justice and policy; and it should be 
75 Hohfeld 1913b, p. 36.
76 As noted by e.g. MacCormick 1978, p. 41-52. In most continental legal systems, this rule 
is laid down in statutory provisions (e.g. in France in Art. 1353 CC; in the Netherlands 
in Art. 150 Rv). In Germany, the rule goes by the name of the Normentheorie (Rosenberg 
1956, p. 153).
77 Unless the claimant requests a declaratory decision that he is not under a legal duty 
towards the defendant, or that the exercise of a power by the defendant was not valid.
78 Already observed by Von Tuhr 1923, p. 18. The defence stage has received more scholarly 
attention in recent years: Nieuwenhuis 1997, p. 15-16; Bakels 2009a, p. 337; Neuner 2012, 
p. 242-245; Goudkamp 2013, p. 19-20, 202; Smith 2016; Martín-Casals 2019a, p. 769-776.
79 Van Gerven 1961, p. 2041 and 2051. See also the distinction made by Frydrych 2017, 
p. 125-131, between models and theories of rights.
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considered, as such, on its merits.’80 For this reason, this book does not only 
rely upon conceptual categories, but will also devote much attention to 
features of legal argumentation.
The principal question which this book aims to answer is whether the 
scheme of analysis conceived and fostered in the context of the national 
systems of private law can be valued as a source of understanding of the 
laws of the European Union. In the first part of the book, several national 
legal systems are examined and compared. What are the themes running 
through the various solutions to individual issues of concurrence? Our 
findings will equip us with the necessary tools to analyse the laws of the 
European Union. Can we see the same principles at work if we examine the 
statements of the Union legislature and the Court of Justice?
The outline of the book is as follows. Building on the current chapter, 
Chapter 2 identifies three categories of legal rules – claims, powers, and 
defences – which play a central role when resolving legal disputes between 
individuals in modern systems of private law. The chapter then considers 
the situation where these rules overlap. How to determine whether, and to 
what extent, one rule affects the scope of application of another rule? When, 
if at all, do specific rules have priority over general rules? The chapter exam-
ines and compares the approaches adopted in Dutch, English, French, and 
German law. Can we see the same principles at work in these legal systems?
Chapter 3 considers in greater detail the reasons underlying the deci-
sion to permit or restrict the availability of one legal rule because of the 
availability of another legal rule. It focuses on the issue which has been at 
the heart of the debate about concurrence in contemporary private law: the 
relationship between the laws of contract and tort. The question to consider 
is whether, and to what extent, the law permits a choice between finding 
liability in contract and in tort. The chapter examines how this question is 
answered in terms of Dutch, English, French, and German law. It traces the 
historical development of these approaches and explains their differences 
by looking at the underlying structure of these systems of private law. How 
to explain that only French law generally excludes the possibility to claim 
in tort if the damage is caused by or related to the performance, or non-
performance, of a contractual obligation?
Having defined and examined our subject more accurately, we will shift 
our attention to the laws of the European Union. Chapter 4 first takes a step 
back and substantiates two underlying propositions. The first proposition 
is that Union law contains rules which are comparable to the rules we have 
examined in the previous chapters. In order to test this proposition, the 
chapter outlines the sources of Union law and their effects in the national 
legal orders. The chapter then investigates whether Union law equips indi-
viduals with claims, powers, and defences. The second proposition is that 
the objectives of each rule, regardless of its source, should be realised to the 
80 Hohfeld 1913b, p. 36.
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greatest possible extent. The chapter shows that this principle is not peculiar 
to the national systems of private law, but also enjoys support within the 
Union legal order.
In Chapters 5 and 6, we will venture on a more detailed examination 
of the laws of the European Union. Chapter 5 focuses on the relationships 
between three sets of provisions contained in the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). Firstly, the chapter will analyse the relation-
ship between claims and defences based on Article 101 TFEU, which deals 
with collusion between undertakings, and on Article 102 TFEU, which deals 
with the market conduct of dominant undertakings. Secondly, the chapter 
will investigate the relationship between claims and defences based on 
Article 18 TFEU, which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nation-
ality, on the one hand, and on the treaty provisions pertaining to the free 
movement of persons and services on the other hand. Thirdly, the chapter 
will examine the relationship between these free movement rules and the 
competition rules laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The question to 
consider, in each case, is whether an individual is permitted to elect the rule 
which appears to him to be the most advantageous.
Chapter 6 examines the rules belonging to the body of secondary 
Union law. It focuses on the directives and regulations by which the Union 
legislature seeks to regulate the internal market. By their very nature, these 
directives and regulations are not wholly autonomous and self-contained. 
They will overlap with other directives and regulations, and they will be 
complemented by national laws. A single set of facts may, therefore, fall 
within the scope of multiple rules, belonging to the body of secondary 
Union law and to other sources of law. The question that arises is whether 
Union law permits an individual to elect the rule of his choice. The chapter 
examines how Union law answers this question by looking closely at the 
statements made by the Union legislature and by the Court of Justice.
Chapter 7 returns to the original research question and presents the 
final conclusions. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
1.5 Scope and methodology
The previous section has demonstrated that questions of concurrence arise 
within the law, as a result of overlaps between rules that are part of the 
law. They are not primarily policy issues that require an assessment of 
the relationship between legal rules and the broader socio-economic and 
cultural context in which these rules operate. This book is not, therefore, 
interdisciplinary in its approach. As a product of legal doctrinal research, 
the book analyses formal legal materials with the objective of revealing 
statements relevant to understand the legal questions raised.81 Its imme-
diate task will be to consult texts of treaties, codes and statutes, reports of 
81 See, on the doctrinal method, e.g. Hutchison 2015, p. 131-132.
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court decisions, and evidence of argumentation and reflections contained 
in scholarly publications. The book describes, defines, and compares these 
features and explains why they are fundamental. At the outset, the reader 
should, therefore, be informed as to the materials which have been exam-
ined and the materials which will not be discussed.
It is important to bear in mind that this book focuses on private parties 
and not on public bodies. To include public bodies would render the scope 
of the research too large and the materials too varied to properly formulate 
well-founded answers to the questions raised. We would be required to 
address the relationship between private law and administrative law, and 
the division of competences between civil courts and administrative courts, 
in each jurisdiction under consideration. This is a complex undertaking, 
not least because legal relationships with public bodies are principally 
governed by administrative law in some jurisdictions, but are also governed 
by private law in other jurisdictions. It might be interesting to examine 
whether the same principles apply when disputes between public bodies 
and private parties must be resolved, but this research seeks to remain 
neutral on this point and will focus only on the legal relationships between 
private parties.
It must be admitted at once that Union law itself does not distinguish 
clearly between the realms of private and administrative law. This does 
not mean, however, that the distinction between private parties and public 
bodies is unfamiliar. In fact, this distinction plays an important role when 
it comes to determining whether Union laws can be applied directly. In this 
context, a distinction is made between so-called ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ 
direct effect. The question of whether a rule of primary or secondary 
Union law is directly effective may be answered differently, depending on 
whether the rule is relied upon against an individual or against an organ of 
the state.82 As explained above, this book adopts the same distinction and 
focuses only on ‘horizontal’ relationships, not on ‘vertical’ relationships.
As a consequence, not all the rules of Union law are relevant in the 
context of this research. When examining the body of primary Union law, 
we will focus on certain directly effective treaty provisions in the area of 
competition law, free movement law, and non-discrimination law.83 When 
examining the body of secondary Union law, regard will be had to the 
directives and regulations by which the Union legislature seeks to regulate 
the internal market.84 The question may be raised as to whether we should 
examine directives at all. Directives cannot, in principle, create rights and 
impose duties on individuals, without national law serving as an intermedi-
ary.85 However, many directives do spell out these rights and duties in great 
82 Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 184-224.
83 See further section 4.3.
84 See further section 4.4.
85 Exceptionally, directives may be relied upon to set aside national laws, but the threshold 
for such ‘incidental’ horizontal effect is high. See further section 4.2.
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detail. Such directives can tell us much about the way Union law deals with 
issues of concurrence in relationships between private parties. They deserve 
to be examined in this book.
Even though the book focuses on the rules which are relevant in ‘hori-
zontal’ relationships between private parties, the reader should be aware 
that these rules may also apply in the context of ‘vertical’ relationships. This 
is especially the case with certain treaty provisions pertaining to free move-
ment law and non-discrimination law. In fact, these rules were tradition-
ally held to apply only to measures adopted by Member States, and not to 
private conduct. Likewise, the competition rules, which were traditionally 
held to apply only to private undertakings, may – under certain circum-
stances – apply to Member States’ behaviour. This means that a number of 
important judgments about the relationship between these treaty provisions 
have been rendered in proceedings involving public bodies, including judg-
ments delivered in first instance proceedings before the General Court and 
in appeal proceedings before the Court of Justice.86 These judgments will be 
discussed if they are necessary in order to find the appropriate answers in 
‘horizontal’ relationships between individuals.
Another question arises as to the scope of our enquiry. Are we dealing 
only with bilateral or also with multilateral relationships? It is not unusual 
to jointly discuss both situations, as Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead does:
‘The law frequently affords an injured person more than one remedy for the 
wrong he has suffered. (…) Cumulative remedies may lie against one person. A 
person fraudulently induced to enter into a contract may have the contract set 
aside and also sue for damages. Or there may be cumulative remedies against 
more than one person. A plaintiff may have a cause of action in negligence 
against two persons in respect of the same loss.’87
Laroche adopts a similar approach. She distinguishes le concours matériel 
from le concours intellectuel, depending on whether the damage has been 
caused by multiple persons or by just one person:
‘Que plusieurs responsabilités soient envisageables car plusieurs personnes ont 
concurru à causer le dommage, et l’on parlera de concours matériel. Que plu-
sieurs responsabilités convergent vers la réparation d’un même dommage, causé 
par un seul responsable, et l’on évoquera l’existence d’un concours intellectuel.’88
86 Formerly known as the Court of First Instance, the General Court hears actions brought 
by individuals and Member States against acts or omissions of the institutions, bodies, 
offi ces or agencies of the EU (Art. 256 TFEU). Its decisions may be subject to an appeal 
before the Court of Justice. This book refers to the General Court when discussing cases 
decided by the Court of First Instance.
87 Tang Man Sit (Deceased) v. Capacious Investments Ltd [1996] A.C. 514 (PC); see also United 
Australia Ltd v. Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] A.C. 1 (HL). Weir 1984; Stevens 1996; Watterson 
2003, and Cartwright 2017, p. 9-21, jointly discuss both situations too.
88 Laroche 2014, p. 13, referring to Leduc 2000.
General Introduction 17
However, most German scholars89 have limited themselves to bilateral 
relationships.90 Many Dutch writers,91 and some English92 and French93 
colleagues, have left multilateral relationships out of their accounts too. 
This restriction is to be preferred. Issues of joint and several liability have 
their own peculiarities and are typically governed by a specific statutory 
regime.94 By contrast, it has largely been entrusted to the judiciary and to 
legal scholarship to solve issues of concurrence in bilateral relationships.95 
For these reasons, this book only focuses on such relationships.
Comparative studies about the general subject of concurrence in private 
law do not exist. Writers tend to focus on the rules belonging to their respec-
tive national legal systems and adjust their terminology accordingly. So an 
English lawyer writes about remedies,96 a French lawyer about actions en 
justice,97 and a German lawyer about Ansprüche.98 Comparative studies on 
the relationship between the laws of contract and tort do exist, but they are 
either not written in English,99 are somewhat outdated,100 or they provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the law as it stands rather than an explanation 
of its development.101 It is the aim of this book to add a current compara-
tive account to these sources. French, German and English law have been 
selected because these are the most important private law systems in 
contemporary Europe, and because they represent both the civil and the 
common law traditions. Reference is also made to Dutch law given that this 
system has been influenced by the French Code Civil but has increasingly 
come under the influence of German law and legal doctrine.
Materials which have been published after 30 November 2019 have not 
been examined. This should not, however, lead the reader to believe that all 
the materials which have been published before that date will be expressly 
89 Leaving aside writers who dealt with, or were heavily infl uenced by, Roman law, e.g. Von 
Savigny 1841, p. 204 et seq.; Windscheid & Kipp 1906, p. 608; Last 1908; Levy 1918; Liebs 
1972.
90 E.g. Eisele 1892, p. 330-331; Lent 1912; Schmidt 1915; Dietz 1934; Georgiades 1968; Arens 
1970; Schlechtriem 1972; Schlosser 1982; Larenz 1992, p. 154-158; Huber 2001; Gsell 2003; 
Neuner 2012, p. 238-242.
91 Boukema 1966; Snijders 1973; Nieuwenhuis 1982; Brunner 1984; Boukema 1992; Bakels 
2009a; Castermans & Krans 2019, p. 6. Star Busmann 1972, p. 133, also discusses multilat-
eral relationships.
92 Stevens 2007, p. 199.
93 Bussy-Dunaud 1988; Serinet 1996; Goldie-Genicon 2009; Borghetti 2010, p. 14-15.
94 Art. 1310 CC; § 420 et seq. BGB; Art. 6:6-6:15 BW; Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978.
95 As observed by Georgiades 1968, p. 64.
96 Cartwright 1991, p. 141-148; Stevens 1996; Edelman 2002; Watterson 2003; Cartwright 
2017, p. 11-21.
97 Bussy-Dunaud 1988; Tournafond 1989; Pollaud-Dulian 1997; Jobard-Bachellier & 
Brémond 1999; Tricoire 2009.
98 Last 1908; Dietz 1934; Berger 1936; Dietz 1962; Georgiades 1968; Arens 1970; Bruns 1971; 
Gsell 2003; Schmidt 2006; Medicus & Lorenz 2015, § 33.
99 Schlechtriem 1972; Von Amsberg 1994; Kegel 2002; De Graaff & Moron-Puech 2017.
100 Weir 1984; Van Rossum 1995.
101 Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 26-315; Martín-Casals 2019b.
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mentioned. It is not the aim of this book to give an exhaustive description of 
every possible element in legal reasoning as concretely pursued in legisla-
tive texts, court decisions, and scholarly writing. It is, quite simply, impos-
sible to examine all the legal materials dealing, in one way or another, with 
the concurrence of legal rules in private law and still discuss the topic with 
tolerable ease and sufficient clarity. Hence we will focus on the most rele-
vant materials. This means, for instance, that most attention will be devoted 
to the decisions of the highest courts in the respective legal systems. As 
far as the interpretation of the laws of the European Union is concerned, 
we will focus on the judgments delivered by the Court of Justice and will 
not discuss the judgments delivered by national courts, even though these 
courts do play an important role within the judicial system of the European 
Union.102
102 As observed e.g. by Rosas 2012, p. 105.
2 Concurrence in Private Law
2.1 Introduction
Does one legal rule affect the scope of application of another legal rule? 
This question has been examined by scholars for a long time.1 Yet the topic 
remains a minefield when it comes to terminology. Having spent one 
afternoon in the legal library of an English university, a diligent student 
will have found contributions about concurrent duties,2 concurrent rights,3 
concurrent liabilities,4 and concurrent remedies,5 causing him or her to 
wonder whether or not the authors are writing about the same subject. And 
even if the authors do use the same term, one cannot be certain that they 
capture the same meaning. Birks has revealed, for instance, that the use 
of the term ‘remedy’ has ‘at least five different meanings loosely grouped 
around the relationship between disease and medicine’.6 The experiences 
of students searching the shelves of libraries of other European universities 
will not be very different. Scholars struggle with the relationship between 
formal recitals and underlying substance.
If understanding the taxonomy of a single legal system can be consid-
ered difficult, perhaps even dreadful, then comparing the categories used 
in different legal systems must be thought of as an ordeal of jargon and 
drudgery. Accepting these difficulties, the first aim of this chapter is none-
theless to attempt to explain what lawyers write about when they write 
about concurrence in private law. Given the ultimate objective of this book, 
which is to use these insights as an aid in the analysis of the laws of the 
European Union, we will not adopt the perspective of one particular system 
of private law currently in force. We will not, for instance, follow the termi-
nology of the French Code Civil (1804), the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(1900), or the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek (1992). Nor will we rely upon soft law 
instruments drafted by lawyers working in different jurisdictions, such as 
the Draft Common Frame of Reference.7 Rather, we will draw on insights from 
analytical jurisprudence and theories of law in order to understand what 
these systems have in common. What kinds of legal rules play a central role
1 See also supra section 1.1.
2 Taylor 2019.
3 Stevens 2007, p. 199-217.
4 Weir 1984; Davies 2018b.
5 Stevens 1996; Watterson 2003.
6 Birks 2000, p. 1.
7 See supra section 1.2.
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when adjudicating disputes between individuals in modern systems of private
law (sections 2.2-2.3)?
Having defined our subject more accurately, we will then examine how 
different legal systems determine the relationship between these rules. To 
this end, this chapter will first subject the well-known maxim lex specialis 
derogat legi generali to close scrutiny. This maxim is often relied upon in order 
to explain that specific rules trump the application of rules more general 
in scope. But when is that really the case? On closer analysis, it appears 
that the question as to whether a specific rule trumps the application of a 
rule more general in scope is a question of interpretation which cannot be 
answered on the basis of this maxim alone. The chapter argues that we must 
take the substance of the rules into account, and not merely their formal 
relationship (section 2.4).
Drawing on insights from different legal systems, the chapter then 
proposes an alternative scheme of analysis. This scheme starts from the 
premise that each applicable rule, however founded, should be realised to 
the greatest possible extent. In principle, then, each rule ought to have its 
intended legal effect once the necessary conditions have been established. 
An exception must be made, however, if cumulative application would lead 
to inconsistent outcomes and when the law prescribes that one of the rules 
applies exclusively (section 2.5). In conclusion, the chapter summarises 
the themes running through the various solutions to individual issues of 
concurrence (section 2.6).
2.2 Concurrence of legal rules
No legal regime is wholly self-contained. No matter what structure is 
adopted when splitting up the law into separate branches, it is inevitable 
that some cases will fall within several of the branches devised. In German 
literature, this phenomenon is known as Normenkonkurrenz or Konkurrenz 
der Rechtssätze. Larenz gives the following definition:
‘Die Tatbestände mehrerer Rechtssätze können sich in vollem Umfang oder teilwei-
se decken, so daβ ein und derselbe Sachverhalt von ihnen erfaβt wird. Man spricht 
dann von einem Zusammentreffen oder einer Konkurrenz der Rechtssätze.‘8
Likewise, Goldie-Genicon refers to the overlap of règles de droit:
‘Le concours de normes se caractérise par la vocation de plusieurs règles de droit 
à régir une même situation de fait. Plusieurs normes présentent une aptitude 
égale à résoudre le même litige.’9
8 Larenz 1992, p. 154.
9 Goldie-Genicon 2009, p. 155.
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These statements indicate that the overlap of legal rules lies at the heart of 
the phenomenon concurrence.10 In order to better understand the nature of 
this phenomenon, it is therefore important to understand how legal rules 
operate. This can best be explained by contrasting them with another type 
of legal norm: principles.
Rules and principles differ in their application. A rule must have its 
intended legal effect once its conditions are fulfilled and cannot have effect if 
its conditions are not fulfilled.11 Under Article 1240 of the French Civil Code, 
for instance, any human action whatsoever which causes harm to another 
creates an obligation in the person by whose fault it occurred to make repa-
ration for the harm caused.12 Principles do not create such an obligation, 
but they do play an important role in determining whether an obligation 
exists on the basis of Article 1240 CC. As Dworkin has stated, principles 
provide reasons to argue in favour or against a particular outcome, but they 
do not lead to a certain outcome if certain conditions are established.13 This 
is why Alexy calls principles ‘optimization requirements’. They ‘require that 
something be realized to the greatest extent possible given the legal and 
factual possibilities’.14
Understanding this distinction is important in the context of this book, 
because conflicts of either rules or principles are resolved in fundamentally 
different ways. When principles collide, they have to be balanced against 
each other.15 Ultimately, one principle will outweigh the other. Under 
certain circumstances, the freedom of contract may, for instance, be of 
greater weight than the principle of equal treatment. This does not mean 
that the principle of equal treatment carries no weight at all, but only that 
it carries less weight than the freedom of contract in the given case. Rules, 
by contrast, do not have a dimension of weight. They are applicable ‘in an 
all-or-nothing fashion’.16 This means that a conflict between applicable rules 
can only be solved by amending or excluding one of them. To stick to the 
example: a contractual clause is either valid or it is null and void because 
10 This conclusion is also drawn by: Von Tuhr 1923, p. 17-18; Dietz 1934, p. 17; Meijers 
1948, p. 161; Boukema 1966, p. 2; Georgiades 1968, p. 98-99; Snijders 1973, p. 454; Pels 
Rijcken 1980, p. 1101; Brunner 1984, p. 1; Weir 1984, p. 3; Boukema 1992, p. 3-4; Schmid 
1996; Klein 1997, p. 18-19; Burrows 1998, p. 20; Huber 2001, p. 177; Harris 2002, p. 575-576; 
Gruber 2004, p. 229-258; Nieuwenhuis 2007b, p. 3; Bakels 2009a, p. 337; Tricoire 2009, p. 11; 
Burrows 2011; Mauchle 2012, p. 934; Neuner 2012, p. 239; Mauclair 2013; Laroche 2014, 
p. 12; Cartwright 2017, p. 11; Davies 2018b; Castermans & Krans 2019, p. 1-6.
11 Scholten 1974, p. 12-13; Dworkin 1977, p. 24; MacCormick 1978, p. 19-52; Larenz 1992, 
p. 138-145; Smith 2004, p. 153; Alexy 2010, p. 48.
12 Art. 1240 CC. This translation is based on the translation by John Cartwright, Bénédicte 
Fauvarque-Cosson & Simon Whittaker, see www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/THE-LAW-
OF-CONTRACT-2-5-16.pdf.
13 Dworkin 1977, p. 25-26 and p. 72.
14 Alexy 2010, p. 47.
15 Dworkin 1977, p. 26-27; Alexy 2010, p. 49.
16 Dworkin 1977, p. 24.
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it violates a rule that prohibits unequal treatment.17 These outcomes are 
incompatible, so a choice must be made between them.
Here, the distinction between rules and principles is used for analytical 
purposes only. It is not our intention to suggest that the interpretation of 
legal rules is predetermined and fixed. There will be room for interpreta-
tion when deciding whether the facts fall within the scope of application 
of a legal rule and whether its conditions have been fulfilled.18 Nor do we 
wish to suggest that rules will automatically be applied once their condi-
tions have been fulfilled. Rules do not enforce themselves. Their application 
necessarily involves an exercise of choice by the parties concerned and by 
the courts who are, to some extent, bound by the facts stated by them.19 The 
reader should be aware that the issue of concurrence may not arise if it has 
not been pleaded.20
Having established that the overlap of legal rules lies at the heart of the 
phenomenon of concurrence in private law, the next section will examine 
the kinds of rules which make up a modern system of private law. What 
kinds of rights and duties do they create?
2.3 Claims, powers, defences
The previous section examined the distinction between rules and principles, 
and explained that we are concerned with the concurrence of legal rules. 
And indeed, private relationships are governed by many different rules, 
from many different sources. Not all these rules, however, appear to be 
relevant in the present context. Therefore, this section will venture on an 
analysis of the kinds of rules which play a central role when adjudicating 
disputes between individuals in modern systems of private law.
According to one theory, articulated by John Austin (1790-1859) and 
endorsed by Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), the whole of the law – and thus of 
private law – can be reduced to rules which order individuals to do or not 
to do certain things. On this view, every rule ‘properly so called’ imposes a 
duty to obey a command on the threat of a sanction.21 The attention is fixed 
on the rules which stipulate the sanction that follows in the event of non-
17 As stipulated by e.g. Art. 7:646 (11) BW.
18 This is uncontroversial (see e.g. Hart 1961, p. 12-13, 121-132; Scholten 1974, p. 7-12; 
Dworkin 1977, p. 81-130; MacCormick 1978, p. 36; Wiarda 1988, p. 19-31). It is a matter 
of contention whether these ‘hard’ cases should be decided on the basis of authoritative 
moral principles (Dworkin) or on the basis of authoritative social standards (Hart). It is 
beyond the scope of this section to consider this debate in detail.
19 As emphasised by, among others, Kelsen 1945, p. 81-83; Scholten 1974, p. 25; MacCormick 
1978, p. 46-47.
20 See, among others, Guest 1961, p. 194-195; Nieuwenhuis 2007b, p. 1-6; Castermans & 
Krans 2009, p. 157-159; Bakels 2009a, p. 344; Burrows 2011, p. 3.
21 Austin 1880, p. 11-12; Kelsen 1945, p. 61.
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compliance with a command.22 Indeed, the threat of a sanction is essential. It 
surfaces again when Austin distinguishes ‘primary’ rights and duties from 
‘secondary’ rights and duties. In his view, secondary rights and duties arise 
from violations of primary rights and duties. Austin calls these secondary 
rights ‘remedial’ and ‘sanctioning’.23
It is questionable, however, whether the whole of law really be reduced 
to duties, commands, and sanctions. Herbert L.A. Hart (1907-1992) has 
rejected this view. He has pointed out that many rules do not impose 
duties but rather provide individuals with the possibility to create rights 
and duties.24 In his view, any modern legal system consists of a union of 
both duty-imposing and power-conferring rules.25 The same distinction 
has been made by the American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879-
1918).26 Troubled as he was by the indiscriminate use of the words ‘rights’ 
and ‘duties’,27 Hohfeld proposed a structure of eight ‘correlative’ concepts 
which can be arranged in two groups.28 Within his theory of fundamental 
legal conceptions, the distinction between claims and powers plays a central 
role.
In its narrowest sense, Hohfeld used the term right (or claim) as the 
correlative of the term duty. If someone has a claim, another person is under 
a duty to behave in a certain way.29 Consider, for instance, the claim for 
specific performance and the claim for compensation. From an analytical 
perspective, such a claim must be distinguished from a power, that is the 
capacity of a person to unilaterally create, modify or extinguish a legal 
position or relationship, and so to create, modify or extinguish claims and 
powers.30 Consider, for instance, the termination of a contract for breach, 
the rescission of a contract for pre-contractual misrepresentation, and the 
possibility to extinguish a claim by setoff. The distinction between claims 
and powers becomes apparent if we take the view of the person affected. 
Hohfeld demonstrated that this person is not under a duty to behave in a 
certain way, but is subjected to the liability that the power will be exercised. 
In his view, therefore, the correlative of a power is not a duty but a liability.31
22 For a contemporary example in the fi eld of private law, see Van Nispen 2018, p. 1-2.
23 Austin 1880, p. 373-374. Kelsen 1945, p. 62-64, has argued that the order should be 
reversed. If the sanction is an essential element of the law, then the rules which stipulate 
sanctions must be called ‘primary’ and the other rules ‘secondary’.
24 Hart 1961, p. 26-48.
25 Hart 1961, p. 77-96.
26 See also Hart 1972, p. 800-801. Hart was also inspired by Bentham, who distinguished 
between coercive laws and permissive laws, and within the latter category between liber-
ties and powers (Bentham 1970, p. 200-201, 290-291).
27 Hohfeld 1913b, p. 28.
28 Lawson 1977, p. 2.
29 Hohfeld 1913b, p. 30-32; Hohfeld 1917, p. 717.
30 Hohfeld 1913b, p. 44-54.
31 As this is ‘a well-known legal term with long-settled meanings’, Pound 1959, p. 81, has 
suggested to use the term risk instead.
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Hohfeld was not the first to distinguish claims and powers. He built on 
the works of John William Salmond (1862-1924),32 who adopted the distinc-
tion, made by Bernhard Windscheid (1817-1892),33 between claims and 
powers.34 The first concept has been developed by Windscheid himself35 
and still forms the backbone of the German Civil Code, which defines the 
claim – the Anspruch – as ‘Das Recht, von einem anderen ein Tun oder 
Unterlassen zu verlangen (…)’.36 Under certain conditions, a person may be 
entitled to demand some performance from another person, such as specific 
performance,37 restitution38 or compensation.39 The power of an individual 
to unilaterally create, modify or extinguish a legal position or relationship 
has been recognised as a separate legal concept ever since the works of Emil 
Seckel (1864-1924), who used the term Gestaltungsrecht.40 This concept is not 
as established in other continental jurisdictions, although it is not unusual 
for a Dutch writer to refer to wilsrechten41 or for a French writer to refer to 
droits potestatifs.42
In line with these theories, we will devote our attention not only 
to claims but also to powers. But we will also incorporate elements of a 
different character. For the relationship between two persons cannot be 
fully understood without paying attention to the position of the person 
affected by the existence of a claim or by the exercise of a power.43 Consider 
the situation that a legal dispute arises and the case is taken to court. It is a 
well-established rule in all jurisdictions that if a matter is taken to court, it is 
up to the claimant to allege the elements of the relevant rule of law in order 
32 Salmond 1902, p. 217-238.
33 Windscheid 1862, p. 81.
34 See, about the roots of Hohfeld’s scheme, Kocourek 1920, p. 25; Pound 1959, p. 76-77; 
Frydrych 2018, p. 329-331.
35 Windscheid 1856, p. 3-7.
36 § 194 (1) BGB.
37 E.g. § 433 (1) BGB gives the buyer the right to demand from the seller the delivery of 
possession and ownership of the thing, free from material and legal defects (Anspruch 
auf Übergabe und Übereignung einer mangelfreien Kaufsache). In turn, § 433 (2) BGB gives 
the seller the right to demand from the buyer payment of the price and acceptance of the 
delivery of the thing (Anspruch auf Kaufpreiszahlung und Abnahme der Kaufsache).
38 E.g. § 985 BGB gives the owner the right to require the possessor to return the thing 
(Herausgabeanspruch).
39 E.g. § 823 (1) BGB gives the person that is intentionally or negligently injured by another 
party the right to claim compensation from that party for the resulting damage (Schadens-
ersatz aus unerlaubter Handlung).
40 Seckel 1903. See about this development Hattenhauer 2011, p. 197 et seq., and about the 
distinction between Ansprüche and Gestaltungsrechte Neuner 2012, p. 219-223.
41 Rupke 1914; Drielsma 1940; Drielsma 1946; Meijers 1948, p. 266; Suijling 1948, p. 102-107; 
Drielsma 1975; Mellema-Kranenburg 1988, p. 8; Snijders 1999; Nieuwenhuis 2007a, 
p. 52-53; Biemans 2011, p. 193-195; Bartels & Van Mierlo 2013, no. 2; Spierings 2016; Verheul
2017; Van Nispen 2018, p. 52-54, 59-61; Verheul 2018.
42 Najjar 1967, p. 100 et seq.; Bénac-Schmidt 1983, p. 114 et seq.; Pomart-Nomdedeo 2010; 
Lefer 2016. See also Vaquer 2009, p. 496-497, with references to Italian and Spanish law.
43 See also supra section 1.3.
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to obtain the result sought.44 Even though he is not required to mention the 
rule by its name, it will be up to him to demonstrate – by reference to the 
relevant standards of proof – that the facts that are necessary for a certain 
rule to become operative have occurred and that the court must, therefore, 
conclude that a claim exists or that a power has been lawfully exercised.45 In 
turn, the defendant may be able to rely upon a defence. And just as a single 
set of facts can, on the face of it, give rise to multiple claims or powers, so 
too may several defences arise in a given case.46
Some defences relate to procedural issues such as the competence of 
the court, the validity of the claim form, or the expiry of the period for 
appeal. In the present context, we are particularly interested in the defences 
pertaining to the merits of the case. The defendant may cast doubt on the 
facts presented by the claimant and argue that one or more elements of the 
cause of action in which the claimant sues are not present. Alternatively, he 
may rely upon a justification or an exemption. The defendant may also be 
able to prevent or limit the actual enforcement of the claim or power, for 
instance by pleading the defence of limitation of the right of action. The 
question to consider, is how these defences relate to each other and how 
they interact with the elements that make up a successful claim or power. 
We should, therefore, not only consider the rules that may serve as grounds 
of claims and powers, but also the rules that can be invoked as defences.47
It should be admitted at once that this vocabulary does have its limi-
tations. On the one hand, it may be thought of as too specific because it 
does not cover all the laws in the codes and all the cases in the law reports. 
Emphasis is laid on claims, powers, and defences, and the remaining rules 
are seen through this particular lens. On the other hand, the vocabulary 
may be rejected because it is over inclusive and does not take into account 
the many fine distinctions existing within the separate categories. Indeed, 
44 As noted by e.g. MacCormick 1978, p. 41-52. In most continental legal systems, this rule 
is enshrined in statutory provisions (e.g. in France in Art. 1353 CC; in the Netherlands 
in Art. 150 Rv). In Germany, the rule goes by the name of the Normentheorie (Rosenberg 
1956, p. 153).
45 Unless, of course, the claimant requests a declaratory decision that he is not under a legal 
duty towards the defendant, or that the exercise of a power by the defendant was not 
valid.
46 Already noted by Von Tuhr 1923, p. 18. The defence stage has received more scholarly 
attention in recent years: Nieuwenhuis 1997, p. 15-16; Bakels 2009a, p. 337; Neuner 2012, 
p. 242-245; Goudkamp 2013, p. 19-20, 202; Smith 2016.
47 See also supra section 1.3.
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the categories can be subdivided indefinitely48 and may even coexist.49 
Finally, the terminology is not widely used in all legal systems that have 
been examined in the context of this research. In fact, thinking in terms of 
claims, powers, and defences is only deeply engrained in Germany.50
And yet it would be quite a task to make sense of the mass of legal rules 
if we were to approach the topic without this focus. Using the vocabulary 
allows for analysis and comparison.51 It calls our attention to the rules 
that play a central role in private relationships – claims, powers, defences –
whether they are statutory or judge-made, discovered or developed, avail-
able only inside the courts or also outside the courts. And when these rules 
overlap, their relationship must be determined.
2.4 General and specific rules: LEX SPECIALIS DEROGAT LEGI GENERALI?
Having examined the kinds of rules we are dealing with – claims, powers, 
defences – we will now consider the situation where they overlap. Such an 
overlap does not give rise to problems as long as the application of the rules 
leads to the same outcome. Yet the rules may vary in certain ways, which 
may lead to different results. The question to consider is whether one legal 
rule affects the scope of application of another legal rule. In this context, it is 
often assumed that the specific rule trumps the application of the rule more 
general in scope. But when is that really the case?
The maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali or specialia generalibus derogant 
appeals more to civil lawyers than it does to common lawyers. Common 
lawyers focus on the facts of each case and on the particular rules estab-
lished by courts in earlier decisions. They are not principally interested 
in systematic and abstract reasoning based on general rules of law.52 By 
48 This was recognised already by Hohfeld himself (see Hohfeld 1917, p. 712). As regards 
claims, for instance, further distinctions can be made between proprietary and obligatory 
claims (dingliche und schuldrechtliche Ansprüche), and still further between primary and 
secondary obligations (Pothier 1773, p. 80), or between legal and equitable relationships 
(Hohfeld 1913a, p. 553). Further distinctions can also be made at the defence stage, e.g. 
between procedural and meritorious defences, and within the latter category between 
defences pertaining to the existence of a claim (Einwendungen) and defences pertaining 
to its enforcement (Einreden), and again within the former category between justifi ca-
tory and excusatory defences (Neuner 2012, p. 242-245). Consider also the distinction, 
made by Martín-Casals 2019a, p. 769, between ‘absent element defences’ and ‘affi rmative 
defences’. The fi rst term refers to ‘those cases where the claimant fails to establish a basic 
requirement of liability’, the second term to defences that apply ‘when all the require-
ments for liability are established’.
49 Some powers may in substance operate as a defence against the exercise of a claim or 
power. E.g. the defendant may elect to rescind the contract that forms the basis of the 
claim.
50 Ebers 2016, p. 53.
51 See also supra section 1.3.
52 Zweigert & Kötz 1992, p. 188.
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contrast, civil lawyers have grown up with the idea that the answers to legal 
questions must be deduced from a comprehensive collection of statutory 
rules.53 The German Civil Code may serve as an example. Its General Part 
contains basic rules common to the whole of private law. The four subse-
quent books provide general rules on obligations, property, family law, and 
succession. These books have been split up into divisions, titles, subtitles 
and chapters, each offering a set of rules for various factual situations. Obvi-
ously, such a codification is an inexhaustible source of controversy about the 
proper relationship of general and specific rules.
Thus, it is in the context of codifications that the maxim that specific 
rules derogate from general rules has attracted considerable attention and 
appreciation.54 And it must be admitted that it only seems natural – perhaps 
even logical – to assume that specific rules have priority over general rules 
because the former must be considered exceptions to or special applications 
of the latter. In modern times, however, many writers warn that the applica-
tion of the maxim is not self-evident. It has been branded as meaningless,55 
misleading,56 overrated,57 and utterly unreliable.58 Indeed, one may wonder 
just how persuasive the maxim really is.
To begin with, the maxim can really only be relied upon when one rule 
is general and another rule is specific. It is widely accepted that this is only 
the case when the lex specialis contains all the elements of the lex generalis 
and at least one additional element. In other words: the general rule must 
embrace all the cases falling within the scope of the specific rule, but the 
specific rule may not embrace all the cases falling within the scope of the 
general rule.59 The relationship between the Articles 6:2 (2) and 6:248 (2) 
BW may serve as an example. Both provisions state that a binding legal 
rule does not apply if this would be unacceptable according to standards 
of reasonableness and fairness. In two respects, Article 6:248 (2) BW is more 
specific in scope. First, it applies only to the parties to a contract whereas 
Article 6:2 (2) BW applies to all creditors and debtors. Secondly, it focuses 
only on the rules binding upon the contracting parties whereas Article 6:2 
(2) BW embraces all rules binding upon creditors and debtors by virtue of 
statute, custom or legal act. Compared to Article 6:2 (2) BW, Article 6:248 (2) 
BW is clearly the more specific rule.
53 Zimmermann 1995, p. 96-97.
54 See e.g. Kamphuisen 1942; Van Oven 1961.
55 Boukema 1966, p. 35; Kisch 1975, p. 540.
56 Brunner 1984, p. 14-15; Goldie-Genicon 2009, p. 448.
57 Faust 2017.
58 Nieuwenhuis 1982, p. 35.
59 Lent 1912, p. 12; Dietz 1934, p. 22; Kamphuisen 1942, p. 326; Meijers 1948, p. 161; Gassin 
1961, p. 91; Boukema 1966, p. 26; Brunner 1984, p. 17-18; Bydlinski 1991, p. 465; Boukema 
1992, p. 7-11; Bergel 2001, p. 192; Huber 2001, p. 203-208; Goldie-Genicon 2009, p. 470; 
Laroche 2014, p. 308; Castermans & Krans 2019, p. 15.
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The example underlines the limited value of the maxim. If the rules 
produce the same outcome, there is really no compelling reason why Article 
6:248 (2) BW should automatically trump the application of Article 6:2 (2) 
BW. Moreover, the overlap can be considered harmless if the lex specialis 
merely complements the lex generalis.60 Thus, it is clear that some conflict 
must exist in order for one of the rules to make way.61 But even if a conflict 
exists, it cannot be taken for granted that the legislature intended the 
specific rule to trump the general rule. It may have been the intention to 
improve the position of the aggrieved party.
This implies that the substantive importance of the rules at issue 
must be considered.62 Essentially, the question is whether the specific 
rule demands the subsidiarity of the general rule.63 According to some 
writers, the specific rule is subsidiary in nature when its consequences are 
less advantageous for the claimant than the consequences imposed by the 
general rule.64 If a choice would be allowed in these instances, the claimant 
will always avoid the application of the specific rule, so the argument runs. 
In practice it will, however, be hard to assess whether the specific rule is 
really less advantageous. Every rule has its merits and demerits.65 And even 
if the specific rule appears to be less advantageous, it is not self-evident 
that the person concerned wishes to avoid the application of this rule. There 
may be practical reasons not to rely upon a particular rule, even if a more 
advantageous possibility is available too.66
A more convincing argument for excluding the general rule is that the 
intentions of the legislature would otherwise be undermined. The question 
to consider is whether the legislature has really intended a particular rule to 
be exhaustive.67 This is a question of interpretation which must be answered 
on the basis of the wordings, structure, and aims of the rules at issue. Even 
when the legislature has intended a particular rule to be exhaustive, the 
other rule should only be excluded to the extent that this is necessary in 
order to do justice to these intentions, as the Bundesgerichtshof emphasises:
‘Eine abweichende Beurteilung ist zwar geboten, wenn einer Vorschrift zu ent-
nehmen ist, dass sie einen Sachverhalt erschöpfend regeln und dementspre-
chend die Haftung aus anderen Anspruchsgrundlagen ausschließen oder in 
bestimmter Hinsicht beschränken will (…).‘68
60 Boukema 1966, p. 27-28; Boukema 1992, p. 11-12; Goldie-Genicon 2009, p. 471; Caster-
mans & Krans 2019, p. 18.
61 Goldie-Genicon 2009, p. 471.
62 Alexy 2010, p. 49.
63 Dietz 1934.
64 Boukema 1966, p. 28-29.
65 As observed e.g. by Serinet 1996, p. 818; Huber 2001, p. 227; Goldie-Genicon 2009, p. 518.
66 Bussy-Dunaud 1988, p. 277; Leduc 2000, p. 23; Huber 2001, p. 209; Goldie-Genicon 2009, 
p. 476-477.
67 Castermans & Krans 2019, p. 17-21.
68 BGH 22 July 2014, KZR 27/13, at 53.
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The foregoing illustrates that it is far from self-evident that a specific 
rule trumps the application of a rule more general in scope. Even if the 
general rule embraces all the cases falling within the scope of the specific 
rule, which is not always the case, the question as to whether the specific 
rule sets aside the general rule is a question of interpretation which cannot 
be answered by relying upon the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali. 
Rather, we should start from the premise that each rule – whether general 
or specific in scope – should be realised to the greatest possible extent. The 
next section will demonstrate that this is, indeed, the approach taken in the 
legal systems under consideration.
2.5 An alternative scheme of analysis
Does one legal rule affect the scope of application of another legal rule? It 
appears that legal systems share a scheme of analysis by which this question 
can be debated and solved. Once a case falls within the substantive scope of 
multiple rules, the starting point is that each rule must be considered on its 
own merits and that no rule should be excluded in advance.69 The Bundes-
gerichtshof in particular has stressed time and again that the conditions, 
content and enforcement of each claim must be assessed independently:
‘Sofern eine Handlung die Tatbestände mehrerer anspruchsbegründender Nor-
men erfüllt, treten die daraus resultierenden Ansprüche, soweit sie auf dasselbe 
Ziel gerichtet sind, grundsätzlich in so genannter echter Anspruchskonkurrenz 
nebeneinander, mit der Folge, dass jeder Anspruch nach seinen Voraussetzun-
gen, seinem Inhalt und seiner Durchsetzung selbständig zu beurteilen ist und 
seinen eigenen Regeln folgt (…).’70
The underlying principle is that the objectives of each rule should be 
realised to the greatest possible extent. This basic principle implies that each 
rule ought to have its intended legal effect, provided, of course, that the 
necessary elements have been established. French lawyers refer to the prin-
ciple of cumul,71 German lawyers to kumulative Konkurrenz,72 Dutch lawyers 
to cumulatie73 and English lawyers to cumulation or combination.74
69 Edelman 2002, p. 264; Cartwright 2017, p. 11. See also the statement by Lord Herschell in 
Derry v. Peek [1889] 14 App Cas 337 (HL), at 359-360.
70 BGH 22 July 2014, KZR 27/13, at 53. It is settled case law: BGH 16 May 2017, X ZR 120/15, 
at 13; BGH 19 October 2004, X ZR 142/03, at 7; BGH 11 February 2004, VIII ZR 386/02, at 
12; BGH 16 September 1987, VIII ZR 334/86, at 17; BGH 28 April 1953, I ZR 47/52, at 4.
71 Carbonnier 1961, p. 332-333; Bussy-Dunaud 1988, p. 123-128; Goldie-Genicon 2009, 
p. 155; Tricoire 2009, p. 257-261; Laroche 2014, p. 369.
72 Enneccerus & Nipperdey 1952, p. 217; Larenz 1992, p. 157; Neuner 2012, p. 239-240.
73 Boukema 1966, p. 22; Snijders 1973, p. 454; Brunner 1984, p. 10; Boukema 1992, p. 11-12; 
Vranken 1998, no. 34; Bakels 2009a, p. 342; Hartkamp 2011, p. 154; Van Nispen 2018, p. 20.
74 Cartwright 1991, p. 141-148; Watterson 2003; Burrows 2004, p. 14-16; Burrows 2016, 
p. 163; Cartwright 2017, p. 17-18.
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Many examples can be given. A contracting party may terminate the
contract and also recover the losses resulting from the breach, as is the 
case under French law.75 Or he may obtain rescission of the contract and 
also claim damages in the tort of deceit, as is the case under English law.76 
Under German law, the owner may claim back his object from the possessor, 
claim any profits made and also claim compensation if the object has been 
damaged.77 In all these instances, the claims and powers can be accumu-
lated if the party concerned so wishes. This does not mean that the applica-
tion of one rule cannot impact upon the application of another rule.78 The 
rescission of a contract may, for instance, affect the extent of the recoverable 
losses.79 Likewise, an award of damages under one head of liability must be 
taken into account when assessing the quantum of damages under another 
head of liability.80 But these are not sufficient reasons to exclude the applica-
tion of one of these rules from the outset. To do so would be ‘an unneces-
sarily blunt method of avoiding double recovery’, as Burrows has argued.81
Sometimes, however, the rules cannot be applied cumulatively, but only 
alternatively. French lawyers use the term option,82 German lawyers refer to 
alternative Konkurrenz83 or to elektive Konkurrenz,84 Dutch lawyers to alterna-
tiviteit85 and English lawyers to the election between alternative remedies.86 
Neuner gives the following explanation:
‘Mitunter stellt das Gesetz jemandem zwei oder mehrere Ansprüche oder 
Gestaltungsrechte wahlweise zur Verfügung. (…) Die Rechtsfolgen der wahl-
weisen Ansprüche oder Gestaltungsrechte schlieβen sich aus, sie können also 
nicht nebeneinander verwirklicht werden. Der Berechtigte hat aber zunächst ein 
Bündel an Rechten.’87
There may be several reasons for rules to be alternatives. The legislature may, 
for instance, have designed the rules to be mutually exclusive.88 Cumulative 
application may also lead to inconsistent outcomes. It is logically impos-
75 Art. 1217 CC.
76 Archer v. Brown [1985] Q.B. 401 at 415 et seq.; Cartwright 2017, p. 86-88.
77 § 985, § 987 and § 989 BGB.
78 Dietz 1934, p. 334; Boukema 1966, p. 22.
79 Cartwright 1991, p. 143; Cartwright 2017, p. 17.
80 Burrows 1998, p. 43-44.
81 Burrows 1998, p. 41.
82 Popesco-Albota 1933; Martine 1957; Bussy-Dunaud 1988, p. 117-123; Viney 1994; Goldie-
Genicon 2009, p. 155; Tricoire 2009, p. 257-261; Abid Mnif 2014; Laroche 2014, p. 14.
83 Enneccerus & Nipperdey 1952, p. 217; Larenz 1992, p. 157.
84 Wiese 2017, p. 233-234.
85 Boukema 1966, p. 22; Snijders 1973, p. 454; Brunner 1984, p. 10; Boukema 1992, p. 12-13; 
Hartkamp 2011, p. 154; Van Nispen 2018, p. 20-21.
86 Stevens 1996; Watterson 2003.
87 Neuner 2012, p. 240.
88 E.g. section 2 (2) Misrepresentation Act 1967; § 284 and § 437 BGB; Art. 7:21 (1) BW; Art. 
1217 CC; Art. 1644 CC.
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sible to rescind a voidable contract and also terminate the same contract. 
Likewise, it is not possible to rescind a contract and also claim damages for 
breach of contract.89 After all, rescission means that the contract is retro-
spectively reversed while termination and damages for breach presuppose 
the existence of a contractual relationship.90 Another classic example is the 
impossible combination of termination for breach and specific performance 
of the same contract.91 Similarly, it is not possible to set aside a general term 
and also nullify the same term.92 One simply cannot have both.
Can two liability rules ever lead to inconsistent outcomes? Although 
a double recovery of the losses can – and should – often be prevented by 
adjusting the quantum of damages, some differences cannot be bridged at 
this stage. English law does not, for instance, permit the award of both an 
account of profits and compensatory damages for an intellectual property 
tort.93 Nor may damages in contract and tort be combined. The reason is 
that the rules pull in different directions: damages in contract aim to bring 
the party in a position as if the contract had been performed (positive 
interest) whereas damages in tort aim to bring the party in a position as 
if no tort had been committed (negative interest).94 The regimes may also 
differ with regard to incidental issues such as limitation, jurisdiction, proof, 
remoteness and the range of available defences.95 In such situations, the 
claimant may be required to clarify which rule he wishes to rely upon as his 
first line of argument.
Sometimes, the law dictates that one of the rules takes priority. French
lawyers describe this outcome with the term non-cumul or exclusion,96 
German lawyers refer to normverdrängende Konkurrenz97 or Gesetzes konkur-
renz,98 Dutch lawyers to exclusiviteit99 and English lawyers to exclusion.100 
The principle of non-cumul des responsabilités contractuelle et délictuelle is 
89 HR 11 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:CA3765, NJ 2013/492 (Vano/Foreburghstaete), at 
3.5.2.
90 Cartwright 2017, p. 18.
91 Burrows 1998, p. 41.
92 HR 14 June 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE0659, NJ 2003/112 (Bramer/Hofman Beheer).
93 Burrows 1998, p. 42; Edelman 2002, p. 248. Along similar lines: HR 14 April 2000, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2000:AA5519, NJ 2000/489 (HBS Trading/Spendax), at 3.3.5.
94 See generally Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, p. 33. See also Cartwright 1991, p. 141; 
Boukema 1992, p. 18; Krans 1999, p. 131-132; Hartkamp 2011, p. 154.
95 For instance, a claim in deceit under English law cannot be met by a defence of contribu-
tory negligence, which might apply to a concurrent claim in negligence or under the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967. See Cartwright 2017, p. 158.
96 Goldie-Genicon 2009, p. 195; Tricoire 2009, p. 317-318.
97 Enneccerus & Nipperdey 1952, p. 217; Larenz 1992, p. 157;
98 Dietz 1934, p. 16. It must be noted that this term has also been used to describe the overlap 
of multiple rules rather than the exclusivity of one of them, e.g. by Lent 1912, p. 12
et seq.; Enneccerus & Nipperdey 1952, p. 217-218.
99 Boukema 1966, p. 22; Snijders 1973, p. 454; Brunner 1984, p. 10; Boukema 1992, p. 11-12; 
Bakels 2009a, p. 342; Hartkamp 2011, p. 154; Van Nispen 2018, p. 20; Castermans & Krans 
2019, p. 91-114.
100 Burrows 1998, p. 20.
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probably the most famous example: it prescribes that the French law of tort 
is not applicable to losses suffered in the context of a contractual relation-
ship. Although German, Dutch and English courts have not chosen the 
same solution for this particular problem,101 they do recognise the possi-
bility of excluding one of the applicable rules. The courts do, however, use 
the technique with great restraint. The Bundesgerichtshof and the Hoge Raad 
focus on the will of the legislature: was the intention really to exclude the 
application of other available rules?102 English law focuses on the will of the 
parties: did they really intend their relationship to be governed exclusively 
by the contract into which they entered?103
Instead of ignoring one of the applicable rules altogether, the courts may 
also adjust their scopes of application. The Cour de Cassation, for instance, 
declared the short time limit of Article 1648 CC – applicable to claims 
related to hidden defects of goods – also applicable to the action en nullité 
pour erreur.104 Likewise, the Hoge Raad confirmed that the short time limit 
of Article 7:23 (2) BW – applicable to the buyer’s claims and defences based 
on the breach of a sales contract – may also apply to claims based on extra-
contractual liability, misrepresentation and fraud.105 The Bundesgerichtshof 
has regularly used this technique too. It has decided, for instance, that the 
rule that the donor (Schenker, § 521 BGB), the lender (Verleiher, § 599 BGB) 
and the board (Geschäftsführung, § 680 BGB) can only be held liable in the 
event of wilful conduct (Vorsatz) or gross negligence (grobe Fahrlässigkeit) 
also applies to a tort claim against these people.106 A similar approach has 
essentially been adopted by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales when 
it decided that the ‘reasonable contemplation’ test in contract also applies 
to a concurrent claim in negligence for pure economic loss,107 and by the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom when it decided that the existence of 
a contract determines the scope of a concurrent equitable custodial duty.108
101 This will be further explained in Chapter 3 of this book.
102 BGH 17 March 1987, VI ZR 282/85, at 37-38; BGH 12 December 1991, I ZR 212/89, at 
10; BGH 22 July 2014, KZR 27/13, at 53; and HR 28 June 1957, NJ 1957/514, note L.E.H. 
Rutten (Erba/Amsterdamsche Bank); HR 15 November 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE8194, 
NJ 2003/48, note J.B.M. Vranken (A.V.O./Petri), at 3.7.2; HR 15 June 2007, ECLI:NL:
HR:2007:BA1414, NJ 2007/621, note K.F. Haak (Fernhout/Essent), at 4.2.
103 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL).
104 Cass. 1e Civ. 19 July 1960, Bull. civ., I. no. 408; RTD civ. 1961. 332, note J. Carbonnier; Cass. 
3e Civ. 11 February 1981, Bull. civ., III, no. 31; D. 1981. IR. 440, note Ch. Larroumet. The 
Cour de Cassation later changed its position, see Goldie-Genicon 2009, p. 165-171.
105 HR 21 April 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AW2582, NJ 2006/272 (Inno/Sluis); HR 29 June 2007, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ7617, NJ 2008/606, note J. Hijma (Pouw/Visser); HR 23 November 
2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BB3733, NJ 2008/552-553, note H.J. Snijders (Ploum/Smeets); HR 
17 November 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2902, NJ 2017/438 (MBS Raad).
106 BGH 23 March 1966, BGHZ 46, 140; BGH 30 November 1972, NJW 1972, 475; BGH 20 
November 1984, BGHZ 93, 23.
107 Wellesley Partners LLP v. Withers LLP [2015] EWCACiv 1146.
108 AIB Group (UK) v. Mark Redler & Co Solicitors, [2015] AC 1503 (UKSC), analysed in more 
detail by Taylor 2019, p. 36-41.
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The resulting rule contains elements of both bodies of law but is quite 
different from its components. Writers have coined new terms to describe 
this effect, such as contorts,109 mixed claims,110 and Anspruchsnormenkonkur-
renz.111 Writers with a preference for all things dogmatic, however, argue 
that the resulting hybrids do not fit the existing categories of the law. 
Goldie-Genicon, for instance, strongly disapproves of the fusion of general 
and specific rules of contract:
‘La mise en œuvre d’une telle technique a un effet radical : elle retire tout enjeu 
au concours d’actions. Le plaideur n’aura plus aucun intérêt à agir sur le ter-
rain du droit commun. L’option entre les deux actions est maintenue, mais elle 
est illusoire. (…) Par une sorte de mariage contre nature, elle crée une action 
nouvelle qui emprunte aux deux corps de règles, et méconnait les contours de 
chaque action définis par le législateur.’112
It is clear that the ‘fusion’ of two bodies of law provokes strong reactions. 
Yet the approach has much to recommend it. Rather than defying the will 
of the legislature or acting contrary to precedent, the courts try to do justice 
to the objectives underlying each rule. They reduce the restrictions imposed 
by the prioritised rule to a minimum and retain as much of the other rule as 
possible. This may be particularly useful when the prioritised rule shows 
gaps and, hence, does not provide all the answers. As a result, the claimant 
may still benefit from the application of the rule of his choice. Contrary to 
what Goldie-Genicon contends, this choice has not become illusory: the claim 
is not declared inadmissible and the arguments have not been put forward 
without reason. At the same time, the defences invoked by the defendant 
are taken into account, even when they belong to a different legal regime.
The examples illustrate that the courts consider a total rejection of 
concurrence an unnecessarily blunt instrument. They strive to realise every 
applicable rule to the greatest possible extent. Consequently, the existence of 
alternative and exclusive rules is an exception which requires justification. 
It flows from this reasoning that the party concerned – usually the claimant 
– may rely on the most advantageous rule – usually a specific cause of 
action – unless the rules are incompatible or one of them applies exclusively. 
We have seen that the benefit of this choice may nonetheless be affected, 
because the content of one rule might affect the content of another rule.113 
This does not mean that the rules are identical in all respects, nor that one 
of the rules is swallowed up by the other. The rules continue to exist side by 
side, in accordance with the basic principle that each rule ought to have its 
intended effect.
109 Gilmore 1974, p. 88, 90 and 94.
110 Snijders 1973; Nieuwenhuis 1982.
111 Georgiades 1968.
112 Goldie-Genicon 2009, p. 165.
113 Also observed by Taylor 2019, p. 21 and 45.
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2.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to uncover the principles that must be 
taken into account when solving issues of concurrence in private law. Before 
examining this question, we have first taken a step back and analysed in 
more detail the kinds of rules which play a central role when adjudicating 
disputes between individuals in modern systems of private law. Drawing 
on insights from analytical jurisprudence and general theories of law, this 
chapter has distinguished three categories of rules. We have examined the 
claims which entitle the individual to demand some performance from 
another individual, such as the claim for specific performance and the claim 
for compensation. Secondly, we have focused on the powers by which an 
individual may unilaterally create, modify or extinguish a legal position or 
relationship, such as the power to terminate a contract. Thirdly, we have 
adopted the perspective of the person affected and examined the defences 
by which the enforcement of such claims and powers can be prevented.
These claims, powers, and defences have been built up over the years, 
sometimes even without any serious consideration by legislatures or courts 
of adjacent rules and accompanying principles. And even when attempts 
have been made to build a coherent system, notably in codified systems of 
private law, the rules may still overlap. Such an overlap does not give rise to 
problems as long as the application of the rules leads to the same outcome. 
Yet the rules may vary in important ways, which may lead to different 
results. In such situations, the question is raised whether one rule affects the 
scope of application of another rule. This question arises regularly, both on 
the part of the claimant and on the part of the defendant. The problem of 
concurrence may be unwelcome, but it is clearly ineradicable.
The question is how we should solve it. One response is to assume 
that specific rules have precedence over rules more general in scope. This 
chapter has submitted that it is appropriate to adopt a cautious approach 
in this respect and to avoid jumping to this conclusion. To begin with, the 
maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali can really only be relied upon when 
one rule is general and another rule is specific. It is widely accepted that 
this is only the case when the general rule embraces all the cases falling 
within the scope of the specific rule. But even if that is the case, the ques-
tion as to whether the specific rule trumps the general rule is a question of 
interpretation which cannot be answered by assuming that the specific rule 
will have priority. Rather, this chapter has argued that we should start from 
the premise that each rule – whether general or specific in scope – should be 
realised to the greatest possible extent.
The chapter has shown that this is, indeed, the approach taken in the 
legal systems under consideration. They share a number of basic responses 
when dealing with the availability of claims, powers, and defences in rela-
tionships between individuals. Together they provide a scheme of analysis 
by which issues of concurrence can be debated and solved. The starting 
point is that each applicable rule, however founded, should be realised to 
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the greatest possible extent. In principle, then, each rule ought to have its 
intended legal effect once the necessary conditions have been established. It 
flows from this reasoning that the claimant or defendant should have a free 
choice to invoke the rule that appears to him to be the most advantageous. 
An exception must be made, however, if cumulative application would lead 
to inconsistent outcomes which cannot exist concurrently. In such situations, 
an election between the available alternatives is required. The underlying 
reason is that the objectives of one rule cannot be realised if the other rule is 
also applied. For the same reason, the law sometimes prescribes that one of 
the rules applies exclusively, so that no election can be made at all.
Every case may spark a debate about whether the rules are incompat-
ible or whether one of them applies exclusively. The outcome may differ 
depending on the content of the rules at issue. The next chapter illustrates 
this point by discussing a classic example of concurrence: the overlap of the 
laws of contract and tort. In doing so, the chapter considers in greater detail 
the reasons underlying the decision to permit or restrict the availability of 
claims, powers, and defences.

3 Concurrent Claims in Contract and Tort: 
A Comparative Perspective*
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the principles that must be taken into 
account when solving issues of concurrence in private law. The chapter 
showed that lawyers from different jurisdictions use the same arguments 
when debating and solving issues of concurrence in private law. In prin-
ciple, they strive to realise the objectives of each rule to the greatest possible 
extent. This means that concurrence is generally allowed, freedom of choice 
is the natural consequence and the existence of alternative or exclusive rules 
is an exception which requires justification.
If the same principles are being followed, does this mean that similar 
issues are solved in similar ways too? This question is examined in the 
present chapter. The attention is fixed on the problem that has always 
been at the heart of the debate: the overlap of the laws of contract and tort. 
More particularly, the chapter analyses whether, and to what extent, the 
law permits a choice between finding liability in contract and in tort. The 
chapter examines the approaches in several European jurisdictions, anal-
yses their historical development and explains their differences by looking 
at the underlying structure of these systems of private law. In doing so, the 
chapter considers in greater detail the reasons underlying the decision to 
permit or restrict the availability of claims, powers, and defences.
Comparative studies on this topic do exist, but they are either not 
written in English,1 are somewhat outdated,2 or they provide a compre-
hensive assessment of the law as it stands rather than an explanation of 
its development.3 It is the aim of this chapter to add a current comparative 
account to these sources. This also offers the opportunity to discuss recent 
developments in case law and legislation. For present purposes, French, 
German and English law have been selected. These are the most important 
private law systems in contemporary Europe, and they represent both the 
civil and the common law traditions. Reference is also made to Dutch law, 
given that this system has been influenced by the French Code Civil but has 
adopted a solution that is comparable to the approach under German law.
*  This chapter has been previously published by the present author in the European Review 
of Private Law 2017, p. 701-726. A few amendments have been made to the original text.
1 Schlechtriem 1972; Von Amsberg 1994; Kegel 2002; De Graaff & Moron-Puech 2017.
2 Weir 1984; Van Rossum 1995.
3 Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 26-315; Martín-Casals 2019b.
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It is necessary to clarify three terminological issues from the outset. 
First of all, this chapter only deals with the laws of contract and tort and 
not with the remaining extra-contractual obligations.4 Secondly, and in line 
with the general scope of the present book,5 this chapter focuses on private 
parties and not on public bodies. The liability of public bodies is either a 
matter of administrative law or governed by private law but influenced by 
administrative rules and principles.6 Thirdly, this chapter uses the common 
law term ‘tort’ instead of the civil equivalent ‘delict’.7
In order to fully understand the nature and scope of the problem, the 
chapter first shows the areas of overlap (section 3.2) and the distinctions 
(section 3.3) between the laws of contract and tort. The chapter then exam-
ines the approaches in several European jurisdictions and traces their histor-
ical development. French law is straightforward: finding liability in tort is 
not possible if the damage is caused by or related to the performance, or 
non-performance, of a contractual obligation (section 3.4). German, Dutch 
and English law take the opposite point of view: finding liability in tort is 
not precluded if the damage is caused by or related to the performance, or 
non-performance, of a contractual obligation (sections 3.5-3.6). The analysis 
shows that these legal systems have developed these particular approaches 
in the light of their own legal history and under the influence of the scope 
and structure of their own laws of contract and tort. The analysis also shows 
that both solutions are more nuanced than they seem at first sight and that a 
trend towards convergence can be observed in all jurisdictions (section 3.7).
3.2 Concurrence of the laws of contract and tort
On the face of it, an act or omission may not only constitute a breach of 
contract but may also violate a tortious duty. Incorrect performance of the 
contract may, for instance, cause injuries to body or health or may inflict 
property damage. Typically, these interests are also protected by the law of 
tort.8 Whether the facts of a case actually fall within the laws of contract and 
tort, depends on the scope of both branches of the law in a particular legal 
system.9
4 E.g. the law of unjustifi ed enrichment, including undue payment (condictio indebiti), and 
the law governing the benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (negotiorum gestio).
5 See supra section 1.5.
6 Oliphant 2016.
7 Zimmermann 1996, p. 907.
8 This does not imply that the type of loss is decisive as regards the question whether 
liability in tort can be established (in some jurisdictions it is not decisive, e.g. in France 
and the Netherlands).
9 Taylor 2019, p. 21.
Concurrent Claims in Contract and Tort: A Comparative Perspective 39
Liability for breach of contract can only be established when one of 
the parties has failed to comply with the express or implied terms of the 
contract.10 It is therefore necessary that a valid contract exists. This depends, 
first of all, on the definition of contract. Some agreements do not fall within 
the law of contract in a particular jurisdiction. It also depends on the rules 
that govern the formation11 and form of the contract12 and on the presence 
of vitiating factors that may make the apparent contract void ab initio (e.g. 
mistake or grounds of illegality) or with retroactive effect (e.g. rescission 
for misrepresentation). Furthermore, the parties have to be bound by the 
contract, which depends on the rules of agency and the rights of third 
parties.13 A valid contract only creates rights and obligations for those 
parties during the period that the contract is in force. As a consequence, 
liability for breach of contract does not, typically, come into play if the facts 
took place before the parties concluded the contract or after the contract has 
ended, or has been avoided or terminated.14
In order for tortious liability to arise, the act or omission must have been 
unlawful, which depends on the scope of the law of tort in a particular juris-
diction. Common law jurisdictions rely on individual torts that have mainly 
been developed in case law. In English law, for example, there are numerous 
torts and equitable wrongs. Some have a broad field of application (negli-
gence), but most are limited to particular situations (e.g. assault, battery, 
trespass to goods, inducing breach of contract, conspiracy, intimidation). 
Civil jurisdictions have codified their private law systems. In some of these 
systems, the law of tort is based on broad, general provisions. In France, 
for instance, every person who is at fault and thus causes harm to another 
person must compensate for any losses sustained.15 In Germany and the 
Netherlands, tortious ‘fault’ liability may only arise when certain interests 
have been harmed or when certain norms have been violated. Liability 
may arise when a legally acknowledged right has been infringed, when a 
10 The subject can be approached even more extensively, by including those situations 
in which the parties are in a special relationship ‘equivalent to contract’ (as is done by 
Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis 2013, p. 20-24). However, the laws of contract and tort do 
not overlap here, so there is no choice available at all.
11 Offer and acceptance (cf. Art. 6:217 BW) may not be enough. English law requires consid-
eration in order for an agreement to constitute a contract. Until 2016, French law required 
a ‘cause’ (Art. 1108 CC). This requirement has been abolished in Art. 1128 CC, as a result 
of Ordonnance n° 2016-13.
12 In all legal systems, there are specifi c formalities for certain types of contract, such as the 
requirement that contracts for the sale of land have to be in writing.
13 A contract may confer rights on third parties which are enforceable directly by the third 
parties themselves. See e.g. the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999; Art. 6:253 
BW.
14 Beale and others 2010, p. 105-106. European legal systems tend to establish precontractual 
liability on the basis of the law of tort or on the basis of a special regime of precontractual 
liability (culpa in contrahendo, e.g. § 311, paras 2 and 3 BGB), see Cartwright & Hesselink 
2008, p. 457-460; Martín-Casals 2019a, p. 716-719 and 793-802.
15 Formerly Art. 1382 and 1383 CC, currently Art. 1240 and 1241 CC.
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statutory duty has been breached,16 or following a violation of either public 
morals with the intention to inflict damages17 or, of a rule of unwritten law 
pertaining to proper social conduct.18
Similar lines can be recognised when it comes to the activities or 
capacities to which the law attributes a so-called ‘strict’ tortious liability. 
Liability may then be established without proving ‘fault’ on the part of 
the defendant,19 although it may be possible for the defendant to escape 
liability, for instance, by proving that he has exercised reasonable care. 
French law maintains several strict liability regimes, including a general 
liability for damage caused by a chose (an object or thing)20 and a general 
liability for damage caused by a person that is under the tortfeasor’s super-
vision.21 Both liabilities were established by the Cour de Cassation on the 
basis of Article 1384, paragraph 1 CC, and have recently been codified by 
the legislature in Article 1242 CC. In other legal systems, strict liability only 
exists on the basis of specific rules more limited in scope.22
The law generally offers the aggrieved party several rights (or 
remedies).23 If the necessary conditions are fulfilled, the law of contract 
entitles him to claim damages, to demand specific performance, and to 
terminate the contract.24 The victim of a tort may also be entitled to claim 
damages to compensate for the harm suffered.25 When it comes to the rela-
tionship between the laws of contract and tort, one question has therefore 
been at the heart of the debate: does the law permit one contracting party to 
claim damages in tort from the other contracting party?26 The answer to this 
question matters. As the next section shows, the outcome of the case may 
not always be the same depending on whether the claim is based on one 
branch of the law or the other.
16 § 823 BGB; Art. 6:162 (2) BW.
17 § 826 BGB.
18 Art. 6:162 (2) BW.
19 In English law, ‘fault’ assumes three forms: malice, intention (including recklessness), 
and negligence (Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis 2013, p. 27).
20 Cass. Civ. 16 June 1896, S. 1897. I. 17, note Esmein (Teffaine).
21 Cass. ass. plén. 29 March 1991, D. 1991. 324, comm. Larroumet, JCP 1991. II. 21673 (Blieck).
22 English law knows several specifi c torts that do not require proof of malice, intention, 
recklessness or negligence (e.g. breach of statutory duty, trespass to land, defamation, 
vicarious liability, liability for animals). German law knows specifi c strict liability rules 
(§ 833 BGB and several acts outside the BGB). The same goes for the Netherlands (cf. Art. 
6:169-184 BW, on liability for persons and things).
23 Traditionally, English lawyers see rights through the lens of the remedies by which they 
are given effect. See supra section 1.3.
24 The range of rights (or remedies) also depends on the nature of the contract. Their order 
may differ from one legal system to another.
25 Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, p. 740-741 and 868-871. § 249 (1) BGB prescribes 
restitution in kind as the fi rst and foremost remedy, Art. 6:103 BW prescribes restitution 
in money, but allows the victim to claim, and the court to order, restitution in kind.
26 Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 6.
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3.3 The differences between the laws of contract and tort
The overlap between the laws of contract and tort does not give rise to 
problems as long as application of the rules produces the same outcome.27 
However, the laws of contract and tort vary in certain ways, which may lead 
to different results depending on the basis of the claim for damages. On a 
fundamental level, this may be caused by the different aims of the laws of 
contract and tort. Generally speaking, the law of tort protects persons and 
their property, while the law of contract promotes their development.28 In 
practice, the most important differences relate to the establishment and 
scope of liability, to questions of limitation or prescription and to questions 
of jurisdiction.29
The first category concerns the conditions that are required to establish 
liability. For the outcome of the case, the following are determining factors: 
the elements which, when taken together, make a successful claim; the tests 
which have to be applied to fulfil those conditions; who is under the obliga-
tion to furnish the relevant facts; and who bears the burden of proof. These 
rules may differ. For instance, a strict liability regime does not, typically, 
require the claimant to argue (and if contested, prove) fault on the part of 
the defendant. It is up to the defendant to argue (and if contested, prove) 
the absence of fault, provided that the law allows such a defence.
Secondly, the scope of liability may differ. This question concerns the 
type and extent of the losses that may be recovered under the respective 
heads of liability.30 The laws of contract and tort may vary with regard to 
the type of loss that may be claimed31 and with regard to the possibility 
to demand exemplary or punitive damages.32 The scope of liability is also 
determined by the remoteness of the damage. To determine whether or 
not the damage is too remote, most legal systems refer to factors such as 
27 See also Martín-Casals 2019a, p. 714.
28 Weir 1984, p. 5. See also Borghetti 2019, p. 134-135 and 152-153; Keirse 2019, p. 333-335; 
Magnus 2019, p. 174 and 188-189; Martín-Casals 2019a, p. 714-715.
29 Cf. Weir 1984, p. 7-24; Kegel 2002, p. 119 et seq.; Martín-Casals 2019a, p. 723-780.
30 Some legal systems deal with this question when establishing liability (e.g. English and 
French law), while other legal systems deal with this question after liability has been 
established (e.g. German and Dutch law). See Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, 
p. 395-427.
31 E.g. pure economic loss, consequential economic loss and non-economic loss. Dutch and 
French law are not familiar with a separate category of pure economic loss. German law 
generally excludes pure economic loss from the scope of the law of tort, while English 
law typically allows recovery of pure economic loss under the ‘economic’ torts, but 
shows restraint when it comes to the tort of negligence. For an overview of the rules and 
exceptions, see Van Boom 2004, p. 1-40.
32 Exemplary or punitive damages are generally only available in tort, in as much as they 
are available at all. They are typically not available in contract, unless contracting parties 
include in their contract a clause providing for the payment of an agreed sum for non-
performance of a contractual obligation. See generally Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 110; 
Martín-Casals 2019a, p. 739.
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the underlying duty, the nature and foreseeability of the damage33 and 
the nature of the defendant’s act.34 The underlying duty is also important 
for the assessment of a defence of contributory negligence35 and for the 
applicability of contractual or statutory rules that limit or reduce the scope 
of recoverable damages. Finally, the calculation of damages proceeds on 
different bases: damages for breach of contract aim to bring the claimant in 
a position as if the contract had been performed (positive interest), whereas 
damages for tort aim to bring the claimant in a position as if no tort had 
been committed (negative interest).36
A third issue relates to the limitation of the action or the prescription of 
the claim.37 Due to differences in the commencement and the duration of 
the applicable time limits, one claim may already be barred by limitation 
or prescription while the other claim may still be enforceable. Even when 
a general regime has been created for all claims for damages, specific rules 
may exist for certain liabilities.38
Finally, the liability rules may lead to different competent courts. This 
issue does not only present challenges if the facts of the case are linked to 
different jurisdictions, as challenges may also arise within the confines of 
one jurisdiction. The legislature may have designated special courts to adju-
dicate on claims with a certain value, such as county courts or sub-district 
courts, or on claims of a certain type, such as labour courts or maritime law 
courts. The claimant may or may not prefer to bring proceedings before a 
special court, for instance, because legal representation is or is not manda-
tory. The nature of the claim may also determine whether the claimant is 
permitted to take the matter to another court than the court of the defen-
dant’s domicile and whether legal aid is available.39
33 E.g. Art. 1231 (3) CC (formerly Art. 1150 CC) limits recovery in contract to foreseeable 
damage.
34 See e.g. Art. 6:98 BW; Cartwright 1996.
35 In some cases, contributory negligence cannot reduce damages, e.g. when the claim is for 
strict liability for accidents caused by motor vehicles (Art. 3, Loi n° 85-677 du 5 juillet 1985 
tendant a l’amelioration de la situation des victimes d’accidents de la circulation et a l’acceleration 
des procedures d’indemnisation, hereafter Loi Badinter) or for the breach of a strict contrac-
tual duty (cf. Burrows 2011, p. 368).
36 See generally Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, p. 33. See also Cartwright 1991, p. 141; 
Boukema 1992, p. 18; Krans 1999, p. 131-132; Hartkamp 2011, p. 154.
37 Unlike prescription, limitation does not extinguish the right, but only makes it impos-
sible to enforce it.
38 E.g. French, German and Dutch law provide one regime that governs all claims for 
damages (Art. 2224 CC; § 195 BGB; Art. 3:310 BW). At the same time, there are special 
time limits, e.g. for certain contractual claims (e.g. Art. 114-1 Code des assurances; § 438 
BGB; Art. 7:23 (2) BW).
39 Joyce v. Sengupta [1992] EWCA Civ 9 provides an example, although the case concerned 
concurrent claims in tort. The plaintiff sued only on the basis of the tort of injurious 
falsehood and not on the basis of defamation, because legal aid was not available for 
defamation.
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The differences outlined above may or may not arise. As will become 
apparent, in some respects, some legal systems have successfully converged 
their liability rules. Yet it is safe to say that in all jurisdictions, the outcome of 
a case will not always be the same depending on whether the claim is based 
on the breach of a contractual obligation or on the violation of a tortious 
duty. For the aggrieved party, it may therefore be more favourable to sue in 
either contract or tort. This raises the question whether, and to what extent, 
the law permits such a choice. The following sections examine how this 
question is answered in terms of French, German, Dutch and English law.
3.4 French law: the gradual emergence of the NON-CUMUL principle
The relationship between the laws of contract and tort has generated 
considerable interest in French literature.40 At the end of the 19th century, 
the debate was triggered by the scholars Sainctelette and Grandmoulin. 
Sainctelette argued that voluntary obligations, created by a contract, should 
be clearly distinguished from obligations imposed by the law.41 By contrast, 
Grandmoulin argued that no separate regime of contractual liability existed, 
as this liability was part of a unified ‘théorie de la responsabilité’.42
Eventually, most scholars adopted an intermediate position, according 
to which contractual and tortious liabilities were part of the general law of 
obligations, but should be treated differently.43 As Brun stated in 1931: ‘il n’y 
a pas deux responsabilités, mais deux régimes de responsabilité’.44 By then, 
most writers supported the idea that the parties to a contract should only 
be subject to the law of contract in order to respect the freedom of contract 
and the intention of the legislature. It should not be accepted that parties, 
having concluded a contract, could ‘escape’ into the general regime of tort.45
This solution became known as the principle of non-cumul des respon-
sabilités contractuelle et délictuelle (hereinafter: non-cumul). The terminology 
is somewhat misleading, because it suggests that the only purpose of the 
rule is to make sure that the aggrieved party is not compensated twice. 
This is surely stating the obvious. It is neither the intention of the aggrieved 
party, nor the meaning of the rule. Rather, the rule means that recourse to 
the law of tort is excluded. If the harm occurs in the context of a contractual 
relationship, the aggrieved party cannot claim in tort.46
40 See, on the origins of the distinction between contract and tort in French law, Moron-
Puech 2018, who submits that the distinction was not imposed by the Code Civil of 1804 
and was not expressly recognised by the courts until the 1890s.
41 Sainctelette 1884, p. 15. The same idea was developed by Sauzet 1883, p. 596-640.
42 Grandmoulin 1892, p. 88. The same idea was developed by Lefebvre 1886, p. 494: ‘Toute 
faute est delictuelle. La faute contractuelle n’existe pas.’
43 See for an overview Juen 2016, p. 12-17, and Viney 1995, p. 399.
44 Brun 1931, p. 382.
45 Borghetti 2010, p. 23-24, with further references.
46 Moréteau 2013, p. 765.
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Three judgments are usually cited to show that the Cour de Cassation 
had already accepted the principle of non-cumul in the year 1890,47 reiter-
ated this in the year 192248 and firmly established this by the year 1927.49 
Nevertheless, according to several authors, these judgments did not create 
a convincing precedent at the time.50 After all, the Cour de Cassation only 
stated that the conditions for contractual and tortious liability are not the 
same51 and that damages for the violation of a contractual norm have to be 
awarded on the basis of the law of contract.52 Recourse to the law of tort is 
not excluded as a matter of principle.53
Upon closer examination, it appears that the courts have developed 
the principle of non-cumul much more gradually. In fact, French courts, 
including the Cour de Cassation, continued to allow recourse to the law of tort 
in several proceedings between contracting parties also after the judgments 
of 1890, 1922 and 1927.54 It lasted until 1945 before the Cour de Cassation 
clearly expressed that a contracting party might not benefit from the exercise 
of a tort claim if he could also bring a contractual claim.55 Several authors 
47 Cass. req. 21 January 1890, D. 1891. 1. 380. Brun 2009, p. 68, refers to this judgment and states 
that the principle of non-cumul ‘a été pose dès la fi n du XIXe siècle par la jurisprudence’.
48 Cass. Civ. 22 January 1922, D. 1922. 1. 16; S. 1924. 1. 105, note Demogue. Van Gerven, Lever 
& Larouche 2000, p. 41 (fn. 93), identify this judgment as the ‘leading case’; Whittaker 1995,
p. 334, refers to the same judgment and notes: ‘By the 1920s, the rule of non-cumul had 
become accepted by the majority of both courts and writers’.
49 Cass. Civ. 6 April 1927, D. 1927. 1. 201, note H. Mazeaud. Babert 2002, p. 268 refers to 
this judgment and states: ‘C’est donc bien en 1927 que la Cour de Cassation change sa 
jurisprudence.’
50 Viney 1994, p. 817; Babert 2002, p. 265-266; Borghetti 2010, p. 14-29; Abid Mnif 2014, 
p. 74-78; Capitant, Terré & Lequette 2015, p. 265, no 4. See already Popesco-Albota 1933, 
p. 172; Savatier 1951, no. 149; Martine 1957, p. 16 et seq.
51 Answering the question whether every fault, however simple, should lead to the obliga-
tion to make good the damage, Cass. Civ. 22 January 1922, D. 1922. 1. 16; S. 1924. 1. 105, 
note Demogue, responds that this is not the basic rule under the regime of contractual 
liability: ‘c’est seulement en matière de délit ou quasi-délit que toute faute quelconque 
oblige son auteur à réparer le dommage provenant de son fait’. The same reasoning can 
be found in Cass. req. 21 January 1890, D. 1891. 1. 380 and in Cass. Civ. 6 April 1927, D. 
1927. 1. 201, note H. Mazeaud.
52 Cass. Civ. 22 January 1922, D. 1922. 1. 16; S. 1924. 1. 105, note Demogue, states that the 
rules governing extra-contractual liability are not applicable to a claim based on a breach 
of contract. Such a claim is governed by the law of contract: ‘les articles 1382 et suivants 
sont sans application lorsqu’il s’agit d’une faute commise dans l’exécution d’une obliga-
tion résultant d’un contrat’. The same reasoning can be found in Cass. Civ. 6 April 1927, 
D. 1927. 1. 201, note H. Mazeaud.
53 Borghetti 2010, p. 16-17; Abid Mnif 2014, p. 74-75.
54 In Cass. Req. 14 December 1926, D. 1927. 1. 105, note Josserand, the Cour de Cassation held 
that the conduct of the responsible persons working at a psychiatric clinic constituted ‘en 
même temps que l’inexécution de leur obligation contractuelle surveillance, une faute 
délictuelle’ towards the patient concerned. An overview of the case law can be found in 
Borghetti 2010, p. 17-21, and in Abid Mnif 2014, p. 76-77.
55 Cass. Civ. 6 March 1945, D. 1945. 1. 217: ‘la victime d’un dommage [provenant de l’inexé-
cution d’un contrat ou de sa mauvaise exécution], qui peut exercer l’action contractuelle, 
ne saurait préférer l’exercice de l’action délictuelle’.
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therefore argue that the principle was only truly established by the 1950s.56 
The Cour de Cassation has since reaffirmed this position several times,57 and 
has also begun to refer to the principle of non-cumul in its judgments.58
Apart from the influence exerted by the literature, there are other 
reasons that seem to have motivated the courts to finally embrace the prin-
ciple of non-cumul. One important reason was the significant expansion of 
the general strict liability for damages caused by a chose (an object or thing) 
under Article 1384, paragraph 1 CC. In the judgment Jand’heur (1930), the 
Cour de Cassation decided that: (1) the presumption of liability under Article 
1384, paragraph 1 CC could only be rebutted by proving that the damage 
had been caused by chance, by force majeure or by an external cause that 
could not be imputed to the defendant; that (2) in order to escape liability, it 
did not suffice that the defendant had not been negligent or that the cause 
of the damage remained unknown; and (3) that in order to establish this 
liability, it was not relevant whether the defendant wielded the object, nor 
was it necessary to prove that the object was, by its nature, defective and 
thus likely to cause damage.59
By its ruling in Jand’heur, the Cour de Cassation effectively created the 
possibility to hold any gardien of any object liable for the damage caused 
by that object, even if the defendant successfully proved that he was not 
at fault. Needless to say that, without any restriction, an extra-contractual 
regime with such generality would be able to intrude and possibly distort 
the rules governing the liability of parties to a contract. A contracting 
party would have a claim each and every time his property was damaged 
by an object that was controlled by the other contracting party. Although 
scholars quarrel about the exact causal relationship, the expansion of this 
strict liability regime has clearly been an important reason for the courts to 
further strengthen the principle of non-cumul.60
This impression was confirmed by yet another significant turnaround 
in the case law of the Cour de Cassation. In the judgment Mercier (1936), 
the Cour de Cassation clarified that the relationship between medical prac-
56 Viney 1994, p. 817; Martine 1957, p. 16 et seq.; Abid Mnif 2014, p. 78. Brun 2010, p. 491, 
also admits that the principle of non-cumul ‘ne s’est pas imposée d’emblée et défi nitive-
ment sans quelques soubresauts, quelques hésitations et peut-être même sans quelques 
mouvements contradictoires’.
57 Brun 2009, p. 68, referring e.g. to Cass. 1e Civ. 4 November 1992, Bull. civ. I, no. 276: ‘le 
créancier d’une obligation contractuelle ne peut se prévaloir contre le débiteur de cette 
obligation, quand bien même il y aurait intérêt, des règles de la responsabilité délictuelle’.
58 The Cour de Cassation refers to ‘la règle du non-cumul des responsabilités contractuelle et 
délictuelle’ (Cass. 2e Civ. 3 March 1993, no 91-17.677) and to ‘le principe de non-cumul 
des responsabilités contractuelle et délictuelle’ (Cass. 1e Civ. 28 June 2012, no 10-28492).
59 Cass. ch. réun. 13 February 1930, D. 1930. 1. 57, S. 1930. 1. 121, note Esmein (Jand’heur).
60 Borghetti 2010, p. 25-29, argues that this has been the main reason for the courts to fi nally 
establish the principle of non-cumul. Brun 2010, p. 491, argues that the principle was 
already established in 1890, but admits that ‘l’avènement du principe de responsabilité 
du fait des choses ait pu conduire la jurisprudence à affermir sa position sur l’interdiction 
de l’option’.
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titioners and their patients was contractual and not extra-contractual.61 
The driving force behind this decision was likely to have been the need to 
shield medical practitioners from liability under Article 1384, paragraph 1
CC.62 Given the principle of non-cumul, this qualification brought these 
relationships exclusively within the realms of the law of contract. According 
to Whittaker, it clearly dawned on the courts that ‘by manipulating the 
boundaries of contract, they can manipulate the boundaries of delict’.63
One may wonder, however, why the courts did not ‘manipulate’ 
those boundaries directly, by adjusting the interpretation of Article 1384, 
paragraph 1 CC, to take into account the special nature of the relationship 
between doctors and their patients. The courts may have taken the view 
that this general provision was not that easy to adjust, that the interpreta-
tion given in Jand’heur should not be revised so soon or that the solution in 
Mercier was in fact a good compromise. A similar question comes to mind 
concerning the solution of non-cumul itself. Instead of excluding the applica-
tion of the law of tort altogether, why did the courts not adjust the tort claim 
to the rules and terms governing the contract? The courts may have been 
influenced by the then prevailing doctrinal opinion,64 according to which, 
the regimes of contract and tort were fundamentally distinct and could not 
be mixed.65
As dogmatically sound as the principle of non-cumul may be, it does 
treat contracting parties differently from and possibly less favourably than 
parties that are not in a contractual relationship. This implication has not 
only been criticised by scholars66 but has also been mitigated to some extent 
by the courts and the legislature. The courts have, for instance, used and 
expanded the concept of obligations de sécurité, obligations owed by one 
contracting party to look after the personal safety of the other contracting 
party. This concept was established by the Cour de Cassation for the first 
time in 1911,67 on the basis of Article 1135 CC, currently Article 1194 CC. 
According to this provision, agreements impose obligations on parties not 
merely in respect of that which they have expressly agreed upon, but also 
in respect of that which follows from ‘l’équité, l’usage ou la loi’. This provi-
sion has given the courts the necessary leeway to protect contracting parties 
while taking into account the nature of their relationship.68 Some contracts 
create obligations de moyens, under which parties have to take reasonable 
61 Cass. Civ. 20 May 1936, D. 1936. 1. 88, note E.P.; S. 1937. 1. 321, note Breton (Mercier).
62 Borghetti 2010, p. 26-28. Some patients also benefi ted from this outcome, because the 
claim became subject to a more favourable regime of prescription. See Bellissent 2001, no. 
956.
63 Whittaker 1995, p. 336.
64 According to Abid Mnif 2014, p. 79.
65 See e.g. Bonnet 1912, p. 437; Brun 1931, no. 351.
66 E.g. by Esmein 1956.
67 Cass. Civ. 21 November 1911, D. 1913. 1. 249, note Sarrut, S. 1912. 1. 73, note Lyon-Caen 
(Compagnie générale transatlantique).
68 Viney 1995, p. 652; Whittaker 1995, p. 336; Borghetti 2016, no. 34.
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care, while other contracts are a source of obligations de résultat, where 
liability may only be escaped by proving the defence of force majeure or faute 
de la victime.
The courts and the legislature have also introduced exceptions to the 
principle of non-cumul.69 In fact, the courts have applied the law of tort to 
contractual relationships in cases involving fraudulent behaviour,70 criminal 
offences,71 transport accidents72 and construction defects.73 Moreover, the 
legislature has introduced general liability regimes that apply to all road 
traffic accidents74 and to all defective products,75 irrespective of whether a 
contract exists between the parties involved.
In recent years, the French legislature has begun reforming the law of 
obligations. All claims for damages are now subject to a general rule on 
prescription.76 The general fault liability has been codified in Articles 1240-
1241 CC, and the strict liability for persons and things has been codified 
in Article 1242 CC.77 A reform of the remaining parts of the law of obliga-
tions is currently on the legislative agenda. In its proposals, the Minister 
of Justice has suggested harmonising several rules in respect of damages 
and causation.78 He has also recommended codifying the principle of non-
cumul. The wording of the proposed Article 1233 CC makes it clear that ‘in 
the case of non-performance of a contractual obligation, neither the debtor 
nor the creditor may escape the application of provisions special to contrac-
tual liability in order to opt in favour of rules specific to extra-contractual 
liability’.79
69 In some cases, the courts have even denied the existence of a contractual relationship, in 
order to be able to apply the law of tort. This is, however, not really an exception to the 
rule, because the laws of contract and tort do not overlap in those cases. See for some 
examples Viney 1995, p. 620; Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 40-41.
70 Viney 1995, p. 621, with references.
71 This exception originates from the case law of the criminal courts, who used to apply 
the law of tort on a claim for compensation brought by the victim in the course of the 
criminal proceedings. The exception is outdated since the legislature gave criminal courts 
the authority to apply ‘des règles de droit civil’, including the law of contract. See Viney 
1995, p. 621-623, with references.
72 For some time, close relatives of the victim of a transport accident could not only claim in 
contract, but also in tort. See Viney 1995, p. 623-624, with references.
73 This exception concerns the recovery of damages by the owner from the builder. See 
Viney 1995, p. 624-626, with references.
74 Art. 1, Loi Badinter.
75 Art. 1386-1 CC. This is a result of the implementation of Council Directive 85/374/EEC 
on the liability for defective products.
76 Art. 2224 CC, modifi ed by Loi n°2008-561 du 17 juin 2008.
77 As a result of Ordonnance n° 2016-131.
78 Art. 1235-1240, Projet de réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile.
79 Ibid., Art. 1233: ‘En cas d’inexécution d’une obligation contractuelle, ni le débiteur ni le 
créancier ne peuvent se soustraire à l’application des dispositions propres à la respon-
sabilité contractuelle pour opter en faveur des règles spécifiques à la responsabilité 
extracontractuelle.’ Translated into English by Simon Whittaker, in consultation with 
Jean-Sébastien Borghetti. This translation is available via www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/
art_pix/reform_bill_on_civil_liability_march_2017.pdf.
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At the same time, the Minister intends to introduce an exception for 
bodily injuries. The Catala committee had already suggested giving these 
victims the choice between claiming in contract or in tort.80 The Terré 
committee went one step further and proposed that bodily injuries should 
only ever be subject to the law of tort.81 The latter suggestion was initially 
embraced by the Minister.82 This would have led to the result that a person 
who had sustained bodily injuries could not have claimed in contract at all, 
even when the contract had contained more favourable terms.83 Responding 
to this criticism, the Minister has proposed to add that the victim may not 
only rely on the law of tort, but also on ‘express stipulations of a contract 
which are more favourable to him than the application of the rules of extra-
contractual liability’.84 If implemented, this rule would permit a choice 
between finding liability in contract and in tort, thus introducing another 
exception to the principle of non-cumul.
It is clear from the above that French law is still struggling with the 
relationship between the laws of contract and tort. Following the majority of 
scholars and responding to the expanding scope of the general strict liability 
for things, the courts have, gradually yet firmly, established the principle of 
non-cumul. At the same time, the courts and the legislature have provided 
certain contracting parties with additional protection, either by implying 
obligations de sécurité or by introducing exceptions that reduce the scope of 
the principle of non-cumul. In spite of these developments, the principle of 
non-cumul will probably be codified in the near future. As a consequence, 
the point of departure under French law remains fundamentally different to 
the position adopted in German, Dutch and English law. In these jurisdic-
tions, finding liability in tort is not precluded if the damage is caused by or 
related to the performance, or non-performance, of a contractual obligation, 
as the following sections illustrate.
3.5 German and Dutch Law: independent yet interdependent 
categories
The question whether, and to what extent, the law should permit a choice 
between finding liability in contract and in tort has also been the subject of 
an ongoing debate in German literature. The two main positions emerged 
80 Art. 1341, Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription. This 
solution had been suggested before, e.g. by Carbonnier 1994, no. 295.
81 Art. 3, see Terré 2011.
82 Art. 1233 (2), L’avant-projet de réforme de la responsabilité civile.
83 For this reason, the proposal has been criticised, e.g. by De Graaff & Moron-Puech 2017, 
p. 86-87.
84 Art. 1233-1 (2), Projet de réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile: ‘Toutefois, la victime 
peut invoquer les stipulations expresses du contrat qui lui sont plus favorables que 
l’application des règles de la responsabilité extracontractuelle.’ Translated into English 
by Simon Whittaker, in consultation with Jean-Sébastien Borghetti.
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during a period of approximately thirty years after the introduction of the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch in 1900. Both sides pleaded for a clear distinction 
between contract and tort but drew different conclusions. At one end of the 
spectrum, writers defended the fundamental priority of the law of contract 
and the subsidiarity of the law of tort. At the other end of the spectrum, 
writers defended the fundamental independence of both regimes, which 
would imply that recourse to the law of tort should remain possible.
According to the first theory (Gesetzeskonkurrenz),85 it is only the law of 
contract which is tailored and therefore designed to deal with the relation-
ship between contracting parties. Even if a claim in tort seems, prima facie, 
possible, such a claim should be repressed in favour of the law of contract. 
If this were not to be the case, the balance of interests and the allocation of 
risks achieved under the rules and terms governing the contract would be 
undermined. In effect, this would render large areas of the law of contract 
pointless and would overrule the assessments and intentions of the legisla-
ture.86
According to the second theory (Anspruchskonkurrenz), the interests of 
contracting parties should also be protected by the law of tort. The law of 
contract cannot be regarded as a special part of the law of tort, as the latter is 
not based on one all-embracing, general clause and does not protect against 
purely economic losses. A breach of contract does not therefore automati-
cally constitute an unlawful act or omission.87 Additionally, the law of tort 
cannot be regarded as subordinate because it cannot be maintained that 
the law of contract, which deals with the rights and duties of contracting 
parties, also settles the legal consequences of unlawful acts or omissions 
exhaustively.88 Since the two bodies of law are independent, they should 
be treated independently, allowing the aggrieved party to claim damages 
on any basis, as long as the necessary conditions (Tatbestände) are present.89
Following the contribution by Dietz to the subject in 1934, the second 
theory gained the upper hand and came to enjoy general support.90 Its 
acceptance by German courts dates back to 1916, when the Reichsgericht 
held that the general legal duty not to injure another person exists towards 
all persons, whether they have concluded a contract or not.91 Likewise, the 
Bundesgerichtshof has repeatedly confirmed that the aggrieved party may 
85 It must be noted that the term Gesetzeskonkurrenz has also been used in a different sense, 
to describe the overlap of multiple norms rather than the exclusivity of one of these 
norms, e.g. by Lent 1912, p. 12 et seq.; Enneccerus & Nipperdey 1952, p. 217-218.
86 E.g. Hellwig 1900, p. 98-99; Endemann 1903, p. 1260; Von Gierke 1917, p. 903; Von Tuhr 
1918, p. 464.
87 Dietz 1934, p. 72-92.
88 Dietz 1934, p. 93-124.
89 Dietz 1934, p. 125-180. For an overview of the literature until the 1930s, see Dietz 1934, 
p. 70-71.
90 Schlechtriem 1972, p. 44-45.
91 Reichsgericht 13 October 1916, RGZ, 88, 433.
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choose which legal ground he wishes to base his claim for damages on, and 
that every claim has to be decided on its own merits and according to its 
own rules. The aggrieved party may also revert to the law of tort when the 
contractual claim is time-barred or excluded.92
This position can be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, the ambit 
of the German law of tort is narrower than in France. Not every breach of 
contract gives rise to tortious liability. Contractual rights are not protected 
under § 823 BGB, pure economic loss is generally not recoverable in tort 
and strict liability only exists on the basis of specific rules more limited in 
scope.93 Secondly, the law of contract has important advantages over the 
law of tort. The claimant does not have to argue (and if contested, prove) 
fault in order to claim damages. It is up to the defendant to argue (and if 
contested, prove) that the breach of contract cannot be imputed to him.94 
Moreover, a contracting party is strictly liable for the conduct of those 
employed in performing his obligation (§ 278 BGB) and this party cannot 
escape liability if reasonable care was exercised by him when selecting and 
managing these employees, as is the case under the law of tort (§ 831 BGB). 
In this context, giving the claimant the choice to proceed on either basis will 
not have major consequences.95
This raises the question why the parties nonetheless tried to claim in 
tort, and why the courts allowed such claims. For a long time, compensa-
tion for non-economic loss (Schmerzensgeld) could only be awarded in 
tort, for example, for injuries to body or health and in case of a depriva-
tion of liberty,96 and not in contract.97 Moreover, the prescription periods 
in contract were sometimes much shorter. For instance, the time limits for 
claims concerning the non-conformity of goods were very short: six months 
or one year after delivery or transfer of the property.98 It was only after 
the Schuldrechtsreform of 2002 that the rules on damages were integrated 
into the general part of the law of obligations (§ 249 et seq. BGB). Since 
these reforms, compensation for non-economic loss can also be awarded 
in contract, for injuries to body or health, or for violations of the right to 
freedom or of the right to sexual self-determination (§ 253 BGB). Moreover, 
the legislature adopted one regime on prescription (§ 195 et seq. BGB), 
although specific rules still exist for certain types of claim.99
92 BGH 24 November 1976, BGHZ 67, 359; BGH 4 March 1971, BGHZ 55, 392. See recently 
BGH 11 February 2004, VIII ZR 386/02.
93 Van Dam 2013, p. 90.
94 Currently § 28 (1) BGB, formerly § 282 BGB.
95 Cf. Zimmermann 1996, p. 905-906.
96 Formerly § 847 BGB.
97 Formerly § 253 BGB.
98 Formerly § 477 BGB.
99 E.g. the special time periods applicable to claims relating to non-conformity of the goods 
(§ 438 BGB; § 634a BGB), to travel contracts (§ 651g (2) BGB), to rental agreements (§ 548 
BGB), to commercial transport (§ 439 HGB).
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While the solution of Anspruchskonkurrenz may have been helpful at the 
time, it does also have its drawbacks. It is as straightforward as the non-
cumul principle. One of the regimes is excluded, not as a matter of principle, 
but rather as a result of the claimant’s choice. Without restrictions, this may 
frustrate the purpose of contractual rules. It is therefore widely accepted 
that the freedom of the claimant to pursue any claim he wishes may be 
limited if the objective of one of the rules would otherwise be undermined. 
In fact, the courts have already been applying standards for contractual 
liability100 and shorter contractual prescription periods101 on concurrent 
tort claims for a long time. The Bundesgerichtshof has repeatedly stated that 
while the conditions, content and enforcement of every claim are required 
to be assessed independently, an exception must be made when it is clear 
that a certain provision regulates a certain situation exhaustively, which 
may exclude or limit the possibility of claiming on another legal basis.102 
Although it is the exception and not the rule,103 it is clear that contractual 
rules may thus affect the existence and substance of the tort claim.104
This has been an argument for some writers to assume that the claimant 
does not have two separate claims (Anspruchskonkurrenz) but a single claim, 
based on two separate norms (Anspruchsnormenkonkurrenz).105 This theory 
shifts the problem, but does not solve it. It is uncontroversial as long as the 
application of the relevant norms would lead to the same legal outcome. Yet 
the theory lacks clarity, even amongst its proponents, as soon as the differ-
ences become apparent and the existence and content of the particular claim 
must be determined.106 The majority of the writers therefore continues 
100 E.g. the rule that the donor (Schenker, § 521 BGB), the lender (Verleiher, § 599 BGB) and the 
board (Geschäftsführung, § 680 BGB) can only be held liable in the event of willful conduct 
(Vorsatz) or gross negligence (grobe Fahrlässigkeit) also applies to a tort claim against the 
donor (BGH 20 November 1984, BGHZ 93, 23), the lender (BGH 23 March 1966, BGHZ 
46, 140) and the board (BGH 30 November 1972, NJW 1972, 475). And the rule that the 
depository (Verwahrer, § 690 BGB) and the shareholder (Gesellschafter, § 708 BGB) can only 
be held liable if they did not exercise the care they can be expected to exercise when 
managing their own affairs, also applies to a tort claim against the depository (BGH 23 
March 1966, NJW 1967, 42) and the shareholder (BGH 20 December 1966, BGHZ 46, 313).
101 The prescription period for claims by the landlord (§ 548, formerly § 558 BGB) also 
applies to a tort claim (BGH 31 January 1967, BGHZ 47, 53; BGH 24 May 1976, BGHZ 
66, 315; BGH 8 January 1986, NJW 1986, 1608). The prescription period for claims by the 
lender (§ 606 BGB) also applies to a tort claim (BGH 31 January 1967, BGHZ 47, 53).
102 This general rule of interpretation is emphasised again in BGH 22 July 2014, KZR 27/13, 
at 53, with references to earlier case law.
103 E.g. the standards for the contractual liability of the Gesellschafter (§ 708 BGB) are not 
applicable when the extra-contractual claim concerns a road accident (BGH 20 Decem ber 
1966, BGHZ 46, 313).
104 This phenomenon is also known as einwirkende Anspruchskonkurrenz, see Georgiades 
1968, p. 86-90.
105 Georgiades 1968, p. 167 et seq. The same position was adopted by Hellwig 1900, p. 98-99; 
Esser 1960, § 201; Larenz 1962, p. 416 et seq.; Eichler 1963, p. 418-420.
106 Arens 1970, p. 400 et seq.; Medicus 2007, p. 7.
52 Chapter 3
to adhere to the theory of Anspruchskonkurrenz,107 but recognises that the 
possibility to proceed in contract or in tort may be limited.108
It is interesting to make a brief comparison between this position and 
the approach followed in the Netherlands. Dutch writers have essentially 
put forward the same arguments as their French and German colleagues, 
although the structure of the law is not entirely comparable.109 As in 
Germany, the claimant does not have to argue (and if contested, prove) 
fault in order to claim damages. It is up to the defendant to argue (and 
if contested, prove) that the breach of contract cannot be imputed to him 
(Art. 6:74 BW). While strict tortious liabilities only exist on the basis of 
specific rules with a more limited scope than in France (Art. 6:169-184 BW), 
the scope of the regime of fault-based liability in tort appears to be more 
extensive than in Germany. The formulation of the duty of care is quite 
general – one has to comply with ‘rules of unwritten law pertaining to 
proper social conduct’110 – and, in addition, there is no separate category of 
pure economic loss and hence no exclusion of such losses from the scope of 
the law of tort.111
In accordance with the former Dutch Civil Code, which was heavily 
influenced by the French Code Civil, the Hoge Raad had already made clear 
that an act or omission may constitute both a failure in the performance 
of an obligation and a ground for tortious liability provided the liability 
in tort exists ‘independently of the violation of a contractual obligation’.112 
Whether that was the case, had to be determined by looking at the purpose 
of the violated norm, the nature of the conduct and the additional circum-
stances of the case.113 A mere breach of contract was not enough.114 If a 
107 An exception is Koziol 2010, p. 101-103.
108 Recent examples include Gsell 2003, p. 319-357; Medicus & Lorenz 2015, § 33; Wandt 
2017, p. 5-11. For an overview of the literature, see Von Amsberg 1994, p. 19-21.
109 In favour of exclusive application of the law of contract e.g. Schoordijk 1964; Boukema 
1966, p. 121 et seq.; Pels Rijcken 1980, p. 1125. Against exclusive application e.g. Snijders 
1973; Nieuwenhuis 1982; Brunner 1984, p. 66; Bakels 2009a, no. 15; Castermans 2012; 
Castermans & Krans 2019, p. 69-76.
110 This rule has been laid down by the Hoge Raad in HR 31 January 1919, NJ 1919/161, note 
W.L.P.A. Molengraaff (Lindebaum/Cohen) and has been codifi ed by the legislature in Art. 
6:162 (2) BW.
111 Art. 6:95 BW.
112 HR 9 December 1955, NJ 1956/157, note L.E.H. Rutten (Boogaard/Vesta): ‘onafhankelijk 
van de schending van een contractuele verplichting’. The rule was already laid down 
in HR 6 May 1892, W 6183 (Korf/Fhijnbeen); HR 26 March 1920, NJ 1920/476 (Curiel/
Suriname); HR 11 June 1926, NJ 1926/1049, note P. Scholten (Canter Cremers/Otten). It 
was reiterated in HR 6 April 1990, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:AD4737, NJ 1991/689, note C.J.H. 
Brunner (Van Gend & Loos/Vitesse); HR 19 February 1993, ECLI:NL:HR:1993:ZC0870, 
NJ 1994/290, note C.J.H. Brunner (Gem. Groningen/Zuidema); HR 6 December 1996, 
ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZC2219, NJ 1997/398 (Fortes/Smits).
113 Cf. HR 3 December 1999, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:AA3818, NJ 2000/235, note P.A. Stein (Pratt 
& Whitney/Franssen), at. 3.5.
114 HR 23 May 1856, Weekblad van het Regt 1852 (Kuyk/Kinker).
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concurrent tortious liability existed, the claimant might choose to proceed 
on that basis. Evading the shorter prescription periods under the law of 
contract was one of the reasons for trying to do so. The drafters of the new 
Dutch Civil Code were well aware of such problems.115 They decided to 
harmonise certain rules governing the different liabilities, thereby reducing 
the tensions between them. Since 1992, the Dutch Civil Code has contained 
a general regime for damages (Art. 6:95 et. seq. BW) and a general regime 
for the prescription of claims (Art. 3:310 BW).
Differences continue to exist however. Giving the claimant an uncon-
ditional freedom to claim in tort may then frustrate the purpose of contrac-
tual rules. As in Germany, an exception is therefore made when this is 
prescribed by, or inevitably follows on from, statutory law.116 The courts 
have, for instance, applied standards for contractual liability117 and shorter 
contractual prescription periods118 on concurrent tort claims. Limitations 
may also follow from the express terms of the contract or from its nature 
and purpose.119 Moreover, case law shows that the level of the general duty 
of care may be influenced by the contractual obligations of the parties.120
As in Germany, this has been an argument for some writers to assume 
that the claimant only has one ‘mixed’ claim (gemengd vorderingsrecht), 
based on two separate norms.121 This theory has come up against compa-
rable objections. Given that the outcome of a dispute also depends on the 
arguments between the parties and on the scope of the duty of the courts to 
apply the law ex officio,122 it is argued that every claim has to be assessed on 
its own merits123 but that the existence and content of the tort claim may be 
influenced by contractual rules.124
115 As is evidenced by the contribution written by Snijders 1973, who was closely involved 
in the fi nal drafting process of the new Dutch Civil Code.
116 As repeated in HR 15 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA1414, NJ 2007/621, note K.F. Haak 
(Fernhout/Essent), at 4.2.
117 HR 2 March 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ3535, NJ 2007/240, note J.M.M. Maeijer (Holding 
Nutsbedrijf Westland), at 3.4.4.
118 HR 21 April 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AW2582, NJ 2006/272 (Inno/Sluis); HR 29 June 2007, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ7617, NJ 2008/606, note J. Hijma (Pouw/Visser).
119 HR 27 April 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB1335, NJ 2002/54, note C.J.H. Brunner (Donkers/
Scholten); HR 25 October 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE7010, NJ 2004/556, note J. Hijma 
(Bunink/Manege Nieuw Amstelland).
120 HR 15 May 1981, ECLI:NL:HR:1981:AG4187, NJ 1982/237, note B. Wachter (Temi IV/
Jan Heymans), at 3; HR 27 February 1987, ECLI:NL:HR:1987:AG5547, NJ 1987/584 
(Van der Peijl/Erasmus College), at 3.4; HR 6 April 1990, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:AD4737, NJ 
1991/689, note C.J.H. Brunner (Van Gend & Loos/Vitesse), at 3.2; HR 19 October 2007, 
ECLI:NL:HR:1990:AD4737, NJ 2007/565 (Vodafone/ETC), at 3.7.
121 Snijders 1973, p. 459-463; Nieuwenhuis 1982, p. 18-22. The Hoge Raad seems to adopt this 
position in HR 15 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA1414, NJ 2007/621, note K.F. Haak 
(Fernhout/Essent), at 4.2.
122 Castermans & Krans 2009, p. 158-159.
123 Pels Rijcken 1980, p. 1102; Nieuwenhuis 2007b; Bakels 2009b, no. 22.
124 Castermans 2012.
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3.6 English Law: independent yet interdependent categories
English law is exceptional because it is not built on the foundations of 
Roman law.125 The law has never been codified, and has mainly been 
developed by individual precedents laid down by decisions from courts 
with different and sometimes overlapping jurisdictions.126 Legal education 
has not traditionally been the domain of universities but of legal practitio-
ners. It has been ‘primarily practical and empirical, more the development 
of a professional skill than a scholarly science’.127 This may explain why 
English lawyers have not written about the subject of concurrent liabilities 
with the conceptual flavour of French lawyers or with the doctrinal rigour 
of German lawyers.128 Yet the subject has most definitely been familiar to 
English lawyers. It was not unusual that a plaintiff could choose between 
several forms of action, nor was it uncommon that one and the same matter 
could be brought either before a common law court or before a court of 
equity, leading to different possible outcomes.129
Although the basic distinction between contract and tort appeared 
already in the Middle Ages,130 the law was not structured on the basis of these 
concepts until the mid-19th century. In 1873, there was a significant reform of 
the courts’ structure and of the law of procedure. From the time of the entry 
into force of the Judicature Act in 1875, all divisions of the High Court and of 
the Court of Appeal became competent to apply all the rules and principles 
of English law.131 The forms of action were abolished, so the claimant was 
no longer obliged to choose at the very start of the litigation process which 
of the different forms of action he was going to base his claim on.132 At the 
same time, success in litigation still largely depended on the question of 
whether any cause of action was raised by the particular facts of the case. 
125 Contrary to the civilian tradition, see Zimmermann 1996, p. 1-33.
126 Zweigert & Kötz 1992, p. 187 et seq.
127 Zweigert & Kötz 1992, p. 198 et seq.
128 Weir 1984, p. 36 noted that there was ‘almost no writing on the topic in England’, refer-
ring only to Winfi eld 1931; Guest 1961; Poulton 1966.
129 Cases of misrepresentation, for example, could be brought before common law courts 
and before courts of equity. At common law, the defendant had to know of the untruth 
of the statement, or be reckless as to its truth. Later decisions in equity made clear that 
liability for misrepresentation could also be established for ‘constructive fraud’ or ‘inno-
cent mistake’. Derry v. Peek [1889] 14 App Cas 337 (HL) clarifi ed that both equity and 
common law required fraud to establish liability. In turn, Derry v. Peek was confi ned, fi rst 
in Nocton v. Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 (HL), and then in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller 
& Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (HL). About this development: Edelman 2014, p. 479-484. 
More examples of relations concurrently legal and equitable are given by Hohfeld 1913a, 
p. 553-554; Davies 2018b, p. 288-293; Taylor 2019, p. 26-27, 36-44.
130 Kegel 2002, p. 44 et seq.
131 Zweigert & Kötz 1992, p. 205-206.
132 Maitland 1910, p. 295 et seq. A heavy blow was struck already in 1852, when the Common 
Law Procedure Act 1852 provided that it should not be necessary to mention any form or 
cause of action in any writ of summons.
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This question remained as important as ever before, as Maitland noted:
‘The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves.’133
The reform of the law of procedure made it necessary to systemise the liabil-
ities that existed under the former forms of action. This task was under-
taken by several writers, who published a series of influential textbooks 
in and around the 1870s.134 Without a fundamental reconsideration of the 
general structure of the law of obligations, they assigned the existing liabili-
ties to two legal categories and emphasised the distinction between them: 
liabilities were either consensual (contract) or non-consensual (tort).135 This 
may have encouraged English lawyers to regard contract and tort as mutu-
ally exclusive.136 Nevertheless, the categories did show a certain overlap 
from the outset. As Pollock observed soon after the abolition of the forms 
of action, some liabilities in contract ‘are not founded on the breach of any 
agreement’, while some torts ‘are not in any natural sense independent of 
contract’.137
For a long time, however, the overlap was rather limited. The scope of 
the law of contract was, and still is, restricted by the doctrines of consid-
eration and privity. Under the doctrine of consideration, a promise is not 
contractually binding if the other party has not done, or promised to do, 
something in return for this promise.138 Under the doctrine of privity, a 
contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations on any person except 
the parties to it.139 More important in this context is that the scope of the law 
of tort was restricted too, due to the relatively late emergence of the general 
duty of care in respect of negligence.
The foundation of the tort of negligence was laid down in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson. The House of Lords decided that a manufacturer owed a duty 
of care in negligence irrespective of the question whether the injured person 
was a party to the incidental contract of sale.140 Donoghue v. Stevenson was 
not a unanimous decision nor was the reasoning clear and unambiguous. 
Today, however, it is regarded as the starting point of the modern law of 
negligence as it was the first time that the House of Lords recognised a 
general rule of liability for harm caused by negligence. This general duty 
133 Maitland 1910, p. 296; Pollock 1887, p. 336.
134 Atiyah 1979, p. 681-693.
135 Weir 1984, p. 35.
136 According to Guest 1961, p. 191; cf. Markesinis 1987, p. 384.
137 Pollock 1887, p. 337. Cf. Weir 1984, p. 35.
138 This requirement is still an essential feature of English contract law, as can be seen in 
MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v. Rock Advertising Ltd [2018] 2 WLR 1603 (UKSC).
139 Although the doctrine of privity still stands up to scrutiny, the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 does determine that a contract may confer rights on third parties which 
are enforceable directly by the third parties themselves.
140 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL). There are older cases that foreshadowed the 
development of the tort of negligence, see Atiyah 1979, p. 501-505, with references.
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of care also applies when the parties are in a contractual relationship. 
Not every breach of contract will, however, lead to a liability in tort.141 
A concurrent liability in tort will only arise in the event that the defendant’s 
behaviour would also have breached a tortious duty if there had not been 
a contract between the parties. In other words: the defendant must have 
violated an obligation to take reasonable care, independent of any obliga-
tion under the contract.142
The question whether the law allows the aggrieved party to bring 
a claim in tort used to arise primarily when negligent conduct of one 
contracting party caused physical damage to the body, health or property 
of another contracting party. The courts accepted that finding liability in 
tort was then possible.143 Pure economic loss was a different matter. In 
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd, the House of Lords accepted 
for the first time that a person (in that case: a bank) could be held liable 
in negligence in respect of pure economic loss resulting from reliance on a 
misstatement (in that case: an inaccurate credit reference).144 This raised the 
question whether parties to a contract could also be held liable in negligence 
in respect of pure economic loss. The courts both allowed and rejected 
concurrent liabilities in this field.145
This question was authoritatively addressed by the House of Lords in 
Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates. The case concerned a collection of claims 
brought by the members (known as ‘names’) of the insurer, Lloyd’s, against 
the managing agents who had acted on their behalf. The managing agents 
were either in a direct contractual relationship with the names or were 
indirectly linked with them through agents. The names alleged that in both 
situations the managing agents had assumed a direct responsibility to the 
names. The names that entered into a contract with the agents wanted to 
establish a concurrent duty of care in tort, in order to benefit from the more 
advantageous position on the accrual of the cause of action in tort.146
In his leading speech,147 Lord Goff clearly showed his concern about the 
‘adventitious effects’ of the existence of different rules in contract and tort 
as regards limitation and remoteness of damage. He indicated that reform 
141 Pollock 1887, p. 339 already noted that a mere non-performance of a promise cannot be 
treated as a substantive tort. Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9 also 
makes clear that the mere existence of a contractual relationship is not enough to justify 
an assumption of responsibility and concomitant reliance.
142 Weir 1984, p. 36; Burrows 1998, p. 25-26.
143 Burrows 1998, p. 25-26, with references.
144 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (HL). See, for an overview of 
the speeches, Robertson & Wang 2015, p. 51-55.
145 The cases are mentioned by Burrows 1998, p. 26, and summarised by Lord Goff in 
Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), at 184-194, with special 
attention for the statement by Lord Scarman in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v. Liu Chong Hing 
Bank Ltd [1986] UKPC 5 (PC).
146 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), per Lord Goff, at 174.
147 All Lords agreed with the speech of Lord Goff. Lord Browne-Wilkinson delivered a short 
concurring speech.
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of these incidental rules would be most welcome but readily admitted that 
‘this is perhaps crying for the moon’.148 After a careful assessment of the 
most important authorities,149 including cases from other civil and common 
law countries,150 Lord Goff reached the following conclusion:
‘My own belief is that, in the present context, the common law is not antipathetic 
to concurrent liability, and that there is no sound basis for a rule which automati-
cally restricts the claimant to either a tortious or a contractual remedy. The result 
may be untidy: but, given that the tortious duty is imposed by the general law, 
and the contractual duty is attributable to the will of the parties, I do not find it 
objectionable that the claimant may be entitled to take advantage of the remedy 
which is most advantageous to him, subject only to ascertaining whether the tor-
tious duty is so inconsistent with the applicable contract that, in accordance with 
ordinary principle, the parties must be taken to have agreed that the tortious 
remedy is to be limited or excluded.’151
The House of Lords thus allowed finding liability in negligence in respect 
of pure economic loss, also where the parties were in a contractual relation-
ship. Unless ‘his contract precludes him from doing so’, the claimant, ‘who 
has available to him concurrent remedies in contract and tort, may choose 
that remedy which appears to him to be the most advantageous’.152
The fact that tortious liability may arise if the damage is caused by or 
related to the performance, or non-performance, of a contractual obliga-
tion shows that the division between contract and tort is not as sharp as 
might be imagined. Even before Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates, Atiyah had 
already argued that this division was ‘not soundly based, either in logic or 
in history’,153 while Gilmore observed that ‘the two fields, which had been 
artificially set apart, are gradually merging and becoming one’.154 Gilmore 
coined the term ‘contort’ to describe this phenomenon. He predicted that 
the law of contract would eventually ‘be swallowed up by tort’, or that both 
areas of law would be unified in a ‘generalized theory of civil obligation’.155
Up until the present date, English law is not structured on the basis 
of such a general theory of obligations.156 The law of contract has not 
been ‘swallowed up’ by the law of tort either. Since Henderson v. Merrett 
Syndicates, it has been debated whether, and to what extent, the tortious 
remedy should be influenced, limited or excluded by the contract. Should 
148 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), at 186.
149 One case is discussed in particular: Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v. Hett Stubbs & Kemp [1979] 
Ch 384 (HC).
150 The contribution written by Weir 1984, is quoted often and has clearly infl uenced the 
outcome.
151 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), at 193-194.
152 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), at 193-194.
153 Atiyah 1979, p. 505.
154 Gilmore 1974, p. 88.
155 Gilmore 1974, p. 88, 90 and 94.
156 Although some writers have developed such a theory, e.g. Burrows 2013.
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the contractual remoteness test, for instance, also be applied to a concurrent 
claim in negligence for pure economic loss?157 In a unanimous judgment, 
the Court of Appeal decided that the test for recoverability of damage 
for pure economic loss should indeed be the more restrictive ‘reasonable 
contemplation’ test in contract and not the ‘reasonable foreseeability’ test in 
tort.158 Case law also shows that the level of the contractual duty is relevant 
in determining whether there was an assumption of responsibility.159 Even 
though the duty of care imposed by the law is independent of the contrac-
tual duty, the contractual context may influence its content,160 as is the case 
in Germany and the Netherlands.
3.7 Conclusion
The concurrence of the laws of contract and tort presents challenges to 
any system of private law. Yet their solutions differ. French law excludes 
the possibility to claim in tort if the damage is caused by or related to the 
performance, or non-performance, of a contractual obligation. German, 
Dutch and English law take the opposite point of view: finding liability in 
tort is not precluded if the damage is caused by or related to the perfor-
mance, or non-performance, of a contractual obligation.
In theory, several arguments have been given for and against both 
solutions. Proponents of a fundamental precedence of the law of contract 
over the law of tort assert that this solution respects the freedom of contract 
and the intention of the legislature. Parties to a contract should not be 
able to ‘escape’ from the regime designed for those relationships into the 
general regime of tort. By contrast, their adversaries argue that the law of 
tort should offer a certain level of protection to all persons, whether they 
have concluded a contract or not. The basic principle should therefore be 
the opposite: in the absence of a clear intention, on the part of the legislature 
or the parties themselves, the mere existence of a contract should not a priori 
set aside the protection provided by the law of tort.
In practice, the choice between these competing solutions is also influ-
enced by the scope and structure of the laws of contract and tort. French 
courts have not merely drawn a rigid demarcation line between the two 
regimes out of a genuine concern for the freedom of contract and the will 
of the legislature, but also to protect contracting parties against the general 
strict liability for things fostered by the courts themselves. German, Dutch 
and English courts have not merely allowed concurrent claims in tort 
157 As proposed by Burrows 2011. Cf. Cartwright 1996.
158 Wellesley Partners LLP v. Withers LLP [2015] EWCACiv 1146. An overview of the speeches 
is given by Taylor 2019, p. 34-36.
159 Riyad Bank v. Ahli United Bank (UK) Plc [2006] EWCA Civ 780 (CA); Robinson v. PE Jones 
(Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9.
160 Taylor 2019, p. 32-36.
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because that solution suited the structure of their systems of private law, 
but also to protect contracting parties when it would not be justified to treat 
them less favourably than passers-by would be treated. In these systems, 
the expansion of tort law seems to have been the price of a rigid contract 
law, to use the expression coined by Markesinis.161
This chapter has shown that the resoluteness of both approaches has 
softened over time. Under German, Dutch and English law, the contractual 
relationship continues to be relevant to the assessment of the tort claim. It 
cannot be said that these legal systems do not respect the will of the parties 
and the intention of the legislature. Germany and the Netherlands have, 
moreover, harmonised the rules on the scope of damages and the prescrip-
tion of claims. The dust is settling in English law too, as the courts are called 
upon to indicate which test applies to a concurrent claim in tort. As a result 
of these judicial and legislative interventions, the scope of the problem has 
been further reduced.
A trend towards convergence can even be observed in France. To be 
sure, recourse to the law of tort remains generally excluded. However, 
several newly adopted liability regimes do transcend the boundaries of 
contract and tort. In the near future, the French legislature also intends to 
harmonise the rules on damages and causation. It must be noted, moreover, 
that the courts have provided additional protection to contracting parties, 
not only by introducing exceptions to the principle of non-cumul but also 
by imposing obligations de sécurité. In France, therefore, the expansion of 
contract law seems to have been the price of the exclusion of tort law.
Importantly, this case study reminds us that the decision to permit or 
restrict the availability of claims, powers, and defences depends on the 
content of the rules and the structure of the legal system at issue. What 
appears at first to be the same problem – the overlap of the laws of contract 
and tort – may turn out to have a different nature and scope in different 
jurisdictions. We should be aware that the courts may be inclined to protect 
certain interests by denying the possibility of dual application altogether. It 
is submitted that this finding does not, however, call in question the scheme 
of analysis as such. Rather, it shows that questions of concurrence are ques-
tions of interpretation which may be answered differently, depending on 
the scope and structure of the relevant rules.
Having considered in greater detail the reasons underlying the deci-
sion to permit or restrict the availability of claims, powers, and defences, 
it is time to embark on the next leg of our journey. What – if any – is the 
impact of the laws of the European Union? How do these laws influence 
our scheme of analysis?
161 Markesinis 1987.

4 Concurrence in European Private Law: 
Two Underlying Propositions
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have explained the scheme of analysis by which 
questions of concurrence are debated and solved within national systems 
of private law. In the current multilevel legal order, private relationships 
are not merely subject to national rules but also, and increasingly so, to 
international legal regimes. It has become particularly important to fathom 
the impact of the laws of the European Union, and to understand their 
interaction with the domestic systems of legal protection. This prompts the 
question whether the previous chapters can be of any assistance here. May 
the scheme of analysis, conceived and fostered in the context of the national 
systems of private law, also be used when the overlapping rules, or some of 
them, originate from Union law?
Before we turn to examine this question, it is important to take a step 
back and substantiate in more detail two underlying propositions. The first 
proposition is that the bodies of primary and secondary Union law contain 
rules that are comparable to the rules we have examined in the previous 
chapters. In order to test this proposition, this chapter first outlines the 
sources of Union law and their effects in the national legal orders (section 
4.2). The chapter then shows that Union law provides individuals with a 
range of claims, powers, and defences. Building on previous research,1 this 
chapter provides a comprehensive overview of these rules. To that end, 
it does not limit itself to one particular source of law or policy area, but 
examines the rules governing private relationships across the full spectrum 
of Union law, paying due attention to the activities of both the Union legis-
lature and the Court of Justice of the European Union (sections 4.3-4.4).
The second proposition is that the objectives of each rule, regardless of 
its source, should be realised to the greatest possible extent. At first sight, 
this position seems difficult to square with the idea of a fixed hierarchy, both 
within the Union legal order and as regards the relationship between Union 
law and the national legal orders. Should we not start from the premise 
that rules with a higher status override rules lower down the hierarchy? 
On second thought, it appears that the question whether one rule trumps 
another rule is a question of interpretation which cannot be answered 
on the basis of the Kelsen model, so this chapter argues (section 4.5). The 
1 See e.g. Dougan 2011, p. 430 and 435-437; Wilman 2016, p. 890-896; Ackermann 2018, 
p. 758-763; De Graaff & Verheij 2019.
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chapter concludes that it is necessary to examine in more detail how Union 
law deals with questions of concurrence (section 4.6).
4.2 The sources of Union law and their effects
We have seen that issues of concurrence are caused by the overlap and 
conflict of legal rules. These rules may be written or unwritten, statutory or 
judge-made, enforceable only inside or also outside the courts. Yet regard-
less of their precise legal source, certain types of rules occupy centre stage 
in any system of private law. The attention is fixed on the claims that enable 
a person to demand some performance from another person and on the 
powers that enable a person to create, modify or extinguish a legal position 
or relationship. Viewed from the angle of the defendant, emphasis is laid on 
the rules that may be relied upon as defences to resist the enforcement of a 
claim or the exercise of a power.2
Rules of Union law also originate from different sources. They may 
be based on binding agreements between the Member States, such as the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (the 
Charter). Some rules have been developed by the Court of Justice under 
the flag of the general principles of Union law.3 And many rules have their 
origins in acts adopted by the Union legislature, in regulations and in direc-
tives.4 This prompts the question whether these rules are comparable to 
the rules we have examined in the previous chapters. Do they create rights 
– more particularly claims, powers, and defences – that can be relied upon 
by one individual against another individual?
The natural starting point for any discussion about the creation of rights 
in Union law is the theory of direct effect. This theory teaches us that only 
rules that are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional are capable of 
being applied directly, without national law serving as an intermediary.5 
According to the Court of Justice, the consequence of direct effect is that 
Union law creates rights upon individuals which they can enforce before 
the domestic courts.6 The Court has thus tied the two concepts – rights and 
2 Supra sections 1.3 and 2.3.
3 As these general principles have been read into the founding treaties, they are usually 
considered part of primary Union law, e.g. by Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 193-196; De 
Witte & Smulders 2018, p. 196-198.
4 Art. 288 TFEU also mentions decisions, recommendations and opinions, but they are not 
discussed here because they do not serve as sources of binding general rules.
5 Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 192.
6 Already apparent in Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, ECLI:
EU:C:1963:1, where the Court held that Article 12 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community ‘must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating 
individuals rights which national courts must protect’.
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direct effect – together.7 This position raises two important questions. What 
kinds of rights do directly effective provisions create? And if only directly 
effective provisions create enforceable rights, should we then confine our 
attention to this category of legal rules?
The first question has already kept scholars busy for a long time. They 
have constructed a narrow and a broad definition of direct effect.8 Propo-
nents of the broad definition, also known as objective direct effect, approach 
the issue from the perspective of the courts. For them, the key question is 
whether a provision of Union law ‘is sufficiently operational in itself to be 
applied by a court’9 or by another authority.10 This does not mean that every 
provision will always have the same kind of effect. It is widely accepted 
that rules may serve as sources of substantive rights – the so-called substitu-
tionary effect – and as standards to review the legality of national law – the 
so-called exclusionary effect.11
Advocates of the narrow definition, on the other hand, focus on the 
relationship at issue rather than on the role of the courts. For them, the key 
question is whether a provision of Union law creates a substantive right and 
a corresponding obligation which would not otherwise have existed on the 
basis of the applicable national law. Viewed from this angle, legality review 
is not a form of direct effect, because it does not create a right and a corre-
sponding obligation between the parties, but only excludes a conflicting 
national legal rule.12 This narrow definition, also known as subjective direct 
effect, seemed to have gone out of fashion but has recently found new 
support among private lawyers.13
The divide between these positions is by no means as large as might be 
imagined.14 At the end of the day, writers on both sides agree that Union 
law may be relied upon for various reasons and that its application by the 
courts may lead to different results. In the present context, it should be 
noted that the meaning of the term ‘right’ changes accordingly. On the one 
hand, the term is used, not least by the Court of Justice itself,15 to refer to a 
7 Timmermans 1979, p. 539; Ruffert 1997, p. 315; Prechal 2005, p. 99.
8 Timmermans 1979, p. 537-544; Prechal 2005, p. 99-106; De Witte 2011, p. 330-331; Craig & 
De Búrca 2015, p. 185-186.
9 Opinion A-G Van Gerven, C-128/92, H.J. Banks & Co. Ltd v. British Coal Corporation, ECLI:EU:
C:1993:860, at 27.
10 Added by Prechal 2005, p. 241.
11 Prechal 2005, p. 241; Dougan 2007, p. 933-934, 937-938; De Witte 2011, p. 331; McDonnell
2018, p. 430-431. See also Opinion A-G Saggio, Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano
Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores v. Rocío Murciano Quintero and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1999:
620, at 37-39.
12 E.g. Lenaerts & Corthaut 2006, p. 291-292, 309-310.
13 Consider e.g. Hartkamp 2013, p. 195-196; Sieburgh 2015, p. 3-4; Verbruggen 2017, p. 59-60; 
and the authors contributing to Hartkamp, Sieburgh & Devroe 2017. These authors label 
legality review as a form of indirect horizontal effect.
14 Timmermans 1979, p. 538-539; Dougan 2007, p. 937-940; Engström 2009, p. 13-14.
15 E.g. in Case C-414/16, Vera Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:257, at 76 and 78; Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, ECLI:EU:C:2018:696, at 69.
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general right to ‘rely on’ Union law. This right corresponds to a duty on the 
courts to apply Union law and, if need be, to set aside conflicting national 
laws in the cases arising before them.16 On the other hand, the term is used 
to indicate a more specific entitlement of an individual against one or more 
others, such as restitution, specific performance or compensation.17
In the previous chapters, we have focused on the latter category of 
rights. In the parlance of Union law, we have been concerned with substitu-
tion rather than exclusion. It would, however, be an error to focus only on 
substitutionary effects and to exclude exclusionary effects from the scope 
of this book. Leaving aside the question of whether the distinction between 
these categories is conceptually convincing,18 it must be noted that the 
review of legality can – and often will – in substance operate as a defence. 
The defendant may argue that Union law precludes the application of 
the rule on which the claimant relies. Likewise, it may be possible for the 
claimant to reply that Union law precludes the application of the rule on 
which the defendant relies. For this reason, this book includes the review of 
national laws against directly effective provisions of Union law and treats it 
as a substantive defence.
The second question remains to be answered. Should we confine our 
attention to directly effective provisions? An affirmative answer would 
mean that we would largely exclude directives from the scope of our 
enquiry. Unlike regulations, directives are only binding ‘as to the result 
to be achieved’ and leave the national authorities ‘the choice of form and 
methods’.19 The Court of Justice maintains that directives cannot, therefore, 
of themselves impose obligations on individuals.20 It is true that the Court 
has occasionally ruled that certain technical provisions of national law had 
to be set aside because they had been adopted without prior notification to 
the Commission,21 or in defiance of an instruction by the Commission to 
postpone the adoption.22 However, this exception – also named ‘incidental’ 
horizontal effect – is rather limited in scope. Setting aside national law on 
the sole basis of non-compliance with the requirements stemming from a 
directive is only possible if the directive ‘does not in any way define the 
substantive scope of the legal rule on the basis of which the national court 
16 Prechal 2005, p. 100.
17 Van Gerven 2000, p. 507; Prechal 2005, p. 97; Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 186.
18 Dougan 2007, p. 937-940, argues that the distinction is arbitrary and diffi cult to maintain. 
In a similar vein, Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 219-220.
19 Art. 288 TFEU.
20 Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching), ECLI:EU:C:1986:84, at 48; Case C-91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl, ECLI:EU:
C:1994:292, at 19-25; Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v. Centre informatique du Centre 
Ouest Atlantique, ECLI:EU:C:2012:33, at 37 and 42; Case C-176/12, Association de médiation 
sociale, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, at 37; Case C-122/17, David Smith v. Patrick Meade and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:631, at 42-43.
21 Case C-194/94, CIA Security International v. Signalson and Securitel, ECLI:EU:C:1996:172.
22 Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia v. Central Food, ECLI:EU:C:2000:496.
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must decide the case before it’.23 We know that this is a high threshold.24 We 
may, therefore, safely conclude that directives can only rarely be applied to 
exclude national laws and cannot, in any case, substitute them with novel 
rights.
Nevertheless, many directives do spell out these rights in great detail. 
Such directives leave little discretion to the national authorities, which 
means that the transposition into national law is almost entirely a matter 
of form.25 It also means that the directives enable the courts to determine 
precisely the level of protection that must be provided by the domestic 
legal systems.26 But instead of moving forward by declaring such provi-
sions directly effective, the Court has gone astray and gradually, yet firmly, 
improved their effectiveness by strengthening the principle of consistent 
or harmonious interpretation. By now, it is clear that the whole body 
of national law, including established case law of the national courts,27 
must be interpreted ‘so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the 
purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought 
by the directive’.28 It is possible to make exceptions, particularly for the 
23 Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia v. Central Food, ECLI:EU:C:2000:496, at 51. This test has been 
confi rmed in Case C-122/17, David Smith v. Patrick Meade and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:631, 
at 53.
24 In Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer and others, ECLI:EU:C:2004:584, for 
instance, the Court held that a provision of German law was incompatible with the 
requirements under the Working Time Directive, but did not draw the conclusion that 
the provision at issue should be set aside. In Case C-122/17, David Smith v. Patrick Meade 
and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:631, at 53-55, the Court proceeded on the assumption that 
the national and contractual provisions at issue violated the Third Directive on insurance 
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, but refused to order the court 
to set aside these provisions, because the case concerned a legal relationship between 
private persons.
25 Also observed by Johnston & Unberath 2006, p. 188-190; Twigg-Flesner 2011, p. 245; 
Wilman 2016, p. 893; De Witte & Smulders 2018, p. 211.
26 As the Court concluded in e.g. Case C-91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl, ECLI:EU:
C:1994:292, at 12-18; Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer and others, ECLI:EU:
C:2004:584, at 102-106.
27 Case C-456/98, Centrosteel v. Adipol, ECLI:EU:C:2000:402, at 17; Case C-441/14, Dansk
Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S, v. Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen, ECLI:EU:
C:2016:278, at 33; Case C-414/16, Vera Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und 
Entwicklung, ECLI:EU:C:2018:257, at 72-73; Case C-684/16, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur 
Förderung der Wissenschaften v. Tetsuji Shimizu, ECLI:EU:C:2018:874, at 60; Joined Cases 
C-569/16 and C-570/16, Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer (C-569/16) and Volker 
Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn (C-570/16), ECLI:EU:C:2018:871, at 68.
28 Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer and others, ECLI:EU:C:2004:584, at 113; Case 
C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v. Swedex, ECLI:EU:C:2010:2148, at 48; Case C-282/10, Maribel 
Dominguez v. Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique, ECLI:EU:C:2012:33, at 24; 
Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S, v. Estate of Karsten Eigil 
Rasmussen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278, at 31; Case C-684/16, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur 
Förderung der Wissenschaften v. Tetsuji Shimizu, ECLI:EU:C:2018:874, at 58; Joined Cases 
C-569/16 and C-570/16, Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer (C-569/16) and Volker 
Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn (C-570/16), ECLI:EU:C:2018:871, at 66.
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protection of legal certainty and legitimate interests,29 but the thresholds are 
high.30 What is more, the Court sometimes suggests that an interpretation 
of national law in conformity with the directive at issue should actually be 
possible.31 National law may still be the formal vehicle, but the Court of 
Justice is squarely in the driver’s seat.
Against this background, the second question must be answered in the 
negative. As we will see, many directives prescribe precisely which claims, 
powers, and defences should be made available under national law, and 
under what conditions. Such directives, and their interpretation by the 
Court of Justice, can tell us much about the way Union law deals with 
issues of concurrence in relationships between individuals. It is important 
to take note of these solutions, if only because national courts are under a 
duty to follow the same line of reasoning when interpreting and applying 
the implementing measures adopted at the national level. For these reasons, 
directives deserve to be examined in this book.32 Before we plunge into the 
body of secondary Union law, however, the next section will provide an 
overview of claims and defences originating from primary Union law.
4.3 Primary Union law: claims and defences
We will not find many comparable rules when we browse the founding 
Treaties and the Charter. The Charter is principally addressed to the various 
institutions and agencies of the Union, and to the Member States when they 
are implementing Union law.33 The Treaties are largely silent too when it 
comes to the relationships between individuals. Only Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU clearly prohibit anticompetitive conduct of private undertakings. 
29 E.g. Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v. Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:33, at 25; Case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, ECLI:EU:
C:2014:2, at 39; Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S, v. Estate of Karsten
Eigil Rasmussen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278, at 32; Case C-122/17, David Smith v. Patrick Meade 
and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:631, at 40.
30 Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 212-216.
31 Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v. Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:33, at 26-31; Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos 
A/S, v. Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278, at 34.
32 The same reasoning is followed by Gruber 2004, p. 14-15, 19-20, 229. Hartkamp 2011, 
p. 158, on the other hand, excludes directives from the scope of his defi nition of concur-
rence because directives are not directly applicable.
33 Art. 51 (1) of the Charter. This does not mean, however, that the Charter cannot apply 
to relationships between individuals, as the Court made clear in Case C-684/16, Max-
Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften v. Tetsuji Shimizu, ECLI:EU:C:2018:874, 
at 76-79; Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer 
(C-569/16) and Volker Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn (C-570/16), ECLI:EU:C:2018:871, at 
87-90.
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Moreover, Article 101 (2) TFEU expressly states that agreements that restrict 
or distort the competition within the internal market ‘shall be automatically 
void’. This provision may be relied upon in order to support a claim under 
national law or to obtain a declaration of nullity, and is generally invoked as 
a defence to resist a claim for performance or a claim for damages for breach 
of contract.34
Apart from Article 101 (2) TFEU, the treaty and Charter provisions 
themselves do not provide much guidance about their effects in relation-
ships between individuals. Clarification, therefore, has to come from the 
Court of Justice. Importantly, the Court has explained that any person is 
entitled to claim compensation for losses resulting from an anti-competitive 
agreement or practice prohibited under Article 101 TFEU.35 Many writers 
assume that this right is conferred directly by the Treaties.36 This conclu-
sion has been supported by the Union legislature, not only with regard to 
infringements of Article 101 TFEU, but also with regard to losses resulting 
from the abuse of a dominant position prohibited under Article 102 TFEU.37 
In fact, the Court has recently confirmed that Article 102 TFEU may serve 
as a basis to claim compensation for the harm suffered as a result of the 
abuse of a dominant position.38 The existence of a legal basis in the Treaties 
explains why the directive on damages for infringements of competition 
laws only deals with incidental issues, such as the extent of compensation, 
limitation, and joint and several liability.
Another example can be found in the case law on the right to paid 
annual leave, which is protected by Article 31 (2) of the Charter. In the view 
of the Court, this provision expresses ‘an essential principle of EU social 
law’ and includes not only the right to paid annual leave as such, but also 
‘the right, inherent in the former, to an allowance in lieu of annual leave 
34 Odudu 2013, p. 395-415; Whish & Bailey 2015, p. 345; Devroe, Cauffman & Bernitz 2017, 
p. 34-37.
35 Case C-453/99, Courage v. Crehan, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, at 26; Joined Cases C-295/04 to 
C-298/04, Manfredi and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, at 61; Case C-557/12, Kone and others 
v. ÖBB-Infrastruktur, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1317, at 22; Case C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunki v. 
Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, at 26.
36 E.g. Komninos 2002; Drake 2006; Dougan 2011, p. 426-430; Havu 2012. See also Opinion 
A-G Wahl, Case C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:100, at 34-45.
37 Recitals 3-4, 7-8, 11 and 14 of Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions 
for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union.
38 Case C-637/17, Cogeco Communications v. Sport TV Portugal and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:
263, at 40.
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not taken upon termination of the employment relationship’.39 The Court 
has also determined that Article 31 (2) of the Charter may, under certain 
circumstances, impose a ‘corresponding obligation on the employer’ to 
grant such periods of paid leave or to pay compensation as a substitution 
for the holidays accrued.40 The latter right is ‘pecuniary in nature’, becomes 
‘part of the relevant person’s assets’ and ‘may be passed on by inheritance’ 
to the legal heirs of the employee.41
A third example can be found in the case law on Article 21 (1) of the 
Charter, which protects individuals against any discrimination on any 
ground. This provision played an important role in a case about the compat-
ibility with Union law of Austrian legislation which required employers 
to give their employees a day off on Good Friday. The problem was that 
the legislature had granted this advantage only to members of certain 
Christian churches. If their employer nonetheless required them to work 
on Good Friday, these employees were entitled to an additional payment. 
No such entitlement existed in respect of non-Christian employees. 
Having concluded that such a legislative measure constitutes a form of 
direct discrimination on grounds of religion which cannot be justified on 
the basis of Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment and 
occupation,42 the Court examined whether Union law requires private 
employers to grant the same benefits to employees who do not belong to 
these Christian churches. The Court determined that all employees should 
enjoy the same treatment until Austrian legislation complies with Union 
law.43 The Court concluded that employees who are not a member of any 
of the churches mentioned by the legislature are entitled, on the basis of 
Article 21 of the Charter, to a public holiday on Good Friday and also to the 
additional payment if their employer refuses their request to be absent from 
work on that day.44
Only rarely does the Court work out the impact of the applica-
tion of a treaty or Charter provision upon legal relationships between 
individuals in such detail. The Court has, however, frequently assessed 
the conduct of private parties against the treaty and Charter provisions 
39 Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer (C-569/16) 
and Volker Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn (C-570/16), ECLI:EU:C:2018:871, at 83 (and at 39 
and 58); Case C-684/16, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften v. Tetsuji 
Shimizu, ECLI:EU:C:2018:874, at 72.
40 Case C-684/16, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften v. Tetsuji Shimizu, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:874, at 79.
41 Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer (C-569/16) 
and Volker Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn (C-570/16), ECLI:EU:C:2018:871, at 48 and 62.
42 Case C-193/17, Cresco Investigation v. Markus Achatzi, ECLI:EU:C:2019:43, at 35-69.
43 Case C-193/17, Cresco Investigation v. Markus Achatzi, ECLI:EU:C:2019:43, at 79-83, refer-
ring to Case C-406/15, Petya Milkova v. Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia i 
sledprivatizatsionen control, ECLI:EU:C:2017:198, at 66-68.
44 Case C-193/17, Cresco Investigation v. Markus Achatzi, ECLI:EU:C:2019:43, at 85-86.
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prohibiting discrimination,45 and against treaty provisions banning restric-
tions of the free movement of citizens46 and workers,47 of the freedom of 
establishment,48 and of the freedom to provide services.49 Compensation 
was often at stake in the underlying legal proceedings. Yet it is questionable 
whether Union law itself confers a fully-fledged claim for damages and 
imposes a corresponding duty on an individual in these circumstances.50 
After all, the basic assumption, laid down by the Court in the leading cases 
Rewe and Comet, is that in the absence of relevant Union laws, the applicable 
national law governs such rights and duties.51 This so-called principle of 
45 The general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality was at stake in 
Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:140; Case 13/76, Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115; 
Case 90/76, Henry van Ameyde v. UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1977:101; Case 43/75, Gabrielle 
Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, ECLI:EU:C:1976:56; Case 
251/83, Eberhard Haug-Adrion v. Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG, ECLI:EU:C:1984:397; Case 
C-411/98, Angelo Ferlini v. Centre Hospitalier de Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:2000:530; Case 
C-22/18, TopFit and Daniele Biffi  v. Deutscher Leichtathletikverband, ECLI:EU:C:2019:497. 
Article 21 (1) Charter was dealt with in Case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, at 47 (discrimination on grounds of age), and in Case C-414/16, Vera 
Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung, ECLI:EU:C:2018:257, at 
76-79 (discrimination on grounds of religion or belief).
46 Case C-22/18, TopFit and Daniele Biffi  v. Deutscher Leichtathletikverband, ECLI:EU:C:2019:
497.
47 Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:140; Case 13/76, Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115; 
Case 251/83, Eberhard Haug-Adrion v. Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG, ECLI:EU:C:1984:397; 
Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc 
Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463; Case C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Braine v. FRBSB, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:201; Case C-281/98, Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:296; Case C-94/07, Andrea Raccanelli v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur 
Förderung der Wissenschaften, ECLI:EU:C:2008:425; Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais 
v. Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143; Case C-379/09, Maurits 
Casteels v. British Airways, ECLI:EU:C:2011:131; Case C-172/11, Georges Erny v. Daimler, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:399.
48 Case 90/76, Henry van Ameyde v. UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1977:101; Case 251/83, Eberhard Haug-
Adrion v. Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG, ECLI:EU:C:1984:397; Case C-309/99, Wouters and 
others v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98; Case 
C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772.
49 Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:140; Case 13/76, Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115; 
Case 90/76, Henry van Ameyde v. UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1977:101; Case 251/83, Eberhard Haug-
Adrion v. Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG, ECLI:EU:C:1984:397; Joined Cases C-51/96 and 
C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL and 
others, ECLI:EU:C:2000:199; Case C-309/99, Wouters and others v. Algemene Raad van de 
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri v. 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
50 E.g. Drake 2006; Leczykiewicz 2010; Havu 2012, argue that no general regime of hori-
zontal liability exists.
51 Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfi nanz and Rewe-Zentral v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:188; Case 45/76, Comet v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, ECLI:EU:C:
1976:191.
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national procedural autonomy is subject to two well-known limitations: 
the national rules (1) cannot be less favourable than those relating to rights 
flowing from national law (the principle of equivalence); and (2) must not 
render the exercise of Union rights practically impossible or excessively 
difficult (the principle of effectiveness).52 Hence, the claim may be based 
on national law, but is modelled on the requirements of Union law, more 
particularly on the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.53
The leading cases Defrenne, Bosman and Angonese may serve as illus-
trative examples.54 Gabrielle Defrenne claimed compensation from her 
employer on the basis of Belgian law. She argued that she had received 
unequal pay for equal work, contrary to the current Article 157 TFEU.55 
Jean-Marc Bosman argued that the transfer rules and nationality clauses 
adopted by professional football associations violated the free movement of 
workers and restricted competition within the internal market. He sought 
a declaration that the rules did not bind him and claimed compensation 
under Belgian law from his former club and from several football associa-
tions.56 Roman Angonese argued that the language requirement imposed 
by a bank for admission to a recruitment competition infringed the free 
movement of workers. He brought legal proceedings in order to have the 
language requirement declared void under Italian law and have the bank 
compensate him for his losses.57 In all these cases, Union law could success-
fully be invoked in support of claims based on national laws.
An infringement of primary Union law may also be pleaded as a 
defence. We have already considered the possibility to invoke competi-
tion law as a defence. This is just one of many examples. The defendant 
may argue that the rule on which the claimant relies must be interpreted 
in accordance with – or must be set aside because it is contrary to – the 
prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality, laid down in 
Article 18 TFEU, protected as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the 
Charter and recognised as a general principle of Union law.58 Likewise, the 
52 An overview of the subsequent case law is provided by Dougan 2011, p. 408-421; Craig & 
De Búrca 2015, p. 225-251; Ebers 2016, p. 19-45.
53 Reich 2007, p. 708-709, who refers to the ‘hybridisation of remedies’.
54 See, about the horizontal direct effect of the treaty provisions banning restrictions of 
the free movement of workers, establishment, and services, also Van den Bogaert 2002, 
p. 123-129; Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 23-29.
55 Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:56.
56 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc 
Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463.
57 Case C-281/98, Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296.
58 With respect to discrimination on grounds of age (Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold 
v. Rüdiger Helm, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709, at 78; Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v. Swedex, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:21, at 56; Case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, 
at 47) and discrimination on grounds of religion or belief (Case C-414/16, Vera Egenberger 
v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung, ECLI:EU:C:2018:257, at 76; Case 
C-68/17, IR v. JQ, ECLI:EU:C:2018:696, at 69).
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arguments put forward by the claimant may be scrutinised on the basis of 
treaty provisions prohibiting discrimination on specific grounds, such as 
unequal treatment of male and female employees,59 or on the basis of the 
free movement of workers, the freedom of establishment, or the freedom to 
provide services.60
Consider the case of football club Olympique Lyonnais against football 
player Olivier Bernard and his new club Newcastle United. Under the Charte 
du Football Professionnel, a collective agreement for the sector, Olympique 
Lyonnais was entitled to have Bernard sign a contract as a professional 
football player after his training programme had ended. Bernard did not 
accept the offer and signed a contract with Newcastle United. Olympique 
Lyonnais then claimed damages on the basis of the French Code du travail 
because Bernard failed to comply with his obligations under the Charte 
du Football Professionnel. Bernard and his new employer replied that this 
outcome would violate the free movement of workers. Olympique Lyonnais 
responded that the restriction of the right of free movement was justified 
because it furthered the recruitment and training of young players. At the 
end of the day, the Court of Justice sided with Bernard. His defence enliv-
ened: the scheme of compensation under the Code du travail went beyond 
what is necessary to attain the stated objective.61
Not only does this judgment highlight the importance of so-called 
Euro-defences,62 it also shows that if a violation of primary Union law has 
been pleaded – either by the claimant or by the defendant – the other party 
may use one or more tools from the same box. He may argue that verdict 
must be given in his favour because his counterpart has invoked Union 
law for abusive or fraudulent ends.63 Depending on the basis of the claim, 
moreover, other defences may be available too. If the claimant pleads a case 
of indirect discrimination, for instance, the defendant may reply that the 
unequal treatment served a legitimate objective, and that the means chosen 
were necessary and appropriate for attaining this objective.64 If the claimant 
59 Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:56.
60 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:
772, at 33, with references to earlier case law.
61 Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United, ECLI:EU:
C:2010:143. See, about this case, also Van den Bogaert 2010, p. 265-272.
62 This term is used by common lawyers, see e.g. Gormley 1986, p. 292; Hall 1991, p. 334-338; 
Jarvis 1995, p. 452 and 464; Howard 2003, p. 36 and 40; Odudu 2013, p. 395-415; Leczykie-
wicz & Weatherill 2013, p. 4; Warner 2013, p. 532-538.
63 The prohibition of abusive practices is a general principle of Union law, as the Court 
confirmed in Case C-251/16, Edward Cussens, John Jennings, Vincent Kingston v. T.G. 
Brosnan, ECLI:EU:C:2017:881, at 27-44; Joined Cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and 
C-299/16, N Luxembourg 1 (C-115/16), X Denmark A/S (C-118/16), C Danmark I (C-119/16), 
Z Denmark ApS (C-299/16) v. Skatteministeriet, ECLI:EU:C:2019:134, at 96-101; Joined 
Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16, Skatteministeriet v. T Danmark (C-116/16), Y Denmark 
Aps (C-117/16), ECLI:EU:C:2019:135, at 70-75, with many references to earlier case law.
64 Ellis & Watson 2012, p. 169-174.
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alleges a breach of Article 101 TFEU, the defendant may argue that the anti-
competitive agreement is not prohibited because it satisfies the conditions 
of a block exemption regulation adopted by the European Commission.65 
If the claimant alleges a restriction of free movement, the defendant may 
respond that the restriction served a legitimate objective, such as public 
policy, public security or public health,66 the protection of fundamental 
rights,67 or some other objective of ‘general interest’,68 and that the means 
chosen were necessary and appropriate for attaining this objective. Thus, 
it is clear that primary Union law provides individuals with a variety of 
defences, each with its own characteristic features.
4.4 Secondary Union law: claims, powers, defences
We will find many more examples if we examine the measures adopted 
by the Union legislature. Since the 1980s, a range of directives regulating 
private relationships has been introduced. Their overall objective is to ensure 
that consumers and businesses have better access to the internal market,
which must result in more cross-border transactions. For this reason, 
most directives regulate contracts in general, and consumer contracts in 
particular. In recent years, the use of regulations has gained in popularity, 
especially in the fields of transport, consumer protection, and judicial 
cooperation in civil matters.69 The question is whether these directives and 
regulations contain rules that are comparable to the rules we have examined 
in the previous chapters. Do they provide – or instruct the Member States to 
provide – individuals with claims, powers, and defences?
65 This is settled case law: Case 10/86, VAG France v. Établissements Magne, ECLI:EU:C:1986:502,
at 12; Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91, at 41; Case 
C-226/94, Grand Garage Albigeois and others v. Garage Massol, ECLI:EU:C:1996:55, at 15; 
Case C-309/94, Nissan and others v. Jean-Luc Dupasquier and others, ECLI:EU:C:1996:57, at 
15; Case C-230/96, Cabour and Nord Distribution Automobile v. Arnor, ECLI:EU:C:1998:181, 
at 47.
66 See, with regard to the free movement of workers, explicitly Case C-415/93, Union Royale 
Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 
86; Case C-350/96, Clean Car Autoservice GmbH v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, ECLI:EU:
C:1998:205, at 24. The interpretation of these exceptions may differ, depending on the 
fundamental freedom at issue.
67 Such as the right to take collective action for the protection of workers: Case C-438/05, 
International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772, at 77; Case 
C-341/05, Laval un Partneri v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, at 103.
68 Such as the recruitment and training of young players (Case C-415/93, Union Royale 
Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, 
at 106; Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:143, at 39).
69 De Graaff & Verheij 2017, p. 990-991; Ackermann 2018, p. 761; De Graaff & Verheij 2019, 
p. 277-281.
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Indeed, many directives and regulations enable individuals to demand 
some performance from another person. The entitlement to payment 
in money is particularly important.70 An early example is the right to 
claim compensation from a producer ‘for damage caused by a defect in 
his product’.71 Consider also the right of the commercial agent to claim 
‘commission’ from his principal for transactions concluded through his 
agency, and to demand compensation upon termination of the agency 
contract.72 For his part, the principal may demand repayment of the 
commission if the contract he concluded with the third party introduced by 
the agent has not been properly executed.73 Consider also the entitlement 
to an ‘allowance in lieu’ of paid annual leave not taken upon termination of 
the employment relationship,74 the right of a creditor to claim compensation 
from a commercial party for losses resulting from late payment,75 the right 
of a payer to demand a ‘refund’ from his payment service provider,76 and 
the right of a consumer to claim reimbursement after termination of a sales 
contract because of a lack of conformity.77
Additional examples can be found in the area of transport. Over the 
years, the Union legislature has introduced a comprehensive set of traveller 
and passenger rights. The set includes, first of all, a directive on package 
travel and linked travel arrangements. In accordance with this directive, 
the traveller is entitled to claim ‘appropriate compensation’ if the organiser 
70 Cf. Wilman 2016, p. 896-909, who deals with a selection of legislative acts in the fi elds 
of public procurement, intellectual property, consumer protection, and competition law. 
Public procurement will not be discussed in this chapter, given the focus of this book on 
the relationships between private parties.
71 Art. 1, Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the liability for defective products.
72 Art. 6-8 and Art. 17 respectively, Council Directive of 18 December 1986 on self-employed 
commercial agents (86/653/EEC). Note that Art. 17 contains two compensatory 
mechanisms – ‘indemnity’ and ‘compensation’ – but leaves the choice between these 
two options to the Member States, as confi rmed in Case C-338/14, Quenon v. Citibank and 
Citilife, ECLI:EU:C:2015:795, at 24.
73 Art. 11 (2) in conjunction with Art. 11 (1), Council Directive of 18 December 1986 on self-
employed commercial agents (86/653/EEC), as interpreted in Case C-48/16, ERGO v. 
Alžbeta Barlíková, ECLI:EU:C:2017:377, at 44 and 48.
74 Art. 7 (2), Directive 2003/88/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working 
time, as interpreted in Case C-619/16, Sebastian W. Kreuziger v. Land Berlin, ECLI:EU:
C:2018:872, at 22; Case C-684/16, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften 
v. Tetsuji Shimizu, ECLI:EU:C:2018:874, at 23; Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, Stadt 
Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer (C-569/16) and Volker Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn 
(C-570/16), ECLI:EU:C:2018:871, at 44.
75 Art. 3-4 and 6, Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial trans-
actions.
76 Art. 73 and Art. 89, Directive (EU) 2015/2366 on payment services in the internal market.
77 Art. 16 (3), Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of 
goods; Art. 16 (1), Directive (EU) 2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the 
supply of digital content and digital services.
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fails to comply with the obligations under the package holiday contract.78 
In addition, a range of regulations has been introduced governing the rights 
of passengers travelling by air, by sea and inland waterway, and by bus and 
coach. On the basis of these regulations, carriers are obliged to pay compen-
sation in the event of denied boarding, cancellation or delay,79 in the event 
of death or injury of passengers,80 and for lost or damaged wheelchairs.81 In 
such circumstances, they may also be obliged to reimburse the passengers 
concerned.82
Illustrative examples can be found in the law of intellectual property 
too. The holders of a copyright or related right, for instance, may claim ‘fair 
compensation’ if their protected works have been reproduced without their 
permission.83 In the near future, a similar right will be introduced in respect 
of press publishers whose publications have been used online by a commer-
cial service provider,84 and in respect of publishers in general if the works 
they have acquired from authors have been used.85 For their part, authors 
78 Art. 14 (2) and recital 34, Directive (EU) 2015/2302 on package travel and linked travel 
arrangements, and Case C-168/00, Simone Leitner v. TUI Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2002:163, 
at 19-24.
79 Art. 4-7, Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation 
and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long 
delay of fl ights, as interpreted in Joined Cases C-402/07 and C-432/07, Sturgeon v. Condor 
Flugdienst, ECLI:EU:C:2009:716. The right to compensation in the event of delay is also 
laid down in Art. 15 of Regulation (EU) 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers 
when travelling by sea and inland waterway, and in Art. 19 of Regulation (EU) 181/2011 
concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach transport.
80 Art. 1 and Art. 3, Regulation (EC) No 889/2002 on air carrier liability in the event of 
accidents.
81 Art. 12, Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 concerning the rights of disabled persons and 
persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air.
82 Art. 8, in conjunction with Art. 4 (1), Art. 5 (1) (a), and Art. 6 (1) (iii), Regulation (EC) No 
261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in 
the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of fl ights. Consider also 
Art. 16, Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations; Art. 18, 
Regulation (EC) No 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers when travelling by 
sea and inland waterway; Art. 10 (3) and 19, Regulation (EU) No 181/2011 concerning the 
rights of passengers in bus and coach transport; Art. 12 (2)-(3), Directive (EU) 2015/2302 
on package travel and linked travel arrangements.
83 Following Art. 5 (2) (a), (b) and (e), Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Member States may 
only limit the right to authorise or prohibit any reproduction in any form if they ensure 
that rightholders receive ‘fair compensation’. This is an autonomous concept of EU law 
which must be interpreted uniformly, according to Case C-467/08, Padawan v. SGAE, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:620, at 29-37.
84 Art. 15 (3), in conjunction with Art. 15 (1), Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and 
related rights in the Digital Single Market (to be implemented by 7 June 2021).
85 Art. 16, Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single 
Market (to be implemented by 7 June 2021). Note that Member States ‘may provide’ for 
such a right.
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and performers will be entitled to receive ‘appropriate and proportionate 
remuneration’ if they license or transfer their intellectual property rights 
to another party.86 They also have the right to obtain an ‘equitable remu-
neration’ from a phonogram or film producer in exchange for the private 
lending of their works.87 Likewise, trade mark holders may claim ‘reason-
able compensation’ from third parties who use an identical sign during the 
period between the publication of the initial trade mark application and 
the publication of the actual registration of the trade mark itself.88 Finally, 
it is important to observe that the Union legislature has determined that 
‘any infringer’ of an intellectual property right shall be liable ‘to pay the 
rightholder damages appropriate to the actual prejudice suffered by him/
her as a result of the infringement’.89 In this context, both economic losses 
and non-economic losses must be fully compensated.90
This technique has now become fairly popular. The Union legisla-
ture regularly goes beyond instructing the Member States to provide for 
‘appropriate remedies’,91 to put in place ‘adequate and effective means’,92 
or to introduce ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions’93 to 
combat infringements of, and enforce compliance with, the relevant Union 
laws. By now, a significant number of directives and regulations contains 
86 Art. 18 (1), Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single 
Market (to be implemented by 7 June 2021). Note that authors of works incorporated 
in a press publication may also receive ‘an appropriate share of the revenues that press 
publishers receive’ for the online use of these publications, according to Art. 15 (5) of the 
same directive.
87 Art. 5 (1), Directive 2006/115/EC on rental right and lending right and on certain rights 
related to copyright in the fi eld of intellectual property. It follows from Case C-271/10, 
VEWA v. Belgische Staat, ECLI:EU:C:2011:442, at 30, that this concept must be given an 
autonomous and uniform interpretation.
88 Art. 11 (2), Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 on the European Union trade mark. This concept 
must also be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation, according to Case 
C-280/15, Irina Nikolajeva v. Multi Protect, ECLI:EU:C:2016:467, at 45.
89 Art. 13 (1), in conjunction with Art. 2 (1), Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.
90 Art. 13 (1), Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
as interpreted in Case C-99/15, Christian Liffers v. Producciones Mandarina and Mediaset 
España Comunicación, ECLI:EU:C:2016:173, at 15-27.
91 This requirement can be found in e.g. Art. 12, Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protec-
tion of databases; Art. 7 (1), Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer 
programs.
92 Art. 11 (1), Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market.
93 This requirement can be found in e.g. Art. 15, Council Directive 2000/43/EC imple-
menting the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin; Art. 17, Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation; Art. 13, Directive 2005/29/EC concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market.
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detailed liability rules which determine precisely the conditions under 
which compensation must be paid for losses resulting from infringements 
of the requirements imposed by those directives and regulations.94 Recent 
examples include the right to claim compensation from a controller or 
processor for the ‘material or non-material damage’ suffered as a result of 
an infringement of the General Data Protection Regulation,95 the right to 
claim ‘damages appropriate to the actual prejudice suffered as a result of 
the unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure’ of a trade secret,96 the right to 
claim compensation from the authorised representative of a manufacturer 
for losses resulting from defective medical devices,97 and the right to claim 
compensation from members of the administrative or management bodies 
of the company being acquired or divided.98
It may be possible, moreover, to demand another form of performance 
than monetary payment. In the event of non-conformity, for instance, the 
trader is under a duty to repair or replace the goods,99 or to bring into 
conformity the digital content or services supplied to the consumer.100 
The holder of an intellectual property right may demand recall, removal 
or destruction of goods created and manufactured in violation of his 
intellectual property right.101 Likewise, the holder of a trade secret may 
demand recall, removal or destruction of goods which significantly benefit 
from trade secrets unlawfully acquired, used or disclosed.102 Additional 
examples can be found in the area of passenger rights. The air passenger, for 
instance, may demand an alternative flight and certain types of care from 
94 Art. 94, Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights; Art. 35a, 
Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 on credit rating agencies; Art. 13, Regulation (EU) No 
655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate 
cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters; Art. 13 (1), Regulation (EU) 
No 910/2014 on electronic identifi cation and trust services for electronic transactions in 
the internal market (eIDAS Regulation); Art. 36 (10), Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insol-
vency proceedings.
95 Art. 82, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation).
96 Art. 14, Directive (EU) 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and busi-
ness information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure.
97 Art. 11 (5), Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on medical devices.
98 Art. 106-107 and 152, Directive (EU) 2017/1132 relating to certain aspects of company 
law.
99 Art. 3, Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees; Art. 13 (2), Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain aspects concerning 
contracts for the sale of goods.
100 Art. 14 (1)-(3), Directive (EU) 2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the 
supply of digital content and digital services.
101 Art. 10, Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
102 Art. 12, Directive (EU) 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and busi-
ness information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure.
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the carrier.103 The General Data Protection Regulation enables a natural 
person to demand access to and rectification, erasure and transfer of his 
personal data.104 Similarly, a payment services user may obtain rectification 
of an unauthorised or incorrectly executed payment transaction.105 Finally, 
an important element in several directives and regulations is that they 
require certain information to be provided in writing, either as a rule,106 or 
upon request.107
Several directives and regulations also enable individuals to create, 
modify or extinguish a legal position or relationship. Most examples can be 
found within the law of contract.108 The power to withdraw from a contract 
is a case in point. It is a key element in directives governing package 
travel contracts,109 contracts for financial services,110 credit agreements,111 
timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale or exchange contracts,112 life 
insurance contracts,113 distance or off-premises contracts,114 and contracts 
103 Art. 8, in conjunction with Art. 4 (1), Art. 5 (1) (a), and Art. 6 (1) (iii), Regulation (EC) No 
261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in 
the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of fl ights. Consider also 
Art. 16, Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations; Art. 18, 
Regulation (EC) No 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers when travelling by 
sea and inland waterway; Art. 10 (3) and 19, Regulation (EU) No 181/2011 concerning the 
rights of passengers in bus and coach transport; Art. 12 (2)-(3), Directive (EU) 2015/2302 
on package travel and linked travel arrangements.
104 Art. 15-20, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation).
105 Art. 71 (1), Directive (EU) 2015/2366 on payment services in the internal market.
106 Art. 14, Regulation 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assis-
tance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of 
fl ights; Art. 14 (11), Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating 
to residential immovable property; Art. 5-7, Directive (EU) 2015/2302 on package travel 
and linked travel arrangements; Art. 4-7, Directive (EU) 2019/1152 on transparent and 
predictable working conditions in the European Union.
107 Art. 13 (1), Directive 86/653/EEC on self-employed commercial agents; Art. 18 (2), Direc-
tive (EU) 2019/1152 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European 
Union.
108 But consider the power to have a court declare a merger or division void, provided for in 
Art. 108 and 153, Directive (EU) 2017/1132 relating to certain aspects of company law.
109 Art. 12 (5), Directive (EU) 2015/2302 on package travel and linked travel arrangements.
110 Art. 6, Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer fi nancial 
services.
111 Art. 14, Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers. See also Art. 14 (6) 
and (11), Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residen-
tial immovable property, but it must be observed that some discretion is awarded to the 
Member States in this regard.
112 Art. 6, Directive 2008/122/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects 
of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts.
113 Art. 186, Directive 2009/138/EC on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insur-
ance and Reinsurance (Solvency II).
114 Art. 9, Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights.
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for the provision of telephone services.115 Several harmonising measures 
provide for other possibilities to modify or extinguish the contractual 
obligations between the parties. Provided that the necessary conditions are 
fulfilled, the contracting party may elect to terminate an agency contract 
or payment services contract,116 to terminate a package travel contract or 
to reduce the price,117 to terminate a sale agreement in the event of non-
conformity or to reduce the price,118 to ‘discharge’ the obligations under 
a credit agreement,119 and to terminate a contract because the terms and 
conditions will change.120 It may also be possible to challenge individual 
terms of a contract. A prime example is the rule ‘that unfair terms used in a 
contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall (…) not be 
binding on the consumer’.121
Many directives and regulations also provide individuals with 
defences. A striking example is the so-called passing-on defence against 
compensation for losses resulting from an infringement of competition 
law. In this case, the infringer argues that the injured party has passed its 
losses on to its own purchasers, so that there is no harm that needs to be 
compensated.122 Another possibility for the defendant may be to plead that 
the claim is ‘unenforceable’ because it is based on contractual provisions 
contrary to Union law.123 Sometimes, defendants may rely upon a justifi-
cation ground. Producers will, for instance, not be liable if they complied 
115 Art. 20 (4), Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to elec-
tronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive).
116 Provided in respect of agency contracts concluded for an indefi nite period under Art. 
15 of Directive 86/653/EEC on self-employed commercial agents, and in respect of a 
payment services contract under Art. 55 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 on payment services 
in the internal market.
117 Art. 12 (1)-(4) and Art. 10 (4), Art. 11 (4), Art. 13 (5)-(6) and Art. 14 respectively, Directive 
(EU) 2015/2302 on package travel and linked travel arrangements.
118 Subject to the conditions under Art. 3 (5)-(6) of Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects 
of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees; Art. 13 (4)-(5), Directive (EU) 
2019/771 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of goods; Art. 14 (4)-(6), 
Directive (EU) 2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital 
content and digital services.
119 Art. 16, Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers; Art. 25, Directive 
2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable 
property.
120 Art. 3 (2), Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for busi-
ness users of online intermediation services.
121 Art. 6 (1), Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts.
122 Art. 13, Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under 
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States 
and of the European Union.
123 E.g. Art. 7 (1), Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial trans-
actions; Art. 7 (1), Regulation (EU) 2017/1128 on cross-border portability of online 
content services in the internal market; Art. 7 (1), Directive (EU) on copyright and related 
rights in the Digital Single Market (to be implemented by 7 June 2021).
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with mandatory laws,124 carriers will not be liable in the event of extra-
ordinary circumstances,125 and providers will not be liable if they have duly 
informed their customers about the limitations related to the use of their 
trust services.126 Defendants may also be able to rely upon exemptions, for 
instance if they can prove that they could not have discovered the existence 
of the defect, given the state of scientifical and technical knowledge at the 
time when the product was put into circulation,127 that they were not in any 
way responsible for the event giving rise to the damage,128 that they did not 
have knowledge of or control over this event,129 or that the event was in 
fact caused by the claimant himself.130 Hence, it is clear that directives and 
regulations may not only provide an individual with one or more claims or 
powers, but also with one or more defences.
4.5 How to solve questions of interpretation in a multi-level 
legal order?
On the basis of the previous sections, we may conclude that current 
Union law contains many rules that are comparable to the rules that play 
a central role in the national systems of private law. These rules have not 
been collected and systemised in a comprehensive codification. Quite the 
opposite is the case. The rules are scattered over multiple instruments and 
sources of Union law. They are supplemented by rules rooted in national 
legislation, in case law, and in contractual agreements. As a result, multiple 
124 Art. 7 (d), Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the liability for defective products.
125 Art. 5 (3), Regulation 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assis-
tance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay 
of fl ights; Art. 20 (3) and (4), Regulation 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers 
when travelling by sea and inland waterway.
126 Art. 13 (2), Regulation 910/2014 on electronic identifi cation and trust services for elec-
tronic transactions in the internal market. Similar rules can be found in Art. 12-15, Direc-
tive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce; Art. 5 (1)(c), Regulation 261/2004 establishing common rules 
on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of 
cancellation or long delay of fl ights; Art. 17 (4), Regulation 1371/2007 on rail passengers’ 
rights and obligations; Art. 20 (2), Regulation 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passen-
gers when travelling by sea and inland waterway; Art. 17 (4), Directive (EU) 2019/790 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market (to be implemented by 7 June 
2021).
127 Art. 7 (e), Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the liability for defective products.
128 Art. 82 (3), Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation).
129 Art. 12 et seq., Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, called ‘defences in law’ by the Court in Case C-291/13, Sotiris Papasavvas v. 
O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etairia and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2209, at 51.
130 Art. 20 (2), Regulation 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers when travelling by 
sea and inland waterway.
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claims, powers, and defences may, on the face of it, be available in a given 
case – each with their own characteristic features and their own constitu-
tional background.
How should we determine the relationship between these rules? Can 
we proceed from the assumption that the objectives of each rule, regardless 
of its legal source, should be realised to the greatest possible extent? Several 
writers have warned against adopting such an approach. Adopting a Kelsen 
view,131 they underline that the formal hierarchy of legal sources plays an 
important role in the context of Union law.132 And it is true that, within 
the Union legal order, the constituent Treaties and the Charter sit at the top 
of the pyramid,133 that general principles come second, and that legislative 
acts come last.134 Moreover, the Court of Justice has consistently held that 
any of these norms takes precedence over any norm of national law.135 This 
principle of primacy is an essential feature of the European legal order.136
However, the existence of a formal hierarchy does not imply that a 
higher norm automatically trumps the application of rules lower down 
the hierarchy. Consider the situation that a national measure falls within 
the substantive scope of one or more treaty provisions and one or more 
harmonising measures. The Court of Justice has stressed time and again that 
a mere overlap is not sufficient to exclude the applicability of either primary 
or secondary law. By contrast, the basic assumption is that the provisions 
of primary and secondary law apply concurrently and may both be used to 
assess the national measure at issue. An exception must, however, be made 
when it has been the intention of the Union legislature to regulate the issue 
exhaustively. Whether this is the case, depends on the interpretation of the 
relevant texts. Only if the answer is affirmative does Union law exclude the 
applicability of primary Union law.137
131 See section 1.2.
132 Gruber 2004, p. 230; Bakels 2009a, p. 338; Sieburgh 2009; Hartkamp 2011, p. 158.
133 Art. 1 and 6 (1) TEU.
134 Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 111-123.
135 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; Case 11/70, Internationale Handels-
gesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114; 
Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49; 
Opinion 1/09 of the Court, [2011] ECR I-1137.
136 Opinion 1/91 of the Court, [1991] ECR I6079, at 21; Opinion 1/09 of the Court, [2011] ECR 
I-1137, at 65; Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, at 59.
137 Case 5/77, Carlo Tedeschi v. Denkavit Commerciale, ECLI:EU:C:1977:144, at 33-35; Case 
C-37/92, José Vanacker v. André Lesage, ECLI:EU:C:1993:836, at 9; Case C-324/99, Daimler-
Chrysler v. Land Baden-Württemberg, ECLI:EU:C:2001:682, at 32; Case C-322/01, Deutscher 
Apothekerverband, ECLI:EU:C:2003:664, at 64; Case C-205/07, Lodewijk Gysbrechts v. Santurel 
Inter BVBA, ECLI:EU:C:2008:730, at 33; Case C-421/12, Commission v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:
C:2014:2064, at 63; Case C-95/14, UNIC and Uni.co.pel, ECLI:EU:C:2015:492, at 33; Case 
C-198/14, Valev Visnapuu v. Kihlakunnansyyttäjä, ECLI:EU:C:2015:751, at 40; Case C-6/16, 
Eqiom and Enka v. Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics, ECLI:EU:C:2017:641, at 15; 
Case C-14/16, Euro Park Service v. Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics, ECLI:EU:
C:2017:177, at 19.
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Consider also the overlap of national laws and Union laws. In this 
context, it is the principle of primacy that safeguards the consistency and 
uniformity in the interpretation and application of Union law. The Court 
has made it very clear that these objectives cannot be achieved if the validity 
of Union law can be challenged by relying upon national laws, regardless 
of their legal rank or constitutional importance.138 This does not, however, 
mean that Union law necessarily excludes the applicability of national law. 
The principle of primacy is essentially a rule of conflict. As De Witte writes, 
primacy only enters the picture ‘when there is an actual conflict between 
two norms that are both capable of being applied to the facts of a case’.139 
As Lenaerts and Corthout observe, moreover, ‘the exclusion only applies 
to the extent of the conflict’.140 The pivotal question, therefore, is whether a 
conflict between national law and Union law actually exists.
The question whether a legislative instrument exhaustively regulates 
a certain issue, and the question whether a conflict exists between Union 
law and the applicable national law, are questions of interpretation. Such 
questions cannot be solved by using the Kelsen model, however useful this 
model may be to understand the vertical structure of the Union legal order 
and its primacy over national laws. Kelsen himself admitted that there 
may be several possibilities for implementing a higher norm, but he did 
not provide tools to make the ‘correct’ choice and merely submitted that 
each lower norm which stays within the frame set by the higher norm is 
‘valid’.141
It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that constitutional scholars 
have emphasised the importance of searching for shared substantive 
principles and commonly negotiated methods of interpretation. It is in 
this context that the principle that each applicable rule ought to have its 
intended legal effect surfaces again. Kumm, for instance, argues that courts 
should determine the relationship between overlapping legal orders ‘on the 
basis of the best interpretation of the principles underlying them both’.142 In 
a similar spirit, Lierman calls for a ‘convergence of methods of interpreta-
tion, of legal instruments and legal principles beyond the limits of separate 
branches of law and legal orders’.143 Consider also the position of Davies, 
who argues that the courts must interpret the texts in a way that fits them 
together, proceeding from the assumption that both Union law and national 
law apply.144
138 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114.
139 De Witte 2011, p. 342.
140 Lenaerts & Corthaut 2006, p. 291.
141 Kelsen 1990, p. 129-130.
142 Kumm 2005, p. 286.
143 Lierman 2014, p. 629.
144 Davies 2018a.
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Such statements indicate that the principle that the objectives of each 
rule should be realised to the greatest possible extent is not peculiar to the 
national systems of private law. This is not to suggest that the primacy of 
Union law may be undermined by reference to national laws and interpre-
tations, nor to claim that private relationships will generally give cause for 
conflicts of constitutional importance.145 Even if one accepts, like this book 
does, that the precedence of Union law is ultimately based on and limited 
by the founding Treaties of the Union, and not based on and limited by the 
national constitutions – a claim which has, in fact, been rejected by a great 
number of supreme and constitutional courts146 – something else might yet 
be needed, something that the principle of primacy does not provide. This 
principle does tell us which law must have priority in the event of conflicts, 
but does not tell us how we should determine whether a conflict actually 
exists. It is against this backdrop that it appears to be necessary to examine 
in more detail how Union law itself answers such questions of interpreta-
tion.
4.6 Conclusion
As indicated, this book explores the potential of the scheme of analysis 
used within the national systems of private law to understand situations of 
overlap and conflict in the context of Union law. Before embarking upon a 
more detailed analysis of this question, it was necessary to take a step back 
and substantiate two underlying propositions.
Firstly, this chapter has demonstrated that Union law contains many 
rules that are comparable to the rules we have examined in the previous 
chapters. In fact, we may conclude that the ‘private enforcement’ of Union 
law is increasingly governed by Union law itself. As far as primary Union 
law is concerned, this development is entirely attributable to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. In a long line of cases, the Court has estab-
lished that certain individuals are under a duty towards other individuals to 
comply with the treaty and Charter provisions prohibiting discrimination, 
the treaty provisions banning restrictions of the free movement of persons 
and services, and the Charter provisions regarding the right to paid annual 
leave. Importantly, the Court of Justice has worked out several claims in 
great detail: the claim for compensation for losses resulting from infringe-
145 Although it must be noted that the clash between the Court of Justice and the Supreme 
Court of Denmark concerned a dispute between two private parties about a relatively 
small claim. See Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S, v. Estate 
of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278, and its aftermath, discussed by Madsen, 
Olsen & Šadl 2017.
146 An overview of the case law can be found in Oppenheimer 1994; Oppenheimer 2003; 
McDonnell 2018, p. 421-427.
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ments of EU competition law, the claim for an allowance in lieu of annual 
leave not taken upon termination of the employment relationship, and the 
claim for compensation for losses resulting from unequal treatment.
As far as secondary Union law is concerned, this chapter has shown 
that the Union legislature regularly goes beyond instructing the Member 
States to provide for adequate and effective means for enforcing Union law. 
Indeed, many directives and regulations enable individuals to claim some 
form of performance, such as specific performance or monetary compensa-
tion, from another individual. In addition, several directives and regulations 
enable individuals to create, modify or extinguish a legal position or rela-
tionship. The power of the consumer to withdraw from a contract within 
a prescribed period of time is particularly important. Finally, the Union 
legislature has provided individuals with a range of defences, including 
grounds of exemption and justification.
It is not uncommon for a single set of facts to fall within the scope 
of multiple rules, rooted in primary and secondary Union law, nor is it 
uncommon that national laws may provide additional protection. The 
question to consider is whether one rule affects the scope of application of 
another rule. This chapter has submitted that, in such situations, we should 
avoid jumping to the conclusion that rules with a higher status automati-
cally override rules lower down the hierarchy. The question whether a legis-
lative instrument exhaustively regulates a certain issue, and the question 
whether a conflict exists between Union law and the applicable national 
law, are questions of interpretation. Such questions cannot be answered on 
the basis of the formal relationship between the rules alone. Regard must be 
had to their substance.
It is against this background that it appears to be worthwile to examine 
in more detail how Union law deals with questions of concurrence. What 
does the Union legislature say? How does the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union respond? Are their approaches comparable to the solutions 
offered in the national systems of private law? These questions will be dealt 
with in the next two chapters; first in the context of primary Union law and 
then in the context of secondary Union law.

5 Concurrence in Primary Union Law
5.1 Introduction
The body of primary Union law consists of the founding Treaties and the 
Charter, and includes the general principles read into these texts by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union.1 A substantial number of these 
norms may be relied upon in relationships between private individuals. As 
the previous chapter has demonstrated, private conduct may, under certain 
circumstances, be assessed against the general prohibition of discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality, against certain free movement provisions, 
and against competition rules.2 These rules each have their own field of 
application. They are not, however, wholly self-contained. On the face of it, 
a single set of facts might fall within the scope of several rules, resulting in 
the availability of multiple claims and defences.
Of course, not every set of facts will necessarily be governed by multiple 
treaty provisions. It is for the law of non-discrimination to determine 
whether there is an unlawful difference in treatment between persons with 
different nationalities, for the law of free movement to determine whether 
access to the market is restricted, and for the law of competition to deter-
mine whether there is a cartel or an abuse of a dominant position. Much can 
be said about the construction of each of these concepts, as to which this 
chapter seeks to remain neutral. Instead, this chapter examines the question 
of whether, in principle, these treaty provisions might apply concurrently 
to the same set of facts. May the interested party rely upon the rule of his 
choice, notwithstanding the applicability of another treaty provision? Or 
does the applicability of one treaty provision necessarily exclude the appli-
cability of the other treaty provision?
This chapter examines how Union law answers these questions. It 
focuses on the three sets of treaty provisions that are most relevant when 
assessing legal relationships between private parties: the general prohibi-
tion of discrimination on grounds of nationality, the provisions concerning 
the free movement of persons and services, and the provisions pertaining 
to competition law. Within these broad categories, three examples will be 
singled out. Firstly, the chapter will analyse the relationship between Article 
18 TFEU, which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality, on 
the one hand, and the treaty provisions pertaining to the free movement of 
1 De Witte & Smulders 2018, p. 193-198.
2 Supra section 4.3.
86 Chapter 5
persons and services on the other hand (section 5.2). Secondly, the chapter 
will investigate the relationship between Article 101 TFEU, which deals 
with collusion between undertakings, and Article 102 TFEU, which deals 
with the market conduct of dominant undertakings (section 5.3). Thirdly, 
the chapter will examine the relationship between these free movement 
rules and the competition rules laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
(section 5.4).
With the exception of Article 18 TFEU, these treaty provisions do not 
make any comment about their mutual relationship.3 Even Article 18 
TFEU merely mentions that it is ‘without prejudice to any special provi-
sions’ contained in the Treaties. It is the question what this statement 
actually means. The case law is of crucial importance if we want to know 
the answers to such questions. For this reason, this chapter devotes much 
attention to judgments delivered by the Court of Justice. The reader should 
be aware that a number of these judgments concern ‘vertical’ relationships 
between a public body and one or more individuals, including judgments 
delivered in first instance proceedings before the General Court and in 
appeal proceedings before the Court of Justice.4 These judgments are 
nonetheless discussed because they are important to find the appropriate 
answers in ‘horizontal’ relationships between individuals.
Before we continue with our enquiry, it should be explained why this 
chapter does not examine the relationship between the various free move-
ment provisions, considering that the chapter does examine the relationship 
between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It will be recalled that only some free 
movement provisions, governing persons and services, may be relied upon 
in order to assess certain conduct of private parties, bringing them within 
the scope of this book.5 But it appears that the question as to which of these 
free movement provision is applicable to the case at hand is rather a ques-
tion of qualification than a question of concurrence. Unlike the free move-
ment of workers, which concerns employment activities,6 the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services concern self-employed 
activities.7 The essential difference between the latter two freedoms, more-
over, is that Article 49 TFEU governs activities performed on a ‘stable and 
3 This chapter refers to the provisions as they are currently numbered in the Treaties.
4 Formerly known as the Court of First Instance, the General Court hears actions brought 
by individuals and Member States against acts or omissions of the institutions, bodies, 
offi ces or agencies of the EU (Art. 256 TFEU). Its decisions may be subject to an appeal 
before the Court of Justice. This book refers to the General Court when discussing cases 
decided by the Court of First Instance.
5 See section 4.3.
6 Case C-268/99, Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:
C:2001:616, at 34. See further, on the defi nition of ‘worker’ within the meaning of Art. 45 
TFEU, Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 748-758.
7 Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 796.
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continuous basis’,8 whereas Article 56 TFEU governs activities performed 
‘on a temporary basis’.9 This means that the provisions will not be appli-
cable concurrently to a single set of facts. For this reason, their relationship 
will not be considered in this chapter.
5.2 Article 18 TFEU and free movement law
5.2.1 Introduction
The natural starting point for any enquiry into the relationship between 
overlapping rules of primary Union law is the principle of equality or non-
discrimination. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union solemnly declares 
that this principle is one of the core values, if not the core value, upon which 
the Union is founded:
‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Mem-
ber States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’
The principle of equality or non-discrimination finds its expression in a 
wide range of separate treaty and Charter provisions,10 some of which may 
be applicable, as we have seen, to private conduct.11 It is not uncommon 
for a single set of facts to fall within the scope of application of multiple 
non-discrimination rules. In fact, as soon as one non-discrimination rule 
is applicable, there is a good chance that another non-discrimination rule 
is applicable too, given the substantial number of discriminatory grounds 
bricked into the building of primary Union law.
To begin with, Article 157 TFEU deals with the right of male and 
female workers to equal pay for equal work of equal value. Articles 18 of 
the TFEU and 21 (2) of the Charter focus on discrimination on grounds of 
nationality. This form of discrimination is also prohibited by provisions 
pertaining to the free movement of citizens12 and workers,13 to the freedom 
of establishment,14 and to the freedom to provide services.15 In addition, the 
8 Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di 
Milano, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, at 25.
9 Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di 
Milano, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, at 26.
10 See also Muir 2019, p. 817-839.
11 See supra section 4.3.
12 Art. 21 TFEU.
13 Art. 45 et seq. TFEU.
14 Art. 49 et seq. TFEU.
15 Art. 56 et seq. TFEU.
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free movement rights of citizens of the Union are protected by the Charter.16 
Underpinning all these rules is the general principle of equal treatment or 
non-discrimination conceived and fostered by the Union Courts as part of 
the unwritten body of primary Union law.17 This general principle may, 
in turn, be subdivided into more specific principles of equality related to 
grounds such as sex, age, religion or belief.18 These unwritten principles 
have also made their way to Article 21 (1) of the Charter, which forbids any 
discrimination on any ground, and lists several examples.19
This subsection will not consider all the possible scenarios of concur-
rence between these non-discrimination rules and principles. Many 
scenarios are simply not that thrilling. No particular problems are, for 
instance, caused by the concurrence of the general and specific principles of 
equality and the identical Charter rights. Since Åkerberg Fransson, we know 
that both sources of Union law have the same field of application: they 
apply as soon as the facts come ‘within the scope of European Union law’ 
on account of another treaty provision, regulation or directive.20 And if the 
facts do fall within the scope of a non-discrimination rule contained in the 
Treaties, we may safely assume that the interpretation and application of the 
general and specific principles of equality and the identical written Charter 
rights will not lead to different outcomes. It is quite clear, for instance, that 
Article 21 (2) of the Charter must be interpreted and applied in accordance 
with Article 18 TFEU.21
For these reasons, this section will not pay attention to the general 
principles and the Charter, but will only examine the corresponding treaty 
provisions. Our attention will be fixed on the relationship between the 
general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down 
in Article 18 TFEU on the one hand, and the treaty provisions governing 
the free movement of workers (Art. 45 TFEU), the freedom of establishment 
(Art. 49 TFEU), and the freedom to provide and receive services (Art. 56 
TFEU) on the other hand. It is often assumed that Article 18 TFEU applies 
only to situations which are not governed by these free movement provi-
16 Article 15 (2) of the Charter.
17 Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709, at 78; Case 
C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, at 47; Case C-555/07, Kücük-
deveci v. Swedex, ECLI:EU:C:2010:21, at 56; Case C-414/16, Vera Egenberger v. Evangelisches 
Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung, ECLI:EU:C:2018:257, at 76-79.
18 As explained by Tobler 2013, p. 449-454.
19 Sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age and sexual orientation.
20 Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, at 16-23, as 
explained by Dougan 2015, p. 1205-1207.
21 As emphasised in Art. 52 (2) of the Charter, explained in the Explanations relating to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, and confi rmed by the Court in Case T-452/15, Andrei 
Petrov and Others v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2017:822, at 39; Case T-618/15, Udo 
Voigt v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2017:821, at 80; Case C-703/17, Krah v. Universität 
Wien, ECLI:EU:C:2019:850, at 18.
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sions. Baquero Cruz, for instance, submits that Article 18 TFEU ‘steps back’ 
in the presence of a more concrete free movement provision.22 This section 
subjects this conclusion to closer scrutiny. When, if at all, do the free move-
ment provisions affect the scope of application of Article 18 TFEU?
Firstly, a brief overview of the provisions and their relationship will 
be provided (subsection 5.2.2). The section then explains that the Court of 
Justice of the European Union has, gradually yet firmly, widened the scope 
of application of the free movement provisions (subsection 5.2.3), raising 
the question of whether the scope of Article 18 TFEU has been extended too. 
This question is worth revisiting now, in the light of the Grand Chamber 
judgment in the case International Jet Management (subsection 5.2.4). Having 
argued that this judgments demonstrates that the free movement provisions 
do not qualify as leges speciales in relation to Article 18 TFEU, the section 
considers the situation where the provisions do overlap. To what extent, if 
at all, should Article 18 TFEU be excluded (subsection 5.2.5)?
5.2.2 General and specific prohibitions of discrimination
As far as discrimination on grounds of nationality is concerned, Article 18 
TFEU is the most general provision contained in the Treaties. It reads as 
follows:
‘Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any 
special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of national-
ity shall be prohibited. (…)’23
This rule applies on its own terms to any situation in which a person 
holding the nationality of one of the Member States is treated differently 
– either directly or indirectly24 – compared with persons holding the nation-
ality of another Member State.25 Two further limitations do apply. In order 
for Article 18 TFEU to be applicable, the situation must fall within ‘the scope 
of application of the Treaties’. Moreover, the provision only applies to cross-
22 Baquero Cruz 1999, p. 613.
23 The second paragraph reads: ‘The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accor-
dance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt rules designed to prohibit such 
discrimination.’
24 This is settled case law, see e.g. Case 152/73, Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundes-
post, ECLI:EU:C:1974:13, at 11; Case C-29/95, Eckehard Pastoors and Others, ECLI:EU:
C:1997:28, at 16; Case C-411/98, Angelo Ferlini v. Centre Hospitalier de Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:
C:2000:530, at 57; Case C-224/00, Commission v. Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2002:185, at 15; Case 
C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171, at 64. On the development 
of indirect discrimination through case law: Tobler 2005, p. 101-278.
25 With regard to companies, the place of the corporate seat is decisive, see Barnard 2016, 
p. 208, and Case C-330/91, The Queen v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte: Commerz-
bank AG, ECLI:EU:C:1993:303 and Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:723, at 106-110.
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border situations and not to situations of a ‘purely internal’ nature.26 The 
same limitations apply in the context of the free movement of workers, the 
freedom of establishment, and the freedom to provide and receive services. 
Only if the persons concerned have sought to exercise their rights of free 
movement does the case fall within the scope of application of these treaty 
provisions.27
On one point, the free movement rights are more narrow in scope. 
Whereas Article 18 TFEU, in principle, covers all activities falling within 
the scope of application of the Treaties, the free movement provisions 
under consideration here only govern ‘economic’ activities. Article 45 
TFEU, for instance, applies to workers, that is to persons performing 
services ‘for and under the direction of another person’ in return for 
‘remuneration’.28 Consider also Article 49 TFEU, which applies to economic 
activities performed by self-employed persons and companies ‘in return 
for remuneration’,29 and Article 57 TFEU, which makes clear that ‘services’ 
must normally be provided ‘for remuneration’ in order to fall within the 
scope of Article 56 TFEU.30
As far as their substance is concerned, the free movement provisions 
seem to contain the same prohibition as the one laid down in Article 18 
TFEU. Article 45 (2) TFEU even uses the same terms. It explicitly prohibits 
‘any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member 
States’. The language of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU is different. These provi-
sions prohibit ‘restrictions’ on the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services respectively. But in both cases, the nationality of 
the person in question remains the distinguishing criterion: Article 49 TFEU 
protects ‘nationals’ of a Member State wishing to establish themselves in the 
territory of another Member State, and Article 56 TFEU protects ‘nationals’ 
of a Member State wishing to provide services to persons established in 
another Member State.31 Indeed, the general prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of nationality is considered to form the conceptual foundation 
26 As explained by Van der Mei 2011, p. 63-64. It must be noted that the Court has somewhat 
loosened the interpretation of this condition under the impact of the provisions on citizen-
ship of the Union (see e.g. Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 865-871, with references to case law).
27 Barnard 2016, p. 209-211. See e.g. Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen v. Kari Uecker and Vera Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, ECLI:EU:C:1997:285, 
at 16; Case C-212/06, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v. 
Flemish Government, ECLI:EU:C:2008:178, at 33-39; Case C-84/11, Marja-Liisa Susisalo, Olli 
Tuomaala, Merja Ritala, ECLI:EU:C:2012:374, at 18, with references to earlier judgments.
28 Case 66/85, Deborah Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Württemberg, ECLI:EU:C:1986:284, at 17.
29 Case C-268/99, Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:
C:2001:616, at 71, on the interpretation of the corresponding provisions contained in the 
Association Agreements between the Communities and Poland and the Czech Republic).
30 The concept of ‘economic activity’ is examined in detail by Odudu 2009.
31 Consider also Art. 61 TFEU, which mentions ‘restrictions without distinction on grounds 
of nationality or residence’.
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upon which the provisions concerning the free movement of persons and 
services are based.32
It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the Court of Justice takes 
the view that Article 18 TFEU has been ‘implemented’ and has been given 
‘specific expression’ by the free movement provisions in the areas of work, 
establishment, and services.33 In some judgments, the Court has added 
that the violation of one of these free movement rights implies that the 
general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality has been 
violated too.34 Equally, the Court has sometimes concluded that Article 18 
TFEU has not been violated because the free movement right at issue has 
32 See e.g. Bernard 1996, p. 97; Baquero Cruz 1999, p. 614; Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 121-124; 
Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 796, referring to Opinion A-G Mayras, Case 33/74, Van Bins-
bergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, ECLI:EU:C:1974:121; 
Barnard 2016, p. 217.
33 These and similar formulations are used in Case 2/74, Jean Reyners v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:
C:1974:68, at 16; Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale 
and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, at 32; Case 13/76, Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:115, at 6; Case 251/83, Eberhard Haug-Adrion v. Frankfurter Versicherungs-
AG, ECLI:EU:C:1984:397, at 14; Case 186/87, Ian William Cowan v. Le Trésor public, ECLI:EU:
C:1989:47, at 14; Case 305/87, Commission v. Greece, ECLI:EU:C:1989:218, at 12; Case 
C-10/90, Maria Masgio v. Bundesknappschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1991:107, at 13; Case C-246/89, 
Commission v. United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:1991:375, at 18; Case C-1/93, Halliburton 
Services v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, ECLI:EU:C:1994:127, at 12; Case C-379/92, 
Matteo Peralta, ECLI:EU:C:1994:296, at 18; Case C-131/96, Carlos Mora Romero v. Landes-
versicherungsanstalt Rheinprovinz, ECLI:EU:C:1997:317, at 11; Case C-336/96, Mr and Mrs 
Robert Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, ECLI:EU:C:1998:221, at 38; Case 
C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scotland v. Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State), ECLI:EU:C:1999:216, 
at 20-21; Case C-55/98, Skatteministeriet v. Bent Vestergaard, ECLI:EU:C:1999:533, at 17; 
Case C-251/98, C. Baars v. Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren, ECLI:EU:C:2000:205, 
at 24; Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft Ltd and Others (C-397/98), 
Hoechst and Hoechst UK (C-410/98) v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue and H.M. Attorney 
General, ECLI:EU:C:2001:134, at 39; Case C-289/02, AMOK Verlags v. A & R Gastronomie, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:669, at 26; Case C-387/01, Harald Weigel and Ingrid Weigel v. Finanzlan-
desdirektion für Vorarlberg, ECLI:EU:C:2004:256, at 58; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri v. 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, at 55; Case C-105/07, Lammers & 
Van Cleeff v. Belgische Staat, ECLI:EU:C:2008:24, at 14; Case C-94/07, Andrea Raccanelli v. 
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, ECLI:EU:C:2008:425, at 45; Case 
C-222/07, UTECA v. Administración General del Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2009:124, at 38; Case 
C-269/07, Commission v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2009:527, at 99; Case C-91/08, Wall v. Stadt 
Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurter Entsorgungs- und Service (FES), ECLI:EU:C:2010:182, at 32; 
Case C-137/09, Marc Michel Josemans v. Burgemeester van Maastricht, ECLI:EU:C:2010:774, 
at 52; Case C-474/12, Schiebel Aircraft v. Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2139, at 21; Case C-470/13, Generali-Providencia Biztosító v. Közbeszerzési 
Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2469, at 31; Case C-703/17, Krah v. 
Universität Wien, ECLI:EU:C:2019:850, at 19.
34 Case 305/87, Commission v. Greece, ECLI:EU:C:1989:218, at 12 (referring to Case 2/74, 
Jean Reyners v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1974:68; Case 13/76, Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:115; Case 90/76, Henry van Ameyde v. UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1977:101); Case 
C-246/89, Commission v. United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:1991:375, at 18; Case C-311/97, Royal 
Bank of Scotland v. Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State), ECLI:EU:C:1999:216, at 20.
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not been violated either.35 And there is one phrase that turns up in nearly 
every judgment, namely that Article 18 TFEU ‘applies independently only 
to situations governed by [Union] law in regard to which the Treaty lays 
down no specific prohibition of discrimination’.36 It is on this firm basis that 
writers characterise Article 18 TFEU as the lex generalis and the free move-
ment provisions as leges speciales.37
5.2.3 From a discrimination approach to a restriction approach
If the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
forms the conceptual basis of the free movement of workers, the freedom 
of establishment, and the freedom to provide and receive services, then it 
is tempting to conclude that these free movement provisions only prohibit 
conduct which qualifies as direct or indirect discrimination. This impres-
sion is confirmed in early judgments such as Walrave and Koch, where the 
Court of Justice held that the free movement provisions in the areas of 
35 Case 90/76, Henry van Ameyde v. UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1977:101, at 27; Case C-41/90, Klaus 
Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, at 36; Case C-112/91, Hans Werner 
v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, ECLI:EU:C:1993:27, at 20; Case C-222/07, UTECA v. Admi-
nistración General del Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2009:124, at 39.
36 These and similar formulations are used in Case 305/87, Commission v. Greece, ECLI:EU:
C:1989:218, at 13; Case C-10/90, Maria Masgio v. Bundesknappschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1991:107, 
at 13; Case C-179/90, Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v. Siderurgica Gabrielli, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:464, at 11; Case C-246/89, Commission v. United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:
1991:375, at 17; Case C-1/93, Halliburton Services v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, ECLI:EU:
C:1994:127, at 12; Case C-379/92, Matteo Peralta, ECLI:EU:C:1994:296, at 18; Case 
C-131/96, Carlos Mora Romero v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinprovinz, ECLI:EU:
C:1997:317, at 10; Case C-336/96, Mr and Mrs Robert Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux 
du Bas-Rhin, ECLI:EU:C:1998:221, at 37; Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scotland v. Elliniko 
Dimosio (Greek State), ECLI:EU:C:1999:216, at 20; Case C-55/98, Skatteministeriet v. Bent 
Vestergaard, ECLI:EU:C:1999:533, at 16; Case C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Braine v. 
FRBSB, ECLI:EU:C:2000:201, at 37; Case C-251/98, C. Baars v. Inspecteur der Belastingen 
Particulieren, ECLI:EU:C:2000:205, at 23; Case C-411/98, Angelo Ferlini v. Centre Hospitalier 
de Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:2000:530, at 39; Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98, Metall-
gesellschaft Ltd and Others (C-397/98), Hoechst and Hoechst UK (C-410/98) v. Commissioners 
of Inland Revenue and H.M. Attorney General, ECLI:EU:C:2001:134, at 38; Case C-100/01, 
Ministre de l’Intérieur v. Aitor Oteiza Olazabal, ECLI:EU:C:2002:712, at 25; Case C-289/02, 
AMOK Verlags v. A & R Gastronomie, ECLI:EU:C:2003:669, at 25; Case C-387/01, Harald 
Weigel and Ingrid Weigel v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg, ECLI:EU:C:2004:256, at 57; 
Case C-40/05, Kaj Lyyski v. Umeå universitet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:10, at 33; Case C-341/05, 
Laval un Partneri v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, at 54; 
Case C-105/07, Lammers & Van Cleeff v. Belgische Staat, ECLI:EU:C:2008:24, at 14; Case 
C-222/07, UTECA v. Administración General del Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2009:124, at 37; Case 
C-269/07, Commission v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2009:527, at 98; Case C-137/09, Marc Michel 
Josemans v. Burgemeester van Maastricht, ECLI:EU:C:2010:774, at 51; Case C-385/12, Hervis 
Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi, ECLI:EU:C:2014:47, at 25; Case C-474/12, Schiebel Aircraft 
v. Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2139, at 20; Case 
C-703/17, Krah v. Universität Wien, ECLI:EU:C:2019:850, at 19.
37 See e.g. Böhning 1973, p. 82; Baquero Cruz 1999, p. 613-614; Davies 2003, p. 188-189; Van 
den Bogaert 2005, p. 121; Hartkamp 2011, p. 164-165; Krenn 2012, p. 193; Veldhoen 2013, 
p. 370-371; Barnard 2016, p. 217; McDonnell 2018, p. 438.
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work and services ‘prohibit any discrimination based on nationality in the 
performance of the activity to which they refer’.38 In later judgments, the 
Court has also suggested that the freedom of establishment had not been 
restricted because there was no direct or indirect discrimination.39 Against 
this background, one may be inclined to conclude that only directly and 
indirectly discriminatory measures could amount to a restriction of the free 
movement provisions.
This conclusion may have been true in the days of Bruno Walrave and 
Norbert Koch, when paced races still kept audiences enthralled, but it is 
not true anymore. Gradually yet firmly, the Court has widened the scope 
of application of the free movement provisions. Nowadays, free movement 
law does not only target any ‘discrimination’ – either directly or indirectly – 
between nationals engaging in economic activities, but also any ‘restriction’ 
which prevents or substantially hinders their access to the market. In the 
words of Barnard, the Court has shifted ‘from a discrimination approach 
to a restriction approach’.40 This shift can be seen in judgments as early as 
Säger, where the Court held:
‘It should first be pointed out that Article [56 TFEU] requires not only the elimi-
nation of all discrimination against a person providing services on the ground of 
his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without 
distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, 
when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of 
services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar 
services.’41
This is not a word game. Adopting the restriction approach instead of the 
discrimination approach actually makes a difference. Take the Bosman 
case as an illustration. Jean-Marc Bosman, a professional football player 
employed by a Belgian first division club, wanted to play for a French foot-
ball club. His efforts to find a new club were frustrated by the transfer rules 
adopted by several professional football associations. These rules obliged 
the new club to pay the former club a fee to recoup part of the investments 
38 Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, at 6. See also Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfs-
vereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, ECLI:EU:C:1974:131, at 25: ‘The provisions of [Article 
56 TFEU] abolish all discrimination against the person providing the service by reason of 
his nationality or the fact that he is established in a Member State other than that in which 
the service is to be provided.’
39 Case 182/83, Robert Fearon and Company Limited v. The Irish Land Commission, ECLI:EU:
C:1984:335, at 10-11; Case 221/85, Commission v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1987:81, at 11-12.
40 Barnard 2016, p. 225. See also Barnard 2001, p. 48-52; Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 124-130; 
Schepel 2012, p. 180-181; Van den Bogaert, Cuyvers & Antonaki 2018, p. 551-552.
41 Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co., ECLI:EU:C:1991:331, at 12. The 
Court repeats the same formulations in Case C-43/93, Raymond Vander Elst v. OMI, 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:310, at 14.
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in the player. This transfer system applied to all players, irrespective of their 
nationality and irrespective of the place of residence of the clubs involved. 
This made it hard to plead a case of direct or indirect discrimination. After 
all, the nationality of the player was not relevant and the rules did not have, 
or were likely to have had, a particularly detrimental effect on players 
wishing to move to another Member State as compared to players wishing 
to move to another club within the same Member State.
Nevertheless, the Court agreed with Bosman that the transfer rules ‘are 
likely to restrict the freedom of movement of players’ by ‘preventing or 
deterring them from leaving the clubs to which they belong’ upon expiry of 
their employment contracts.42 Even though the transfer rules applied to all 
clubs and all players in the same manner, the Court found that they none-
theless constituted an obstacle to the freedom of movement for workers:
‘It is sufficient to note that, although the rules in issue in the main proceedings 
apply also to transfers between clubs belonging to different national associa-
tions within the same Member State and are similar to those governing trans-
fers between clubs belonging to the same national association, they still directly 
affect players’ access to the employment market in other Member States and are 
thus capable of impeding freedom of movement for workers. (…).’43
The same line of reasoning was followed in Alpine Investments, a case about 
the compatibility of a prohibition of cold-calling with the free movement 
of services.44 In fact, numerous judgments confirm that Article 56 TFEU 
requires the abolition of ‘any restriction’ that is ‘liable to prohibit, impede 
or render less advantageous’ the exercise by service providers of their rights 
of free movement, even if the restriction applies ‘without distinction’.45 
42 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc 
Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 99.
43 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc 
Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 103.
44 Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments v. Minister van Financiën, ECLI:EU:C:1995:126, at 34-39.
45 See e.g. Case C-272/94, Michel Guiot and Climatec, ECLI:EU:C:1996:147, at 10; Case 
C-3/95, Reisebüro Broede v. Gerd Sandker, ECLI:EU:C:1996:487, at 25; Case C-222/95, Parodi 
v. Banque H. Albert de Bary et Cie, ECLI:EU:C:1997:345, at 18; Joined Cases C-369/96 and 
C-376/96, Arblade (C-369/96) and Leloup (C-376/96), ECLI:EU:C:1999:575, at 33; Joined 
Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98, Finalarte and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:564, at 28; Case C-165/98, André Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assistance, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:162, at 22; Case C-164/99, Portugaia Construções, ECLI:EU:C:2002:40, 
at 16; Case C-279/00, Commission v. Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2002:89, at 31; Case C-168/04, 
Commission v. Austria, ECLI:EU:C:2006:595, at 36; Case C-244/04, Commission v. Germany, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:49, at 30; Case C-433/04, Commission v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:2006:702, at 
28; Case C-250/06, United Pan-Europe Communications Belgium and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2007:
783, at 29; Case C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau v. Maschinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:127, at 78; Case C-458/08, Commission v. Portugal, ECLI:EU:C:2010:692, 
at 83; Case C-577/10, Commission v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:2012:814, at 38; Case C-475/11, 
Kostas Konstantinides, ECLI:EU:C:2013:542, at 44; Case C-49/16, Unibet International v. 
Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Központi Hivatala, ECLI:EU:C:2017:491, at 32.
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Similar formulations have been used in judgments about the interpretation 
of Articles 45 and 49 TFEU.46
The Court’s shift from a discrimination approach to a restriction 
approach has attracted considerable attention from commentators. Some 
of them reject the restriction approach altogether. Davies, for instance, 
argues that it is impossible to take free movement law beyond discrimi-
nation without coming into conflict with the ‘foundational legal, political 
and economic principles of the internal market’.47 In his view, entirely 
non-discriminatory restrictions simply cannot exist, because the applica-
tion of free movement law to such restrictions amounts to positive action.48 
However, it cannot be denied that the objective to realise an internal market 
is ‘functionally broad’.49 It may be recalled that the Treaty itself speaks of 
‘restrictions’ to free movement50 and defines the internal market as ‘an area 
without internal frontiers’.51 For these reasons alone, it is arguable that 
restrictions can be caught by the free movement provisions, whether or not 
they discriminate.52
The real difficulty, of course, is to determine where the outer boundaries 
lie. Surely not every non-discriminatory restriction should be subjected 
to scrutiny.53 In the present context we are not, however, concerned with 
drawing these lines. For our purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the 
Court has repeatedly confirmed that genuinely non-discriminatory restric-
tions may, in principle, breach the free movement rules, and that this 
approach differs from, and is broader in scope than, an approach which 
focuses exclusively on directly and indirectly discriminatory restrictions. 
This observation naturally raises a follow-up question which does concern 
us: what, if any, are the consequences of this development for the interpreta-
tion of Article 18 TFEU?
46 Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, ECLI:EU:C:1993:125, at 32 
(concerning Art. 45 and 49 TFEU); Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine 
degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, at 37 (Art. 49 and 56 TFEU); 
Case C-190/98, Volker Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau, ECLI:EU:C:2000:49, at 18 (Art. 45 
TFEU); Case C-387/01, Harald Weigel and Ingrid Weigel v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarl-
berg, ECLI:EU:C:2004:256, at 51 (Art. 45 TFEU); Case C-464/02, Commission v. Denmark, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:546, at 45 (Art. 45 TFEU).
47 Davies 2011, p. 9. See also Davies 2003, p. 93-115.
48 Davies 2011, p. 7 and 9.
49 Weatherill 2017, p. 43.
50 Art. 49 and 56 TFEU.
51 Art. 26 (2) TFEU.
52 See e.g. Opinion A-G Jacobs, Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments v. Minister van Financiën, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:15, at 47-50; Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 124; Wollenschläger 2011, p. 7-8; 
Tryfonidou 2014, p. 396.
53 Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 130-135; Barnard 2016, p. 228-232.
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5.2.4 Consequences for the interpretation of Article 18 TFEU?
What does the shift from a discrimination approach to a restriction approach 
mean for the interpretation of Article 18 TFEU and, consequently, for its 
relation to the provisions pertaining to the free movement of workers, the 
freedom of establishment, and the freedom to provide and receive services? 
Has the restriction approach worked its way up to Article 18 TFEU?
If we assume that a violation of any of these free movement provisions 
‘automatically and inevitably’ constitutes a violation of Article 18 TFEU,54 
as the Court has occasionally done,55 then we may be inclined to conclude 
that Article 18 TFEU requires not only the elimination of all discrimination 
but also the abolition of any non-discriminatory restriction which prevents 
or substantially hinders access to the market. Along these lines, Schepel has 
suggested that the interpretation of Article 18 TFEU keeps pace with the 
interpretation of the free movement provisions:
‘It seems arguable, then, that rather than Article 18 limiting the horizontal appli-
cation of free movement provisions to discriminatory measures, the free move-
ment provisions have stretched the horizontal application of Article 18 to any 
restriction of free movement.’56
It must be admitted that the Court has, at times, created the impression that 
Article 18 TFEU governs any restriction of free movement. Schepel referred 
to Ferlini, where the Court held that Article 18 TFEU applies to actions 
‘which adversely affect the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaran-
teed under the Treaty’.57 Another, more recent example can be found in the 
judgment TopFit and Daniele Biffi v. Deutscher Leichtathletikverband, where the 
Court reviewed the rules adopted by the German athletics association both 
against the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
and against Article 21 TFEU.58 The latter provision is commonly consid-
ered to be the lex generalis in relation to the provisions governing the free 
54 Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 121.
55 Case 305/87, Commission v. Greece, ECLI:EU:C:1989:218, at 12 (referring to Case 2/74, 
Jean Reyners v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1974:68; Case 13/76, Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:115; Case 90/76, Henry van Ameyde v. UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1977:101); Case 
C-246/89, Commission v. United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:1991:375, at 18; Case C-311/97, Royal 
Bank of Scotland v. Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State), ECLI:EU:C:1999:216, at 20.
56 Schepel 2012, p. 189.
57 Case C-411/98, Angelo Ferlini v. Centre Hospitalier de Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:2000:530, at 
50, referring to Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale 
and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140; Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge 
de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, ECLI:EU:C:1976:56; Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des 
Societes de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463.
58 It must be noted that the Court has read these provisions in conjunction with Article 165 
TFEU, which determines that the Union ‘shall contribute to the promotion of European 
sporting issues’ and that Union action in this area shall be aimed at ‘promoting fairness 
and openness in sporting competitions’.
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movement of persons, as it generally protects the right of Union citizens to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.59 Having 
found that the athletics association had restricted freedom of movement as 
protected by Article 21 TFEU,60 the Court examined whether this restriction 
could be justified in the light of Articles 18 and 21 TFEU.61 The application 
of Article 18 TFEU in this context may lead one to believe that the general 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality applies to any 
restriction of free movement, even though the nationality requirement at 
issue was clearly discriminatory and not merely restrictive.62
The reasoning expressed by the Grand Chamber in International Jet 
Management, however, makes clear that the substance of Article 18 TFEU 
has not been extended beyond discrimination.63 International Jet Manage-
ment is an airline company based in Austria. It operates private flights from 
Russia and Turkey to Germany without having obtained permission to enter 
German airspace. Unlike airline companies registered in Germany, foreign 
airline companies are required to obtain such permission in advance, even 
if they possess a valid operating licence issued in another Member State. 
Because International Jet Management did not have the permission to 
enter German airspace, the company is prosecuted and fined. On appeal, 
the company relies upon Article 18 TFEU. The distinction between airline 
companies registered in Germany and airline companies registered in 
Austria would violate the general prohibition of any discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. The Oberlandesgericht Braunschweig decides to refer 
several questions concerning the interpretation of Article 18 TFEU to the 
Court of Justice.
The key question is whether Article 18 TFEU is applicable at all.64 It 
is important to observe, in this regard, that International Jet Management 
possessed a valid operating license, issued by the Austrian Ministry of 
Transport in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008.65 The Court 
observes that this Regulation does not only cover flights made within the 
European Union, but also flights between a third country and a Member 
State.66 In fact, the Regulation prohibits undertakings such as International 
Jet Management to transport air passengers without possessing a valid 
59 E.g. by Davies 2003, p. 189; Wollenschläger 2011, p. 30; Tryfonidou 2014, p. 386.
60 Case C-22/18, TopFit and Daniele Biffi  v. Deutscher Leichtathletikverband, ECLI:EU:C:2019:
497, at 47.
61 See, explicitly, Case C-22/18, TopFit and Daniele Biffi  v. Deutscher Leichtathletikverband, ECLI:
EU:C:2019:497, at 65.
62 As noted in Opinion A-G Tanchev, Case C-22/18, TopFit and Daniele Biffi  v. Deutscher 
Leichtathletikverband, ECLI:EU:C:2019:181, at 85.
63 Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171.
64 Opinion A-G Bot, Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2013:279, at 28.
65 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the 
Community.
66 Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171, at 41-46.
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operating license.67 Because the facts of the case are governed by secondary 
legislation, the Court holds that the situation falls within the scope of Union 
law within the meaning of Article 18 TFEU.68 This conclusion cannot, in the 
view of the Court, be called into question by the fact that the Union legisla-
ture has not harmonised the provision of air transport services between the 
Member States and third countries as such.69
Does this mean that Article 18 TFEU is applicable to the case at hand? 
The French and German governments object. They draw attention to Article 
58 (1) TFEU, which determines that transport services are governed by 
Title VI of the TFEU. It is trite law that transport services are not, there-
fore, governed by Article 56 TFEU.70 Title VI, for its part, only applies to 
transport by rail, road, and inland waterway.71 Sea and air transport are not, 
therefore, subject to the general rules contained in Title VI,72 but can only be 
regulated by the Union legislature in accordance with the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure.73 If the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality were to be applied to air transport services, so the French and 
German governments contend, the freedom to provide services laid down 
in Article 56 TFEU would effectively be applied through the backdoor of 
Article 18 TFEU. This would deprive the derogation provided for in Article 
58 (1) TFEU of ‘any useful effect’.74
In other words, the French and German governments argue that if the 
specific prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality is not appli-
cable, the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
should not be applicable either. The Court does not buy this argument. It 
first explains the meaning of the prohibition laid down in Article 56 TFEU:
‘According to the Court’s settled case-law, Article 56 TFEU requires not only 
the elimination of all discrimination against providers of services on grounds 
of nationality or the fact that they are established in a Member State other than 
67 Art. 3 (1), Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air 
services in the Community.
68 Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171, at 53. See also Opinion 
A-G Bot, Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2013:279, at 42-56.
69 Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171, at 39.
70 Joined Cases 209/84 to 213/84, Asjes and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1986:188, at 37; Case 4/88, 
Lambregts Transportbedrijf v. Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:1989:320, at 9; Case C-49/89, 
Corsica Ferries France v. Direction générale des douanes, ECLI:EU:C:1989:649, at 10; Case 
C-17/90, Pinaud Wieger v. Bundesanstalt für den Güterfernverkehr, ECLI:EU:C:1991:416, at 
7; Case C-467/98, Commission v. Denmark (‘Open Skies’), ECLI:EU:C:2002:625, at 123; Case 
C-382/08, Michael Neukirchinger v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Grieskirchen, ECLI:EU:C:2011:27, 
at 22.
71 Art. 100 (1) TFEU.
72 Case 167/73, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:1974:35, at 32; Joined Cases 209/84 to 
213/84, Asjes and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1986:188, at 44; Case C-178/05, Commission v. Greece, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:317, at 52; Case C-382/08, Michael Neukirchinger v. Bezirkshauptmann-
schaft Grieskirchen, ECLI:EU:C:2011:27, at 21.
73 Art. 100 (2) TFEU.
74 Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171, at 55.
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that where the services are to be provided, but also the abolition of any restric-
tion, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to 
those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less 
advantageous the activities of a provider of services established in another Mem-
ber State where he lawfully provides similar services (…).’75
The Court then explains that this prohibition is wider in scope than the 
prohibition laid down in Article 18 TFEU:
‘[Article 56 TFEU] therefore has a scope which exceeds the prohibition of dis-
crimination provided for in Article 18 TFEU.’76
Responding to the arguments raised by the French and German govern-
ments, the Court submits that Article 58 (1) TFEU retains its intended effect. 
This provision may not exclude the application of the general prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, but it does deprive air carriers of 
the possibility to challenge entirely non-discriminatory restrictions to free 
movement:
‘Therefore, while the Member States are entitled, under Article 58(1) TFEU, to 
impose certain restrictions on the provision of air transport services in respect of 
the routes between third countries and the European Union in so far as (…) the 
EU legislature has not exercised the power conferred upon it by Article 100(2) 
TFEU to liberalise that type of service, those States nevertheless remain subject to 
the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality enshrined 
in Article 18 TFEU.’77
Importantly, the foregoing demonstrates that we should not take the 
statement, expressed so often by the Court,78 that Article 18 TFEU ‘applies 
independently only to situations governed by Union law in regard to which 
the Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination’ to mean that 
Article 18 TFEU can never be applied to cross-border activities employed 
by workers, by self-employed persons and companies, and by providers 
of services. Proceeding from the assumption that Article 18 TFEU is appli-
cable as soon as the facts fall within the scope of Union law, the Court only 
accepts its exclusion if the authors of the Treaties have expressly provided 
for a derogation.79 The mere fact that transport activities are excluded from 
the scope of application of the freedom to provide services does not, there-
fore, imply that they are also excluded from the scope of application of the 
75 Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171, at 57, referring to Case 
C-475/11, Kostas Konstantinides, ECLI:EU:C:2013:542, at 44.
76 Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171, at 58.
77 Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171, at 59.
78 See supra section 5.2.2.
79 See also the Opinion A-G Bot, Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:279, at 40.
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general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality.80 This 
line of reasoning has also been followed in earlier judgments, in which the 
Court decided that transport activities remain subject to the free movement 
rules in the area of work81 and the competition rules.82
For present purposes, it is important to observe, moreover, that the 
Court has expressly distinguished the prohibitions laid down in Article 
18 TFEU and in Article 56 TFEU. After International Jet Management, it is 
clear that entirely non-discriminatory restrictions of the right to provide 
services are governed only by Article 56 TFEU, and not by Article 18 TFEU. 
We may safely conclude that the same reasoning applies when it comes to 
the relationship between Article 18 TFEU and the free movement of work 
and the freedom of establishment. Contrary to what Schepel has suggested, 
the substance of the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality has not been extended beyond discrimination. Not every 
restriction of free movement is directly or indirectly discriminatory within 
the meaning of Article 18 TFEU.83 In some respects, free movement law is 
broader in scope than the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of nationality.
In the light of these findings, we must conclude that the free movement 
provisions cannot, in all situations, be characterised as the leges speciales and 
that the general prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality 
cannot, in all situations, be characterised as the lex generalis.84 It has become 
impossible, therefore, to maintain the view that a violation of one of the 
free movement rights automatically and inevitably constitutes a violation of 
Article 18 TFEU.85 Nor can it be said that the absence of a violation of one 
of the free movement rights necessarily implies that Article 18 TFEU has 
not been violated either.86 It is advised that the Court does not create these 
impressions in its judgments anymore.
80 Case C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171, at 59.
81 Case 167/73, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:1974:35, at 28-33.
82 Joined Cases 209/84 to 213/84, Asjes and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1986:188, at 40-45; Case 
66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlau-
teren Wettbewerbs, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140, at 5.
83 Already observed by Baquero Cruz 1999, p. 614.
84 As many writers assume, e.g. Böhning 1973, p. 82; Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 121; Hartkamp 
2011, p. 164-165; Krenn 2012, p. 193; Veldhoen 2013, p. 370-371; McDonnell 2018, p. 438.
85 Case 305/87, Commission v. Greece, ECLI:EU:C:1989:218, at 12 (referring to Case 2/74, 
Jean Reyners v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1974:68; Case 13/76, Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:115; Case 90/76, Henry van Ameyde v. UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1977:101); Case 
C-246/89, Commission v. United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:1991:375, at 18; Case C-311/97, Royal 
Bank of Scotland v. Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State), ECLI:EU:C:1999:216, at 20.
86 As the Court has concluded in Case 90/76, Henry van Ameyde v. UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1977:101, 
at 27; Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, at 36; 
Case C-112/91, Hans Werner v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, ECLI:EU:C:1993:27, at 20; 
Case C-222/07, UTECA v. Administración General del Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2009:124, at 39.
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5.2.5 Concurrence of Article 18 TFEU and free movement law?
In view of the foregoing analysis we will, for now, assume that the facts 
of a case do, on the face of it, fall within the scope of application of both 
Article 18 TFEU and one of the free movement provisions in the areas of 
work, establishment, and services. In other words, we will focus on directly 
and indirectly discriminatory restrictions to free movement, and leave aside 
entirely non-discriminatory restrictions. The question to consider is whether 
the free movement provisions affect the scope of application of the general 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, so that the latter 
cannot be relied upon.
Once again, it seems that the approach of the Court has developed over 
time. Initially, the Court did not shy away from examining all the relevant 
rules simultaneously. In Walrave and Koch, for instance, the Court reviewed 
the rules of the Association Union Cycliste Internationale both against the 
general prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality and 
against the provisions governing the free movement of work and services.87 
In later judgments, however, the Court did not insert Article 18 TFEU in 
the operative part anymore.88 Sometimes, the Court added that it would 
be ‘unnecessary’ to give a ruling on the interpretation of Article 18 TFEU.89 
87 Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:140. The same approach has been followed by the Court in Case 13/76, 
Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115, concerning Art. 18, 45 and 56 
TFEU; Case 90/76, Henry van Ameyde v. UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1977:101, concerning Art. 18,
49 and 56 TFEU; Case 251/83, Eberhard Haug-Adrion v. Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG, ECLI:
EU:C:1984:397, concerning Art. 18, 45 and 56 TFEU; Case 186/87, Ian William Cowan v. Le 
Trésor public, ECLI:EU:C:1989:47, concerning Art. 18 and 56 TFEU; Case C-10/90, Maria 
Masgio v. Bundesknappschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1991:107, concerning Art. 18 and 45 TFEU; Case 
C-379/92, Matteo Peralta, ECLI:EU:C:1994:296, concerning, inter alia, Art. 18, 45 and 56 
TFEU.
88 Case 305/87, Commission v. Greece, ECLI:EU:C:1989:218; Case C-419/92, Ingetraut Scholz 
v. Opera Universitaria di Cagliari and Cinzia Porcedda, ECLI:EU:C:1994:62; Case C-105/07, 
Lammers & Van Cleeff v. Belgische Staat, ECLI:EU:C:2008:24; Case C-269/07, Commission v. 
Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2009:527.
89 These and similar formulations are used in: Case 305/87, Commission v. Greece, ECLI:EU:
C:1989:218, at 28; Case C-131/96, Carlos Mora Romero v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Rhein-
provinz, ECLI:EU:C:1997:317, at 12; Case C-336/96, Mr and Mrs Robert Gilly v. Directeur des 
Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, ECLI:EU:C:1998:221, at 39; Case C-55/98, Skatteministeriet 
v. Bent Vestergaard, ECLI:EU:C:1999:533, at 17; Case C-100/01, Ministre de l’Intérieur 
v. Aitor Oteiza Olazabal, ECLI:EU:C:2002:712, at 26; Case C-289/02, AMOK Verlags v. 
A & R Gastronomie, ECLI:EU:C:2003:669, at 26; Case C-387/01, Harald Weigel and Ingrid 
Weigel v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg, ECLI:EU:C:2004:256, at 59; Case C-341/05, 
Laval un Partneri v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, at 55; Case 
C-91/08, Wall v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurter Entsorgungs- und Service (FES), 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:182, at 32; Case C-470/13, Generali-Providencia Biztosító v. Közbeszerzési 
Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2469, at 31; Case C-474/12, Schiebel 
Aircraft v. Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2139, at 22.
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Sometimes, the Court even concluded that the general prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality did not apply at all because the 
facts fell within the scope of one or more free movement rules.90 Against 
this background, Baquero Cruz has suggested that the free movement 
provisions automatically exclude the application of Article 18 TFEU:
‘In the presence of a more concrete provision Article [18 TFEU] steps back, or 
more precisely, its normative substance is applied through the more concrete 
provision.’91
One may wonder whether it is necessary to exclude the general prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of nationality altogether as soon as, and for 
the very reason that, a dispute is governed by a free movement provision. 
In many situations, the application of these rules will not lead to different 
outcomes. In some respects, however, the rules do differ, which may lead 
to different results. This becomes clear if we adopt the perspective of the 
defendant. He may take comfort from the fact that the free movement provi-
sions expressly allow for justification defences based on grounds of public 
policy, public security, and public health.92 Take Article 52 (1) TFEU as an 
illustration:
‘The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall 
not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on 
grounds of public policy, public security or public health.’
These written derogations can be relied upon in respect of any conduct 
breaching the free movement right at issue, whether the restriction is 
directly or indirectly discriminatory.93 In addition, indirectly discrimina-
tory restrictions may be ‘objectively’ justified on the basis of unwritten 
derogations developed by the Court of Justice under the so-called ‘rule of 
reason’ doctrine.94 In proceedings concerning legal relationships between 
private individuals, the Court has recognised several objective justifications 
90 E.g. Case C-1/93, Halliburton Services v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, ECLI:EU:C:1994:127, 
at 12; Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scotland v. Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State), ECLI:EU:
C:1999:216, at 21; Case C-251/98, C. Baars v. Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:205, at 25; Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft Ltd and 
Others (C-397/98), Hoechst and Hoechst UK (C-410/98) v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
and H.M. Attorney General, ECLI:EU:C:2001:134, at 40; Case C-137/09, Marc Michel Jose-
mans v. Burgemeester van Maastricht, ECLI:EU:C:2010:774, at 52.
91 Baquero Cruz 1999, p. 613.
92 Art. 45 (3), Art. 52, and Art. 62 TFEU. Given the focus of this book on private relation-
ships, we will not examine the public service and the official authority exceptions 
provided for in Art. 45 (4) and Art. 51 TFEU respectively.
93 Non-discriminatory restrictions are not discussed here, for the reasons explained above.
94 Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 149-152.
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of ‘general interest’, such as maintaining a balance between sports clubs,95 
encouraging the recruitment and training of young players,96 and the right 
to take collective action for the protection of workers against possible social 
dumping.97 In order for such an objective justification defence to enliven, it 
must be demonstrated that the conduct is suitable for achieving an impera-
tive requirement in the general interest and does not go beyond what is 
necessary for that purpose.98
Conduct which indirectly discriminates on the basis of nationality can 
also be objectively justified on the basis of Article 18 TFEU.99 Crucially, 
however, Article 18 TFEU does not contain any written justification 
grounds. Unlike the free movement provisions, it does not expressly allow 
for justification defences based on grounds of public policy, public security, 
and public health. Does this mean that direct discrimination on grounds of 
nationality can never be justified in the context of Article 18 TFEU?
This question is deeply controversial, no doubt because direct discrimi-
nation conflicts sharply with the very principle of equal treatment. The 
general understanding is that direct discrimination can only ever be justi-
fied on the basis of the derogation grounds expressly mentioned in the 
Treaties or in secondary legislation.100 It has sometimes been suggested that 
the justification of direct discrimination should be allowed in exceptional 
situations,101 and there are some judgments in which it appears as if the 
95 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc 
Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 106; Case C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Braine v. 
FRBSB, ECLI:EU:C:2000:201, at 53-54.
96 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc 
Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 106; Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard 
and Newcastle United, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143, at 39.
97 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:
809, at 103.
98 See e.g. Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, ECLI:EU:C:1993:125, at 
32; Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di
Milano, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, at 37; Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Foot-
ball Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 104; Case C-438/05, 
International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772, at 75.
99 See e.g. Case C-274/96, Horst Otto Bickel and Ulrich Franz, ECLI:EU:C:1998:563, at 27; 
Case C-224/98, Marie-Nathalie D’Hoop v. Offi ce national de l’emploi, ECLI:EU:C:2002:432, 
at 36; Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v. État belge, ECLI:EU:C:2003:539, at 31; Case 
C-209/03, The Queen, on the application of Dany Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing and Secre-
tary of State for Education and Skills, ECLI:EU:C:2005:169, at 54; Case C-382/08, Michael 
Neukirchinger v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Grieskirchen, ECLI:EU:C:2011:27, at 35; Case 
C-628/11, International Jet Management, ECLI:EU:C:2014:171, at 68, and in the context of 
a dispute between an individual and a national sports association, Case C-22/18, TopFit 
and Daniele Biffi  v. Deutscher Leichtathletikverband, ECLI:EU:C:2019:497, at 67.
100 Prechal 2004, p. 545; Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 156; Ellis & Watson 2012, p. 172-174; Tobler 
2013, p. 460; Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 938.
101 Notably by A-G Van Gerven, in Opinion A-G Van Gerven, Case C-132/92, Birds Eye 
Walls Ltd. v. Friedel M. Roberts, ECLI:EU:C:1993:868, at 12-14, concerning the possibility of 
justifying discrimination directly based on sex.
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Court has accepted this possibility.102 In TopFit and Daniele Biffi v. Deutscher 
Leichtathletikverband, it may be recalled, the Court first concluded that the 
nationality requirement imposed by the German athletics association consti-
tuted a restriction of free movement and then examined possible objective 
justification defences,103 even though the association clearly treated foreign 
athletes differently because of their nationality.104 By adopting a restriction-
based approach instead of a discrimination-based approach, however, 
the Court formally dodged the question. Apparently, the Court is not yet 
prepared to expressly confirm that directly discriminatory conduct can be 
justified. At this stage we must, therefore, conclude that Article 18 TFEU 
does not allow for justification defences in cases concerning direct discrimi-
nation.
For this reason, it is important to know that the application of the 
general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality is excluded 
if the facts of the case fall within the scope of application of the free move-
ment provisions governing workers, self-employed persons and companies, 
and service providers. In such situations, the alleged infringer may rely 
upon the express derogations available under these free movement provi-
sions, even if his conduct appears to be directly discriminatory and would, 
for that reason, not be justifiable under Article 18 TFEU. This is not to say 
that the principle of non-discrimination has no role to play at all. The fact 
that the conduct is directly discriminatory must be taken into account when 
considering whether the means chosen were necessary and appropriate for 
attaining the stated objective.105 But it is not impossible to justify the conduct 
from the outset. Even though the free movement provisions can no longer 
be characterised as the leges speciales in relation to Article 18 TFEU, they 
clearly do have priority once the facts fall within their scope of application.
102 Case 106/83, Sermide v. Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1984:394, 
at 28: ‘It is appropriate in the fi rst place to point out that under the principle of non-
discrimination between Community producers or consumers, which is enshrined in 
the second subparagraph of [Article 40 (3) TFEU] and which includes the prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in the fi rst paragraph of [Article 
18 TFEU], comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations 
must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justifi ed’ (emphasis 
added); Case C-122/96, Stephen Austin Saldanha and MTS Securities Corporation v. Hiross 
Holding, ECLI:EU:C:1997:458, at 29: ‘Suffi ce it in this regard to point out that, even though 
the object of a provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings (…) is not as such 
contrary to [Article 18 TFEU]’ (emphasis added). See also Case C-408/92, Smith and Others 
v. Avdel Systems, ECLI:EU:C:1994:349, at 30, in a statement concerning today’s Art. 157 
TFEU: ‘Even assuming that it would, in this context, be possible to take account of objecti-
vely justifi able considerations (…)’ (emphasis added).
103 Case C-22/18, TopFit and Daniele Biffi  v. Deutscher Leichtathletikverband, ECLI:EU:C:2019:
497, at 42-47 and 55-67 respectively. The same approach is adopted in Case C-415/93, 
Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:
C:1995:463, at 116-137.
104 As noted in Opinion A-G Tanchev, Case C-22/18, TopFit and Daniele Biffi  v. Deutscher 
Leichtathletikverband, ECLI:EU:C:2019:181, at 85.
105 See Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 158; Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 759.
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5.2.6 Interim conclusion
This section has examined the relationship between the general prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of nationality enshrined in Article 18 TFEU 
and the treaty provisions pertaining to the free movement of persons and 
services. Importantly, the section has demonstrated that Article 18 TFEU 
cannot, in all situations, be considered the lex generalis and that the free 
movement provisions cannot, in all situations, be considered leges speciales. 
The reason is that the Court of Justice of the European Union has replaced 
the concept of discrimination with the concept of restriction in the context 
of the law of free movement. The precise content of the latter concept may 
not always be entirely clear, but its scope is evidently broader than the 
concept of discrimination. Crucially, the Court has so far refused to adopt 
the concept of restriction in the context of Article 18 TFEU. In fact, it has 
explicitly confirmed that the scope of the general prohibition of discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality does not extend beyond discrimination. In 
the light of these developments, we must conclude that not every restriction 
is governed by Article 18 TFEU anymore. Consequently, Article 18 TFEU 
can no longer be considered the all-embracing lex generalis as compared 
with the free movement provisions.
As soon as the facts of the case do fall within the scope of application of 
one of the free movement provisions, however, the Court tends to exclude 
the application of the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality altogether. This section has questioned whether this solution is 
necessary. After all, the application of the two regimes will not necessarily 
lead to different outcomes. Yet the section has also discussed one example 
of a situation in which it does matter that recourse to Article 18 TFEU is 
excluded. Contrary to Article 18 TFEU, the free movement provisions 
expressly allow for justification defences based on grounds of public policy, 
public security, and public health. In cases concerning directly discrimina-
tory restrictions to free movement based on nationality, the defendant may 
take comfort from the fact that he can rely upon such defences in order to 
justify conduct which would not escape scrutiny under Article 18 TFEU.
5.3 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
5.3.1 Introduction
Whereas the previous section has examined the relationship between the 
general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality and the 
free movement provisions governing persons and services, the current 
section will focus on the area of competition law. We will investigate the 
relationship between Article 101 TFEU, which deals with collusion between 
undertakings, and Article 102 TFEU, which deals with the market conduct 
of dominant undertakings. Before analysing the case law of the Court to see 
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whether a single set of facts may fall within the scope of application of both 
provisions (subsection 5.3.5), we will briefly examine the legal framework 
within which the provisions operate (subsection 5.3.2) and highlight their 
most important similarities and differences (subsections 5.3.3-5.3.4).
5.3.2 A brief overview of the provisions
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU focus on different forms of anticompetitive 
conduct. Article 101 TFEU prohibits ‘all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object 
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market’. In other words, Article 101 TFEU deals with collusion 
between several independent market operators. By contrast, Article 102 
TFEU prohibits any ‘abuse’ by ‘one or more undertakings’ of a ‘dominant 
position’, that is a position of economic strength which enables the under-
takings to influence the conditions of competition on the market.106 So, 
Article 102 TFEU does not deal with collusion but with dominant under-
takings which, separately or collectively,107 are in a position to hinder the 
development of competition on the market.
Both rules form part of the only section within the TFEU that is explic-
itly addressed to undertakings.108 This section also contains several insti-
tutional provisions: one rule conferring a power on the Council to adopt 
secondary legislation in this field (Art. 103 TFEU), and two rules concerning 
the competence of the national authorities (Art. 104 TFEU) and of the Euro-
pean Commission (Art. 104 TFEU) to investigate suspected infringements 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The section is rounded off with Article 106 
TFEU. The first and third paragraphs of this provision are not relevant 
in the present context, as they concern the actions by which the Member 
States intervene in the market, either through public undertakings or by 
granting undertakings exclusive or special rights. But the second para-
graph of Article 106 TFEU is relevant, because it provides a derogation to 
106 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, at 65; Case 85/76, Hoffmann-
La Roche v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, at 38-39.
107 On several occasions, the Court has held that two or more independent economic enti-
ties may together hold a dominant position towards other operators on the same market 
(see e.g. Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, Società Italiana Vetro and Others v. 
Commission (‘Flat Glass’), ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, at 357-360; Case C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo 
and Others v. Energiebedrijf IJsselmij, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171, at 41-43; Case C-96/94, Centro 
Servizi Spediporto v. Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo, ECLI:EU:C:1995:308, at 32-33; Joined 
Cases C-140/94, C-141/94 and C-142/94, DIP and Others v. Comune di Bassano del Grappa 
and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:330, at 25-26; Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, 
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, at 
35-45).
108 Title VII, Chapter 1, Section 1, titled: ‘Rules applying to undertakings’.
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‘undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly’. On this 
basis, certain undertakings may be exempted from scrutiny on the basis of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.109
5.3.3 Similarities between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
Before we arrive at the justification stage, however, we will focus on the 
content of the two substantive norms that govern the anti-competitive 
conduct of undertakings: Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. There are important 
similarities between these provisions. To begin with, the interpretation of 
the concept of ‘undertaking’ is identical, as the Court has made clear:
‘The Court considers that there is no legal or economic reason to suppose that 
the term “undertaking” in Article [101] has a different meaning from the one 
given to it in the context of Article [102].’110
The meaning of the term ‘undertaking’ is not defined in the TFEU, but 
has been worked out by the Court. By now, it is trite law that this term 
encompasses ‘every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of 
the legal status of the entity and the way it is financed’.111 Importantly, the 
Court has ruled that the same definition applies when determining which 
undertaking is liable to pay compensation in respect of losses resulting from 
an infringement of EU competition rules.112
Ultimately, the definition of the term ‘undertaking’ – and indeed, the 
very scope of EU competition law – depends on the definition of the term 
‘economic activity’.113 The Court has determined that, within the context 
of competition law, this term refers to ‘any activity consisting in offering 
109 Jones & Sufrin 2016, p. 623-643.
110 Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, Società Italiana Vetro and Others v. Commission 
(‘Flat Glass’), ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, at 358.
111 Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, at 21; Joined 
Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Christian Poucet v. Assurances générales de France en Caisse 
mutuelle régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon and Daniel Pistre v. Cancava, ECLI:EU:C:1993:63, 
at 17; Case C-327/12, Ministero dello Sviluppo economico and Autorità per la vigilanza sui 
contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture v. SOA Nazionale Costruttori – Organismo di 
Attestazione, ECLI:EU:C:2013:827, at 27.
112 Case C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, at 47.
113 If an organisation does not carry out economic activities, it is not considered to be an 
undertaking within the meaning of competition law. See e.g. Joined Cases C-159/91 and 
C-160/91, Christian Poucet v. Assurances générales de France en Caisse mutuelle régionale 
du Languedoc-Roussillon and Daniel Pistre v. Cancava, ECLI:EU:C:1993:63, at 19; Case 
C-309/99, Wouters and others v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:98, at 112.
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goods and services on a given market’.114 It is not necessary that the under-
taking makes a profit or intends to make a profit by offering the goods and 
services.115 What is required is that the activity is ‘economic in nature’,116 
meaning that the activity ‘has not always been, and is not necessarily, 
carried out by public entities’.117 As Odudu writes, the central issue under 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU appears to be ‘whether the potential to make a 
profit without state intervention exists’.118 This basic test applies across the 
range of EU competition rules.119
A second point of similarity is that both Article 101 and 102 TFEU 
only govern anticompetitive conduct which ‘may affect trade between 
Member States’. This element is interpreted in the same way under both 
provisions.120 It determines the dividing line between national and EU 
competition law, confining the scope of the latter to conduct that is capable 
of having a minimum level of effect on cross-border trade. In the words 
of the Court, EU competition law only enters the picture if the actual or 
potential effect of the conduct in question on the trade between Member 
States is ‘appreciable’.121 The meaning of this concept for the purposes of 
both Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU is explained in the ‘Guidelines on the 
effect on trade concept’, in which the European Commission sums up the 
relevant case law.122
A third point of similarity that is relevant in the present context is that 
both Article 101 and 102 TFEU may serve as a basis to claim compensation 
from the infringer. In a range of leading judgments, the Court has explained 
114 Case 118/85, Commission v. Italy, ECLI:EU:C:1987:283, at 7; Joined Cases C-180/98 
to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Others v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:428, at 75; Case C-465/99, Ambulanz Glöckner v. Landkreis Südwestpfalz, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:577, at 19; Case C-327/12, Ministero dello Sviluppo economico and Autorità 
per la vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture v. SOA Nazionale Costruttori 
– Organismo di Attestazione, ECLI:EU:C:2013:827, at 27.
115 Odudu 2009, p. 232; Jones & Sufrin 2016, p. 116.
116 Case T-155/04, SELEX Sistemi Integrati v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2006:387, at 77.
117 Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, at 22; Case 
T-155/04, SELEX Sistemi Integrati v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2006:387, at 89.
118 Odudu 2009, p. 231-232. See also Opinion A-G Jacobs, Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, 
C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband and Others v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes 
and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2003:304, at 28: ‘the basic test appears to me to be whether [the 
activity] could, at least in principle, be carried on by a private undertaking in order to 
make profi ts’; and Wendt 2013, p. 91: ‘(…) the question is whether a particular activity, in 
principle, can be carried out under market conditions, i.e. by a private actor with a view 
to profi t’.
119 Wendt 2013, p. 91-95, 173; Jones & Sufrin 2016, p. 116, 263, and 595.
120 Wendt 2013, p. 154-155, 173; Jones & Sufrin 2016, p. 171-173, 270-271.
121 E.g. Case 22/71, Béguelin Import Co. and Others v. S.A.G.L. Import Export and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:1971:113, at 16; Case C-49/07, MOTOE v. Elliniko Dimosio, ECLI:EU:C:2008:
376, at 41.
122 European Commission Notice, ‘Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in 
Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty’.
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that any person is entitled to claim compensation for losses resulting from 
an anti-competitive agreement or practice prohibited under Article 101 
TFEU.123 In Cogeco Communications, the Court has added that Article 102 
TFEU may serve as a basis to claim compensation for the harm suffered as a 
result of the abuse of a dominant position.124 The latter judgment confirms 
that the claimant must satisfy the same set of constitutive conditions, 
regardless of whether he claims compensation for losses resulting from a 
collusion or from an abuse of a dominant position.125
A fourth point of similarity concerns the rules that are relevant if 
consumers and customers wish to enforce their claims against one or more 
undertakings. Several of these rules have been harmonised, as the result 
of the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and of Directive 
2014/104/EU.126 Although the Regulation largely focuses on the coopera-
tion between the competition authorities and the national courts, some of 
its rules are also relevant in civil proceedings between private parties. The 
division of the burden of proof, for instance, is subject to the same rules, 
regardless of whether the case concerns an infringement of Article 101 (1) 
or of Article 102 TFEU. The burden of proving an infringement ‘shall rest 
on the party or the authority alleging the infringement’,127 and the burden 
of proving the conditions for applying ‘a defence against a finding of an 
infringement’ shall lie with the undertaking or association invoking the 
benefit of the defence.128
The Directive, for its part, also applies equally to claims resulting 
from an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and to claims resulting from an 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU. It harmonises several incidental issues 
such as evidence disclosure, joint and several liability, and the range 
of available defences. The underlying purpose has been to create a level 
123 Case C-453/99, Courage v. Crehan, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, at 26; Joined Cases C-295/04 to 
C-298/04, Manfredi and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, at 61; Case C-557/12, Kone and others 
v. ÖBB-Infrastruktur, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1317, at 22; Case C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunki v. 
Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, at 26.
124 Case C-637/17, Cogeco Communications v. Sport TV Portugal and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:
263, at 40.
125 Rousseva 2010, p. 443-445, also points out that a ‘similar right to damages’ exists in both 
situations. See also Opinion A-G Wahl, Case C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Indus-
trial Solutions and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:100, at 34-45.
126 Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national 
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union.
127 Art. 2, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on compe-
tition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
128 Recital 5 and Art. 2, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. See also Recital 39, 
Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national 
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, on the burden of proving the passing-on of losses.
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playing field for undertakings and to improve the conditions under which 
consumers can enforce their rights.129 As a result of the introduction of the 
Directive, the private enforcement of EU competition law – and in fact, also 
of national competition law130 – has become subject to the same harmonised 
regime.
5.3.4 Differences between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
In addition to these similarities, there are also differences between Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. It will be recalled that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU focus 
on different forms of anticompetitive conduct. Whereas the first provision 
focuses on cooperation between undertakings, the latter provision focuses 
on unilateral behaviour of one or several undertakings.131
It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the treaty provisions 
differ considerably in terms of their structure. Under Article 101 TFEU, 
the starting point is that any agreement, decision and concerted practice 
which has as its ‘object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the internal market’ shall be prohibited (paragraph 1) 
and shall be automatically void (paragraph 2). The Court, for its part, has 
added that agreements, decisions and practices which have an ‘insignificant 
effect on the markets’ fall outside the scope of the prohibition altogether 
(the de minimis doctrine).132 As such conduct does not ‘appreciably’ restrict 
competition under Article 101 (1) TFEU it should only be assessed, if at all, 
on the basis of the national competition laws.133 The reader must be aware 
that the concept of ‘appreciability’ used here is different from the concept 
of ‘appreciability’ used for determining the effect of the anticompetitive 
conduct on cross-border trade explained in the previous section.134
The structure of Article 102 TFEU is different. The starting point is that 
dominant positions on the market are allowed and that only the abuse of 
129 Recitals 9-10, Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member 
States and of the European Union.
130 Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national 
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union also applies to infringements of national competition laws.
131 Wendt 2013, p. 34 and 36.
132 Case C-226/11, Expedia v. Autorité de la concurrence and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795, at 
16-17, with references to several judgments, including Case 5/69, Franz Völk v. Établis-
sements J. Vervaecke, ECLI:EU:C:1969:35, at 7. See also Communication from the Commis-
sion — Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(De Minimis Notice).
133 Jones & Sufrin 2016, p. 171.
134 Jones & Sufrin 2016, p. 170-177, 235-237.
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such positions is forbidden.135 Dominant undertakings do, however, have 
a ‘special responsibility’ not to allow their conduct to impair ‘genuine 
undistorted competition’ on the market.136 Consequently, some actions 
will be considered permissible if they are committed by a non-dominant 
undertaking, but abusive if they are committed by one or several dominant 
undertakings.137 Indeed, any abuse committed by a dominant undertaking 
‘is, by its very nature, liable to give rise to not insignificant restrictions of 
competition, or even of eliminating competition on the market on which the 
undertaking concerned operates’.138 This means that there is no threshold 
of ‘appreciability’ for the purpose of determining whether there is an abuse 
of a dominant position.139 Finally, it must be noted that Article 102 TFEU 
does not declare agreements automatically void. It is subject to debate 
whether, and in what way, the existence of an abusive practice might affect 
the validity of any agreements imposed by the dominant undertaking on its 
customers.140 According to the Court, this issue should be resolved on the 
basis of the applicable national law.141
Several other differences can be recognised if we examine the provisions 
from the point of view of the alleged infringer. Once it is established that 
there is an infringement of Article 101 (1) TFEU, the conduct in question 
may nonetheless escape scrutiny if it satisfies the four conditions listed 
in Article 101 (3) TFEU. In order for this exemption to apply, the conduct 
must (1) improve ‘the production or distribution of goods’ or promote 
‘technical or economic progress’ and (2) allow consumers ‘a fair share of the 
resulting benefit’, provided that it (3) does not impose restrictions ‘which 
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives’ and (4) does 
not eliminate competition ‘in respect of a substantial part of the products 
in question’. The application of this derogation requires a balance to be 
struck between the interests of the undertakings involved and those of the 
direct and indirect users of the products or services covered by the anti-
competitive conduct.142
135 Wendt 2013, p. 336-337. A concentration of two or more previously independent under-
takings may nonetheless be prohibited on the basis of the Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regula-
tion).
136 Wendt 2013, p. 342-343.
137 Wendt 2013, p. 342 and 348.
138 Case C-23/14, Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, ECLI:EU:C:2015:651, at 73.
139 But there is a threshold of ‘appreciability’ for the purpose of determining whether the 
conduct ‘may affect trade between Member States’. This threshold applies in the context 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. See section 5.3.3.
140 Devroe, Cauffman & Bernitz 2017, p. 90-96, with references.
141 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140, at 45: ‘(…) the competent national adminis-
trative or judicial authorities must draw the inferences from the applicability of [Article 
102 TFEU] and, where appropriate, rule that the agreement in question is void on the 
basis, in the absence of relevant Community rules, of their national legislation’.
142 Wendt 2013, p. 451-453.
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An agreement is considered to satisfy the conditions under Article 101 
(3) TFEU if it is covered by a Block Exemption regulation adopted by the 
Council or the Commission.143 These regulations aim at improving the 
efficiency of the decision-making process and at providing legal certainty 
to firms operating on certain markets. In the view of the Court, they should 
not be given a broad interpretation. Consequently, an agreement must fall 
squarely within the scope of the Block Exemption Regulation in order to 
benefit from the exemption.144 It must be noted, however, that where the 
conditions of a block exemption are not satisfied, the agreement may none-
theless benefit from an individual exemption on the basis of Article 101 (3) 
TFEU, provided, of course, that the alleged infringer relies upon this provi-
sion and puts forward sufficient arguments and evidence.145
In addition to the system of exemptions based on Article 101 (3) TFEU, 
the Court has recognised another possibility for exempting anticompetitive 
conduct, one that allows for a broader enquiry into the objectives served 
by the conduct in question, and its necessity and proportionality. The first 
example is the Wouters case, which concerned a regulation adopted by the 
Dutch Bar Association prohibiting multidisciplinary partnerships between 
members of the Bar and accountants. The Court admitted that the regula-
tion had certain restrictive effects, but concluded nevertheless that Article 
101 (1) TFEU had not been violated since the Dutch Bar Association ‘could 
reasonably have considered that that regulation, despite the effects restric-
tive of competition that are inherent in it, is necessary for the proper practice 
of the legal profession’.146 In subsequent case law, the Court has recognised 
several objectives which may be relied upon in order to exempt certain 
restrictive effects, such as the proper conduct of competitive sport,147 the 
quality of the services offered by chartered accountants,148 and the quality 
of the work of geologists.149 It has also stressed the importance of verifying 
143 E.g. Council Regulation (EC) No 169/2009 applying rules of competition to transport 
by rail, road and inland waterway; Commission Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia); Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer 
agreements.
144 Case C-439/09, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique v. Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence and 
Ministre de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi, ECLI:EU:C:2011:649, at 56-57.
145 Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265, at 
233-236.
146 Case C-309/99, Wouters and others v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:98, at 110.
147 Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, 
at 42-56.
148 Case C-1/12, Ordem dos Técnicos Ofi ciais de Contas v. Autoridade da Concorrência, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:127, at 93-100.
149 Case C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi v. Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato 
and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato v. Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:489 at 53-57.
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whether the restrictions of competition ‘are limited to what is necessary to 
ensure the implementation of legitimate objectives’.150
Unlike Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU does not contain any written 
justifications. It may be recalled that the existence of an abuse is already an 
exception to the general rule that dominant positions are allowed. Appar-
ently, the drafters of the Treaties did not deem it necessary to provide for 
any further exemptions.151 The Court has, however, developed a concept of 
‘objective justification’ in order to absolve abusive practices which seek to 
achieve a legitimate objective. In the words of the Court, it is ‘open to a domi-
nant undertaking to provide justification for behaviour that is liable to be 
caught by the prohibition under Article [102 TFEU]’.152 In the same judgment 
– Post Danmark I – the Court mentions two examples: (a) the situation that 
the conduct is ‘objectively necessary’, and (b) the situation that the conduct is 
justified ‘by advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit consumers’.153
The conditions for applying the second category of justification defence 
have been explained by the Court. They show resemblance to,154 but are not 
entirely consistent with, the conditions of Article 101 (3) TFEU mentioned 
above:
‘[With regard to the advantages in terms of efficiency], it is for the dominant 
undertaking to show that the efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct 
under consideration counteract any likely negative effects on competition and 
consumer welfare in the affected markets, that those gains have been, or are 
likely to be, brought about as a result of that conduct, that such conduct is neces-
sary for the achievement of those gains in efficiency and that it does not elimi-
nate effective competition, by removing all or most existing sources of actual or 
potential competition.’155
150 Case C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi v. Autorità garante della concorrenza e del 
mercato and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato v. Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:489, at 54; Joined Cases C-184/13 to C-187/13, C-194/13, C-195/13 and 
C-208/13, API — Anonima Petroli Italiana v. Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti and 
Ministero dello Sviluppo economico, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2147, at 48; Joined Cases C-427/16 and 
C-428/16, CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria v. Yordan Kotsev and FrontEx International v. Emil Yanakiev, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:890, at 55. See also Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen 
v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, at 54, where the Court determined that ‘it does not 
appear that the restrictions which that threshold [contained in the anti-doping rules] 
imposes on professional sportsmen go beyond what is necessary in order to ensure that 
sporting events take place and function properly’.
151 See also Rousseva 2010, p. 22.
152 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, at 40, referring 
to Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, at 184; Joined Cases 
C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefi s Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publica-
tions Ltd (ITP) v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, at 54-55; Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket 
v. TeliaSonera Sverige, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, at 31 and 75.
153 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, at 41.
154 As noted by Nazzini 2011, p. 305.
155 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, at 42; Case 
C-23/14, Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, ECLI:EU:C:2015:651, at 49.
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It is less clear which test should be applied when assessing the first category 
of justification defence mentioned by the Court in Post Danmark I. When 
is the abuse of a dominant position ‘objectively necessary’? Some writers 
suggest that a Wouters-like proportionality test also applies in the context of 
Article 102 TFEU.156 At the same time, it appears that dominant undertak-
ings have less room for manoeuvre. In its rare case law on the matter, the 
Court has emphasised that, in principle, it is up to the public authorities, 
and not to dominant undertakings, to eliminate products from the market 
because of health or safety concerns.157 This suggests that it is more difficult 
to justify an abuse of a dominant position than it is to justify a concerted 
practice.158 Such an approach makes sense, as it takes into account the 
special responsibility dominant undertakings have, given their position of 
economic strength on the market.
5.3.5 Concurrence of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU?
The existence of difference prompts the question of whether the same situ-
ation may fall within the scope of Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU. Is it 
conceivable that an undertaking has violated Article 101 TFEU, because it 
has collaborated with other competitors, and has also violated Article 102 
TFEU, because it has abused its dominant position on the market? This 
question may not only arise in proceedings between private individuals,159 
but also in proceedings between alleged infringers and competition 
authorities. For this reason, we should not only pay attention to prelimi-
nary rulings, but also to judgments in administrative proceedings between 
alleged infringers and the European Commission. Do the General Court 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union permit a choice between 
Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU as a basis for establishing anticompetitive 
conduct?
The case Hoffmann-La Roche is important in this regard. Hoffmann-La 
Roche had concluded so-called ‘fidelity agreements’ with its purchasers. 
In order to enjoy a fidelity rebate the purchasers had to buy all or most 
of their requirements exclusively, or in preference, from Hoffmann-La 
Roche. The Commission found that Hoffmann-La Roche had abused its 
dominant position on the relevant markets by imposing these terms on its 
156 E.g. Rousseva 2010, p. 268; Mataija 2016, p. 96.
157 As observed in Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70, at 118; Case 
C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak International v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436, at 36.
158 In a similar vein, see Monti 2007, p. 203; Lianos 2009, p. 28-29; Jones & Sufrin 2016, p. 370.
159 According to Art. 6 and Recitals 7 and 21 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 
national courts have the power to apply the entirety of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, also 
when deciding disputes between private individuals. No prior fi nding of an infringe-
ment is necessary (see also Case C-595/17, Apple Sales International and Others v. MJA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:854, at 35).
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purchasers. Before the Court of Justice, the question was raised whether the 
fidelity agreements might also fall within the scope of Article 101 TFEU and 
whether this would exclude Article 102 TFEU as a legal basis for fining the 
company. The Court held that:
‘(...) the fact that agreements of this kind might fall within Article [101 TFEU] and 
in particular within paragraph (3) thereof does not preclude the application of 
Article [102 TFEU], since this latter article is expressly aimed in fact at situations 
which clearly originate in contractual relations so that in such cases the Com-
mission is entitled, taking into account the nature of the reciprocal undertakings 
entered into and to the competitive position of the various contracting parties on 
the market or markets in which they operate to proceed on the basis of Article 
[101] or Article [102].’160
In the view of the Court, the treaty provisions are not mutually exclusive, 
but complementary. Consequently, the Commission may elect to proceed on 
the basis of Article 101 or on the basis of Article 102 TFEU, or – it must be 
added – on the basis of both provisions.
The case Ahmed Saeed provides support for this conclusion. The Bundes-
gerichtshof asked the Court according to which criteria it should review 
price fixing agreements concluded between air carriers. The Court first 
determined under what conditions such agreements are void on the basis 
of Article 101 (2) TFEU.161 The Court then spelled out the criteria according 
to which the national court should apply Article 102 TFEU to the case at 
hand.162 Clearly, the Court was not prepared to exclude the possibility that 
one of the air carriers might actually have imposed the tariffs on its compet-
itors. In the words of the Court, it ‘cannot be ruled out’ that Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU ‘may both be applicable’.163 The Court also explicitly rejected the 
argument, put forward by the Commission and by the United Kingdom, 
that the assessment under Article 102 TFEU should be substantially similar 
to the one carried out under Article 101 TFEU. At least one important differ-
ence exists between the rules, the Court noted: whereas a concerted practice 
may qualify for exemption under Article 101 (3) TFEU, ‘no exemption may 
160 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, at 116.
161 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140, at 19-29.
162 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140, at 38-46.
163 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140, at 37. In a similar vein: Joined Cases 
T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line and others v. Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2003:245, at 610; Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie Mari-
time Belge Transports and Others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, at 33 and 130; Case 
T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2003:281, at 153; Case T-712/14, 
Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) v. Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2017:748, at 94.
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be granted, in any manner whatsoever, in respect of abuse of a dominant 
position’.164
Several other examples demonstrate that the Union Courts recognise 
that the treaty provisions might apply concurrently, but are careful not to 
conflate the legal tests. According to the General Court, the treaty provi-
sions seek to achieve the same objective – maintaining effective competition 
within the internal market – but nonetheless constitute ‘two independent 
legal instruments addressing different situations’.165 The existence of an 
agreement, a decision of an association of undertakings or a concerted 
practice is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a dominant position 
under Article 102 TFEU.166 The Commission may not, therefore, ‘recycle’ 
the facts constituting a violation of Article 101 TFEU in order to establish a 
violation of Article 102 TFEU.167 The converse is true as well. The fact that 
certain conduct is permissible under Article 101 TFEU does not mean that 
the same conduct is also permissible under Article 102 TFEU.168
This does not mean that the existence of an agreement, a decision of an 
association of undertakings or a concerted practice should be disregarded 
when interpreting Article 102 TFEU. The nature and terms of an agreement 
may support the conclusion that a collective dominant position exists:
‘The existence of a collective dominant position may (…) flow from the nature 
and terms of an agreement, from the way in which it is implemented and, conse-
quently, from the links or factors which give rise to a connection between under-
takings which result from it. Nevertheless, the existence of an agreement or of 
other links in law is not indispensable to a finding of a collective dominant posi-
tion; such a finding may be based on other connecting factors and would depend 
on an economic assessment and, in particular, on an assessment of the structure 
of the market in question.’169
164 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140, at 32; repeated in Joined Cases T-191/98 and 
T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line and others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2003:245, 
at 1112.
165 Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41, at 22. See also Case 
6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company v. Commission, ECLI:EU:
C:1973:22, at 25: ‘Articles [101] and [102] seek to achieve the same aim on different levels 
(…)’; Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and 
Others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, at 33: ‘the objectives pursued by each of those 
two provisions must be distinguished’.
166 Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others 
v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, at 43 and 45; Case C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann and Sony 
Corporation of America v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:392, at 119.
167 Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, Società Italiana Vetro and Others v. Commission 
(‘Flat Glass’), ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, at 360.
168 Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others 
v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, at 131; Case T-712/14, Confédération européenne des 
associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2017:748, at 94.
169 Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others 
v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, at 45.
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Likewise, the fact that certain conduct does not have anticompetitive 
effects under Article 101 (1) TFEU can be an ‘indication’ that the same 
conduct does not constitute a violation of Article 102 TFEU either.170 At the 
end of the day, the outcome might not be different, because the content of 
one competition rule might affect the content of the other competition rule. 
However, it must be stressed that such an outcome can only be reached 
through an interpretation of each individual competition rule, given the fact 
that the Court is clearly not prepared to conclude that Article 101 TFEU 
subsumes Article 102 TFEU, or vice versa.171
5.3.6 Interim conclusion
 The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that the same set of facts may 
fall within the scope of application of both Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU. 
In other words, it is possible to engage in an anticompetitive concerted 
practice and also abuse a dominant position on the market. The dividing 
line between these two situations becomes particularly thin in the event 
of anticompetitive contractual arrangements entered into by undertakings 
which together hold a dominant position on the relevant market.172 In such 
situations, both treaty provisions may have been violated. It flows from this 
reasoning that the aggrieved party may have a good claim for compensa-
tion with respect to any of the infringements, provided that there is a causal 
relationship between the infringement in question and the harm suffered. It 
is fair to assume, then, that this party will have a choice to claim compensa-
tion for any of the infringements, subject to a prohibition of double recovery 
for the same losses.
This does not mean that one applicable competition rule cannot 
impact upon the interpretation of another applicable competition rule. In 
fact, we have seen some convergence in the interpretation of the separate 
treaty texts. For instance, similar arguments run through the written and 
unwritten justification defences which may be relied upon in order to 
challenge the finding that either Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU has been 
violated.173 Meanwhile, it is clear that the provisions cannot be wholly 
equated. In principle, the Union Courts consider each competition rule on 
its own merits and do not exclude one of them from the outset. Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU are not mutually exclusive, but complementary.
170 Case T-712/14, Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) v. 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2017:748, at 96.
171 Cf. Wendt 2013, p. 386.
172 E.g. in Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, Società Italiana Vetro and Others v. 
Commission (‘Flat Glass’), ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, in Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 
P, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, and 
in Case T-712/14, Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) 
v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2017:748, the Commission considered that the same behavior 
constituted a concerted practice as well as an abuse of a collective dominant position.
173 Mataija 2016, p. 102-103.
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5.4 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and free movement law
5.4.1 Introduction
The third topic is situated at the crossroads of the previous two topics. 
Having examined competition laws and free movement laws, this section 
will consider the interface between them. It will be recalled that anticom-
petitive conduct of private undertakings is governed by Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU. We have also seen that several free movement rules – although 
traditionally associated with controlling Member States’ behaviour – govern 
certain actions of individuals.174
This subsection examines whether these regimes may be applicable 
to a single set of facts. Are private parties, for instance, obliged to comply 
with both sets of rules if they impose their terms and conditions on market 
players? And if that is the case, may the interested party then rely upon the 
rule of his choice, for instance when claiming compensation for the losses 
sustained, notwithstanding the applicability of another treaty provision? 
Before analysing the case law of the Court (subsection 5.4.4), we will take 
a step back and examine the most important similarities and differences 
between the competition laws and free movement laws at issue (subsections 
5.4.2-5.4.3).
5.4.2 Similarities and differences between the provisions
At the very outset, it must be noted that both the free movement provisions 
and the competition rules are aimed at establishing the internal market and 
ensuring its proper functioning.175 Their overall objective is to create and 
maintain ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’.176 Protecting individuals 
against restrictions on their free movement rights is a necessary first step 
in order to achieve this objective. But removing such restrictions will not be 
enough to ensure a proper functioning of the internal market. Even if access 
to a particular market is secured, economic activity can still be hindered 
when undertakings or associations of undertakings restrict or prevent 
competition on that market.177
174 Mortelmans 2001, p. 781-803, has called this development the ‘privatisation’ of free 
movement law. A comparable development has taken place in the fi eld of competition 
law. Under certain circumstances, these rules – although addressed to undertakings – can 
also be applied to Member States’ behavior. This development – the ‘publicisation’ of 
competition – will not be dealt with in detail here, given the focus of this book on the 
relationships between individuals.
175 Which is one of the aims of the Union, according to Art. 3 (3) TEU.
176 As expressed in Art. 26 (2) TFEU.
177 Swaak & Van der Woude 2018, p. 715.
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For this reason, the internal market also ‘includes a system ensuring 
that competition is not distorted’. This statement, laid down in one of the 
Protocols annexed to the TFEU, underlines that free movement law and 
competition law are complementary counterparts.178 The Court has also 
emphasised that both regimes contribute to achieving the same ultimate 
goal: to accomplish economic integration and even to contribute to the 
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.179 
Against this background, scholarship stresses that the two regimes are part 
of a ‘seamless web’ promoting cross-border competition.180
However, the two sets of rules cannot be fully understood by refer-
ence to one overarching principle of free trade and competition only. Both 
regimes also pursue their own particular aims.181 Free movement law 
is traditionally directed at the conduct of public authorities and involves 
general interests. It targets restrictive measures and scrutinises the propor-
tionality of these measures. By contrast, competition law is traditionally 
directed at the conduct of private undertakings and associations of private 
undertakings who pursue their own interests. It focuses on the economic 
effects of the conduct of these undertakings and associations on the state of 
competition on a particular market. The underlying objective is to promote 
the efficient operation of these markets.182
The differences between the two regimes come to light when we 
examine the criteria according to which a restriction of either free move-
ment or competition must be established.183 Under Article 101 (1) TFEU, it 
is necessary to analyse the economic and legal context in which the agree-
ments or practices occur and to assess their actual and potential effects on 
competition on the relevant market.184 Likewise, Article 102 TFEU requires 
the person alleging a breach to define the relevant market and to assess the 
economic position of the undertaking or undertakings on this market.185 
178 Protocol No. 27 on the internal market and competition. A similar conclusion is drawn by 
Baquero Cruz 2002, p.  90; Krenn 2012, p. 204; Mataija 2016, p. 116-117.
179 This connection is made by the Court in its Opinion 1/91, at 17-18. The Court has also 
remarked that Art. 101 TFEU ‘constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential 
(…) for the functioning of the internal market’ (in Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time 
v. Benetton International, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, at 36; Case C-453/99, Courage v. Crehan, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, at 20).
180 See especially Gyselen 1996, p. 242; Mortelmans 2001, p. 622. See also Prechal & De Vries 
2009, p. 5-24; Mataija 2016, p. 116-119.
181 Baquero Cruz 2002, p. 90-91.
182 Mataija 2016, p. 119-120.
183 Mortelmans 2001, p. 630-632, and Mataija 2016, p. 144.
184 Case C-345/14, SIA ‘Maxima Latvija’ v. Konkurences padome, ECLI:EU:C:2015:784, at 26-30, 
with references to earlier judgments, and especially to Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. 
Henninger Bräu, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91, at 15-26.
185 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, at 65.
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By contrast, economic analysis does not play an important role in the field 
of free movement.186 Unlike the competition rules, which require that the 
effect of the anticompetitive conduct on cross-border trade is ‘appreciable’ 
in economic terms,187 the free movement provisions prohibit any restriction 
that is liable to prevent or hinder access to the market in respect of persons 
who have sought to exercise their rights of free movement.188
The same difference can be seen if we adopt the perspective of the 
defendant.189 If the aggrieved party alleges a restriction of free movement, 
the defendant may respond that the restriction served a legitimate objective, 
such as public policy, public security or public health,190 the protection of 
fundamental rights,191 or some other objective of ‘general interest’,192 and 
that the means chosen were necessary and appropriate for attaining the 
stated objective.193 Again, economic analysis does not play an important 
role in this context. In fact, it is settled case-law that restrictions to free 
movement cannot be justified by objectives of a ‘purely economic nature’.194 
The underlying idea is that economic concerns of Member States should not 
stand in the way of the realisation of the internal market.195 By contrast, the 
competition rules typically allow for purely economic justifications, such as 
186 Mortelmans 2001, p. 636-637.
187 See supra section 5.3.3.
188 See supra section 5.2.2.
189 Mortelmans 2001, p. 635-645.
190 See, with regard to the free movement of workers, explicitly Case C-415/93, Union Royale 
Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 
86; Case C-350/96, Clean Car Autoservice GmbH v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, ECLI:EU:
C:1998:205, at 24. The exceptions, and their interpretation, may differ depending on the 
fundamental freedom at issue.
191 Such as the right to take collective action for the protection of workers: Case C-438/05, 
International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772, at 77; Case 
C-341/05, Laval un Partneri v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, at 103.
192 Such as the recruitment and training of young players (Case C-415/93, Union Royale 
Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, 
at 106; Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:143, at 39).
193 See e.g. Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, ECLI:EU:C:1993:125, at 
32; Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori 
di Milano, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, at 37; Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de 
Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 104; Case C-438/05, 
International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772, at 75.
194 See already Case 7/61, Commission v. Italy, ECLI:EU:C:1961:31, where the Court held that
quantitative restrictions on importation can only be justifi ed by ‘eventualities of a non-
economic kind’. See also Case C-109/04, Karl Robert Kranemann v. Land Nordrhein-West-
falen, ECLI:EU:C:2005:187, at 34; Joined Cases C-52/16 and C-113/16, SEGRO (C-52/16) 
and Günther Horváth (C-113/16), ECLI:EU:C:2018:157, at 123.
195 See e.g. Babayev 2016, p. 992.
Concurrence in Primary Union Law 121
the existence of efficiency advantages that benefit the consumer196 and the 
protection of legitimate business interests.197
The approach followed under free movement law has, it is true, 
softened over the years. Even though the Court is clearly not prepared 
to depart openly from the principle that purely economic reasons cannot 
justify a restriction of a fundamental freedom, the Court does accept certain 
economic reasons as justifications, provided that they serve the achieve-
ment of a non-economic objective in the public interest. It must be noted, 
however, that this path towards justification is straight and narrow. It is 
generally reserved to public authorities who wish to maintain the financial 
balance of a particular national security system.198 The statements issued by 
the Court should, moreover, be treated with ‘circumspection’, as Advocate 
General Jacobs has argued.199 They contain a ‘double derogation’, as they 
derogate both from the prohibitions and from the exceptions written down 
in the free movement provisions.200
It is nonetheless arguable that some public interest justifications which 
have been expressly recognised by the Court are essentially based on 
economic considerations.201 In Bosman, for instance, the Court admitted that 
transfer rules may be justified by the objective of maintaining a financial 
and competitive balance between football clubs.202 However, it must be 
observed that the Court was ultimately motivated not by purely economic 
reasons but by the ‘considerable social importance of sporting activities and 
in particular football in the Community’.203 Such cases do not, therefore, 
appear to have altered the default position adopted within the fabric of 
free movement law, namely that economic reasons can only be advanced as 
justifications if they serve the achievement of a non-economic objective in 
the public interest.
196 See Art. 101 (3) TFEU and, in the context of Art. 102 TFEU, Case C-95/04 P, British Airways 
v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166, at 85-86; Case C-209/10, Post Danmark v. Konkurren-
cerådet, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, at 40-41).
197 In the context of Art. 102 TFEU: Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:
1978:22, at 189-190; Opinion A-G Colomer, Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lélos 
kai Sia and Others v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proïonton, formerly Glaxowellcome 
AEVE, ECLI:EU:C:2008:180, at 99-105.
198 See e.g. Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171.
199 Opinion A-G Jacobs, Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, ECLI:EU:C:2005:40, at 31.
200 See also Opinion A-G Sharpston, Case C-73/08, Nicolas Bressol and Others v. Gouvernement 
de la Communauté française, ECLI:EU:C:2009:396, at 92.
201 Barnard 2009, p. 280.
202 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc 
Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 105-107.
203 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc 
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Has this position been changed since the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has been endowed with binding force? Indeed, some writers have 
suggested that the Charter creates more room for private parties to advance 
economic reasons as justifications. They argue that Article 16 of the Charter, 
which protects the freedom to conduct a business, may serve as a counter 
mechanism to the fundamental freedoms.204 It remains to be seen, however, 
to what extent the freedom to conduct a business may effectively be relied 
upon in order to justify a restriction of a free movement right. Surely not 
every economic interest will be protected as a fundamental right under 
Article 16 of the Charter. The Court, for its part, has chosen to assess the 
relationship between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights within 
the framework of the free movement provisions.205 In spite of Article 16 of 
the Charter, it is quite unlikely, therefore, that the Court will confirm that 
restrictions of free movement rights can generally be justified by economic 
arguments.
What about competition law? Here too, it seems that the approach has 
softened over the years. It will be recalled that the Court has recognised 
several objectives of general interest which may be relied upon in order to 
exempt certain effects restrictive of Article 101 (1) TFEU that are inherent in 
the pursuit of a legitimate objective in the general interest.206 In fact, Meca-
Medina and Majcen confirms that such objectives cannot be purely economic 
in nature. Responding to the argument raised by Meca-Medina and Majcen 
that the anti-doping rules at issue also protected the economic interests of 
the International Olympic Committee and could not, therefore, be regarded 
as inherent in the proper conduct of competitive sport, the Court confirmed 
that the rules could only be exempted if their restrictive effects did not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to ensure that legitimate objective in the 
general interest.207 We have seen, moreover, that a broader enquiry into 
the objectives served by the anti-competitive conduct in question, and its 
necessity and proportionality, is also possible in the context of Article 102 
TFEU.208
Still, the question can be raised whether the acceptance of these exemp-
tions has really caused competition law to drift away from its core objec-
tive, which is to promote the efficient operation of the internal market. It 
is telling, in this regard, that some writers have sought to reformulate the 
unwritten exemptions introduced by the Court in terms of the written treaty 
provisions. Wendt, for instance, argues that non-market objectives can and 
204 See e.g. Babayev 2016, p. 997-1005.
205 See e.g. Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line, ECLI:EU:
C:2007:772, at 77-90; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, at 90-111.
206 See supra section 5.3.4.
207 Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, 
at 47, responding to the argument raised by the appellants that the anti-doping rules also 
protected the economic interests of the International Olympic Committee.
208 See supra section 5.3.4.
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should be taken into account either under Article 101 (3) TFEU, to the extent 
that the anti-competitive conduct yields economically beneficial effects for 
consumers,209 or under Article 106 (2) TFEU, which provides for a general 
justification avenue in respect of services in the general interest.210 Such 
statements show that economic considerations are still central to competi-
tion law, just as non-economic considerations are still at the heart of free 
movement law.
A final point of divergence between the two regimes is important to 
consider in the present context. It may be recalled that the infringement of 
both Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU entitles the aggrieved party to claim 
compensation, directly on the basis of Union law, provided that there is a 
causal relationship between the harm suffered and the infringement.211 The 
Union legislature has also harmonised the rules on issues such as evidence 
disclosure, joint and several liability, and the range of available defences in 
the field of competition law.212 Such an enforcement regime does not exist 
in the field of free movement law. As the case law stands, it will be up to 
national law to provide the aggrieved party with a claim for compensation, 
subject only to compliance with the requirements of equivalence and effec-
tiveness.213
5.4.3 Concurrence of competition law and free movement law?
For the reasons stated above, the aggrieved party may or may not prefer 
to proceed on the basis of competition law rather than on the basis of free 
movement law.214 The question to consider is whether the law permits such 
a choice. May the aggrieved party plead that the other party has violated 
free movement law if the conduct at issue is also governed by one or 
more competition rules? Will the argument raised by the defendant that 
the competition rules govern the case exclusively be successful? As the 
treaty provisions themselves do not provide any guidance, we will have to 
analyse the case law. Do the Union Courts recognise the possibility that free 
movement law and competition law may be applicable concurrently to a 
single set of facts?
In principle, the Court examines each rule on its own terms. Consider 
Meca-Medina as an example. In this case about the compatibility of anti-
doping rules with the rules on competition and the freedom to provide 
services, the Court stressed that sport is only subject to Union law ‘in so 
209 Wendt 2013, p. 451-519.
210 Wendt 2013, p. 519-546.
211 Supra section 4.3.
212 Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national 
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union.
213 Supra section 4.3.
214 Mataija 2016, p. 149-150.
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far as it constitutes an economic activity’.215 The Court then pointed out 
that free movement law only applies if the activity ‘takes the form of 
gainful employment or the provision of services for remuneration’,216 and 
does not apply to ‘rules concerning questions which are of purely sporting 
interest’.217 At the same time, the Court underlined that the mere fact that 
the rules fall outside the scope of free movement law does not mean that 
they also fall outside the scope of the other treaty provisions.218 According 
to the Court, sporting rules must satisfy all the relevant requirements 
flowing from the rules relating to the freedom of movement for workers, the 
freedom to provide services, and competition.219 If the rights to free move-
ment have not been restricted, competition law may still apply:
‘(…) even if those rules do not constitute restrictions on freedom of movement 
because they concern questions of purely sporting interest and, as such, have 
nothing to do with economic activity (…), that fact means neither that the sport-
ing activity in question necessarily falls outside the scope of Articles [101 and 102 
TFEU] nor that the rules do not satisfy the specific requirements of those articles.’220
So, the mere fact that an activity is not governed by free movement law does 
not mean that competition law does not apply. This approach is in line with 
earlier judgments, in which the Court confirmed that transport activities are 
governed by competition law, even though such activities are not subject to 
the general rules relating to the freedom to provide services, because of the 
derogation provided for in Article 58 (1) TFEU.221
215 Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, 
at 22, with references to Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Interna-
tionale and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, at 4; Case 13/76, Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:115, at 12; Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football 
Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 73; Joined Cases C-51/96 
and C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL 
and others, ECLI:EU:C:2000:199, at 41; Case C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Braine v. 
FRBSB, ECLI:EU:C:2000:201, at 32.
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at 23.
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at 25.
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at 26-28.
219 Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, 
at 29-30.
220 Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, 
at 31. Along the same lines: Case T-144/99, Institute of Professional Representatives before 
the European Patent Offi ce v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2001:105, at 66-67; Case 
C-49/07, MOTOE v. Elliniko Dimosio, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376, at 22; Case T-23/09, Conseil 
national de l’Ordre des pharmaciens (CNOP), Conseil central de la section G de l’Ordre national 
des pharmaciens (CCG) v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2010:452, at 81.
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The converse is true as well. The fact that a situation escapes competi-
tion law scrutiny does not mean that the same situation also falls outside 
the scope of free movement law. Take Viking Line as an illustration. This 
Finnish ferry operator sought to reflag one of its vessels – the loss-making 
Rosella – to Estonia, so as to take advantage of the possibility of concluding 
a new collective bargaining agreement. During legal proceedings, the ques-
tion was raised whether a strike called by the trade unions would unlaw-
fully restrict the freedom of establishment of the ferry operator. Before the 
Court, the trade unions relied on the Albany case, in which the Court had 
held that collective bargaining agreements fall outside the scope of Article 
101 TFEU because they pursue important social policy objectives.222 The 
trade unions argued that the same exception should be made for collective 
actions in the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services. The Court did not buy this argument:
‘[T]he fact that an agreement or an activity are [sic] excluded from the scope of 
the provisions of the Treaty on competition does not mean that that agreement 
or activity also falls outside the scope of the Treaty provisions on the free move-
ment of persons or services since those two sets of provisions are to be applied in 
different circumstances (…).’223
Once again, these examples illustrate that, in the absence of express deroga-
tions, situations falling within the scope of Union law are governed by all 
the requirements resulting from free movement law and from competition 
law. It flows from this reasoning that the same situation might fall both 
within the scope of free movement law and within the scope of competition 
law.224 This conclusion was drawn by A-G Lenz in the Bosman case:
‘No reason can be seen why the rules at issue in this case [the transfer rules and 
nationality clauses adopted by the football associations, RdG] should not be sub-
ject both to Article [45 TFEU] and to [EU] competition law. The [TFEU] at various 
places regulates the inter-relationship of the various fields in which its provi-
222 Case C-67/96, Albany International v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:430, at 59-60.
223 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:
772, at 53, referring to Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commis-
sion, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492. Along the same lines: Case C-271/08, Commission v. Germany, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:426, at 46-48.
224 E.g. Baquero Cruz 1999, p. 619: ‘(…) their joint application should not be seen as a 
systemic misconstruction (…), but rather as the natural effect of their overlapping and 
yet autonomous fi elds of application’; Krenn 2012, p. 205: ‘(…) in fact the Court applies 
competition law and fundamental freedoms cumulatively’; Mataija 2016, p. 127: ‘(…) it is 
possible that the same conduct is subject to and infringes both the competition and free 
movement rules’.
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sions apply. For Article [45] on the one hand and Article [101] et seq. on the other 
hand there is no such provision, so that in principle both sets of rules may be 
applicable to a single factual situation.’225
Having examined both regimes in detail, A-G Lenz found that the rules 
adopted by national and international football associations did not only 
restrict the right to free movement of workers, but also violated the current 
Article 101 TFEU.226 The Court, for its part, decided not to deal with the 
competition provisions in detail. Having concluded that the football asso-
ciations had violated the right to free movement of workers, the Court did 
not find it necessary to embark upon an examination of today’s Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU:
‘Since both types of rule [the transfer rules and nationality clauses adopted by 
the football associations, RdG] to which the national court’s question refer [sic] 
are contrary to Article [45 TFEU], it is not necessary to rule on the interpretation 
of Articles [101 and 102 TFEU].’227
This was not an isolated incident.228 On occasion, the Court has also decided 
to skip the analysis of the free movement provisions after having examined 
the conduct on the basis of the relevant competition rules.229 This approach 
is surprising, given the Court’s own position that the two sets of rules are to 
be distinguished.
This is not to say that the outcome will necessarily be different, 
depending on whether the case is assessed on the basis of free movement 
law or on the basis of competition law. Indeed, it has been argued that 
the two sets of rules should be interpreted harmoniously. A-G Lenz, for 
instance, argued that a ‘uniform result’ should be reached in Bosman.230 
The same approach has been advanced by A-G Kokott, who submitted that 
‘conflicting assessments of the fundamental freedoms and competition 
law are to be avoided in principle’.231 Consider also the position of Weath-
erill, who has argued that ‘there is and should be an ultimate functional 
225 Opinion A-G Lenz, Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association 
ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:293, at 253.
226 Opinion A-G Lenz, Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association 
ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:293, at 287.
227 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc 
Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, at 138.
228 Mortelmans 2001, p. 640-641; Van den Bogaert 2005, p. 194-198; Mataija 2016, p. 128-130.
229 Case C-309/99, Wouters and others v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:98, at 119-123; Joined Cases C-184/13 to C-187/13, C-194/13, C-195/13 
and C-208/13, API — Anonima Petroli Italiana v. Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti 
and Ministero dello Sviluppo economico, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2147, at 59.
230 Opinion A-G Lenz, Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association 
ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:293, at 278.
231 Opinion A-G Kokott, Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League 
and Others v. QC Leisure and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:43, at 249.
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comparability between the inquiries conducted under these economic law 
provisions’.232 To some extent, this approach has been followed by the 
Court. As the previous section has demonstrated, both free movement law 
and competition law nowadays take account of factors other than those 
expressly mentioned in the relevant treaty provisions. There clearly is some 
convergence in the interpretation of the two sets of rules.
However, the previous section has also demonstrated that free move-
ment law and competition law cannot be wholly equated. Differences 
between them continue to exist. What is more, the Court itself has occasion-
ally refused to answer preliminary questions concerning the interpretation 
of competition law, because a lack of sufficient factual and legal informa-
tion, but has nonetheless chosen to answer the preliminary questions 
concerning the interpretation of free movement law asked by the same 
court.233 Against this background, it is submitted that it is unwelcome if the 
Court skips the analysis of one of the applicable treaty provisions if it does 
have sufficient factual and legal information available. After all, it cannot be 
ruled out that the application of the treaty provisions may lead to different 
outcomes. In any event, the Court’s own position that free movement law 
and competition law are complementary implies that a convergence in 
outcome can only be reached through an interpretation of each set of rules, 
and only to the extent that the outcome can be accommodated within that 
framework, having regard to the underlying objectives of free movement 
law and competition law respectively.
5.4.4 Interim conclusion
This subsection has considered the interface between the laws of competi-
tion and free movement. It has discussed the similarities and differences 
between these regimes and has examined whether they may be applicable 
to the same set of facts. Even though the Court has acknowledged that 
both regimes contribute to achieving similar objectives, and in spite of the 
fact that both regimes take account of factors other than those expressly 
mentioned in the underlying treaty provisions, differences between them 
continue to exist. For this reason, it might be preferable for the aggrieved 
party to proceed on the basis of either competition law or free movement 
law. In view of the principled position taken by the Court, which is that the 
232 Weatherill 2013, p. 414.
233 Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et 
disciplines associées ASBL and others, ECLI:EU:C:2000:199, at 28-40; Case C-176/96, Jyri 
Lehtonen and Castors Braine v. FRBSB, ECLI:EU:C:2000:201, at 22-29; Case C-134/03, 
Viacom Outdoor v. Giotto Immobilier SARL, ECLI:EU:C:2005:9421-33; Case C-380/05, 
Centro Europa 7 v. Ministero delle Comunicazioni e Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni, 
Direzione generale per le concessioni e le autorizzazioni del Ministero delle Comunicazioni, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:59, at 57-71; Case C-384/08, Attanasio Group v. Comune di Carbognano, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:133, at 32-35; Case C-234/12, Sky Italia v. Autorità per le Garanzie nelle 
Comunicazioni, ECLI:EU:C:2013:496, at 30-33.
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regimes are not mutually exclusive but complementary, it is submitted that 
the interested party may indeed rely upon the rule of his choice, notwith-
standing the applicability of another treaty provision. As there exists no 
order of priority between free movement law and competition law, any 
convergence in outcome must be reached through an interpretation of the 
rule at issue, and can only be attained to the extent that such an outcome 
can be accommodated within the framework governing free movement and 
competition respectively.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined how the Union Courts approach situations of 
concurrence of rules belonging to the body of primary Union law. It has 
discussed the relationship between equal treatment and free movement 
rules, between competition rules, and between free movement and competi-
tion rules respectively. Having discussed their similarities and differences, 
each section has considered the question of whether, if at all, Union law 
permits the aggrieved party to rely upon the rule of his choice, notwith-
standing the applicability of another treaty provision.
The analysis of the case law demonstrates that the Union Courts have 
chosen familiar solutions when dealing with overlaps between rules 
belonging to the body of primary Union law. They assume that each rule 
must be considered on its own merits and that no rule should be excluded 
in advance. In the absence of express derogations, situations falling within 
the scope of Union law are governed by all the requirements resulting from 
the treaty provisions governing non-discrimination, free movement, and 
competition law respectively. The applicability of one treaty provision does 
not, in principle, affect the scope of application of another treaty provision. 
In fact, the Union Courts assume that each rule ought to have its intended 
legal effect if the necessary elements have been established. It flows from 
this reasoning that concurrently applicable rules may, in principle, be 
applied cumulatively, so as to realise the objectives underlying each rule to 
the greatest possible extent.
The fact that each applicable rule should be considered on its own 
terms does not mean that one rule cannot impact upon the interpretation of 
another rule. In fact, we have seen some convergence in the interpretation 
of the different sets of rules. For instance, similar arguments run through 
the written and unwritten justification defences which may be relied upon 
in order to challenge the finding that either Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU 
has been violated. Likewise, both free movement law and competition law 
nowadays takes account of factors other than those expressly mentioned 
in the treaty provisions themselves. This does bring the sets of rules closer 
together. Meanwhile, it is clear that the Union Courts are careful not to 
exclude one of the rules from the outset. The violation of one provision does 
not imply the violation of another provision. Likewise, the permissibility 
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of certain conduct under one branch of primary Union law does not imply 
that the same conduct must also be considered permissible under another 
branch of primary Union law. As the rules continue to exist side by side, 
any convergence between them must be realised through interpretation, to 
the extent that each separate rule accommodates a convergence in outcome.
Although concurrence is principally allowed, an exception must 
be made when the treaty provisions dictate that one of the rules applies 
exclusively. This chapter has examined one such example, namely the 
relationship between the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of nationality and the free movement provisions governing persons and 
services. Importantly, the analysis has demonstrated that the general prohi-
bition of discrimination on grounds of nationality does not embrace all the 
cases falling within the scope of the free movement provisions. This chapter 
has submitted that it is impossible, therefore, to maintain the view that a 
violation of one of the free movement rights automatically and inevitably 
constitutes a violation of Article 18 TFEU. Nor can it be said that the absence 
of a violation of one of the free movement rights necessarily implies that 
Article 18 TFEU has not been violated either. Consequently, we should 
proceed with caution if we want to use the principle lex specialis derogat legi 
generali in order to find the appropriate answers. As soon as the facts do 
fall within the scope of application of one of the free movement provisions, 
however, the Court tends to assess the case only in the light of these provi-
sions. To that extent, the scope of application of Article 18 TFEU is affected 
by the free movement provisions.
The next chapter shifts the attention to the body of secondary Union 
law. It examines the relationship between Union rules contained in direc-
tives and regulations, and their relationship to the applicable national law. 
Can we see the same principles at work when we analyse the statements 
made by the Union legislature and by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union?

6 Concurrence in Secondary Union Law
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has focused on rules belonging to the body of 
primary Union law. It has discussed the overlap of, and the relationship 
between, treaty provisions pertaining to competition, equal treatment and 
free movement respectively. The current chapter shifts the attention to the 
rules belonging to the body of secondary Union law. It will focus on the 
directives and regulations by which the Union legislature seeks to regulate 
the internal market.1 We have seen that these measures provide individuals 
with a range of claims, powers, and defences.2
By their very nature, these directives and regulations are limited in 
scope. Most of them govern areas in which the Union shares its competence 
to legislate with the Member States: social policy, consumer protection, 
transport, the area of freedom, security and justice, public health matters, 
and the internal market more broadly.3 This means that a Member State 
may legislate to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence 
to legislate, or has stopped doing so.4 It also means that the exercise by the 
Union of its competence to legislate is curbed by the principles of subsid-
iarity and proportionality.5 In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
the Union may take action ‘only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States’.6 
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, any action ‘shall not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’.7
1 See Art. 26 TFEU and the provisions creating specifi c requirements for legislative inter-
ventions, such as Art. 114 TFEU.
2 See supra section 4.4.
3 Art. 4 (2) TFEU. But note that the Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provi-
sions of the Member States and of the European Union has been adopted on the basis of 
Art. 103 (competition law) and 114 (internal market) TFEU. In the area of competition law, 
the Union has exclusive competence (Art. 3 (1) (b) TFEU). This means that Member States 
may only legislate ‘if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union 
acts’ (Art. 2 (1) TFEU).
4 Art. 2 (2) TFEU.
5 See the report of the Report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and “Doing 
Less More Effi ciently” 2018.
6 Art. 5 (3) TEU. This principle does not apply in areas falling within the exclusive compe-
tence of the Union, such as the area of competition law.
7 Art. 5 (4) TEU. This principle also applies in areas falling within the exclusive competence 
of the Union, such as the area of competition law.
132 Chapter 6
For these reasons, the directives and regulations which will be discussed 
in this chapter cannot be wholly autonomous and self-contained. They will 
overlap with other directives and regulations, and they will by comple-
mented by national laws. A single set of facts may, therefore, fall within 
the ambit of multiple rules, originating from the body of secondary Union 
law and from other sources of law. The question to consider is whether the 
scope of application of one rule is affected by the scope of application of 
another rule. To what extent, if at all, does one rule exclude the applicability 
of another rule?
This chapter examines how Union law answers these questions by 
looking closely at the statements made by the Union legislature and by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. It purports to demonstrate that we 
should start from the premise that each rule, however founded, should be 
realised to the greatest possible extent. By discussing a range of examples, 
the chapter shows that the scope of application of one rule should only be 
affected by another rule if this is in accordance with the intentions of the 
Union legislature. It flows from this reasoning that rules may, in principle, be 
applicable concurrently if their respective conditions have been established 
(sections 6.2-6.5). This does not, however, mean that concurrently applicable 
rules will always coexist peacefully. The chapter discusses two exceptions, 
namely the existence of alternative rules (section 6.6) and the existence of 
exclusive rules (section 6.7). In conclusion, the chapter recapitulates the 
themes running through the various solutions to individual issues of concur-
rence (section 6.8).
6.2 When the Union legislature explicitly leaves room 
for other Union rules
The Union legislature often explicitly asserts that the adoption of a directive 
or regulation does not affect the scope of application of other Union rules. 
A first example can be found in the area of transport. The Union legisla-
ture has emphasised that the rights of travellers under the Package Travel 
Directive are not affected by the introduction of several regulations in the 
area of passenger rights.8 Air passengers are permitted, therefore, to claim 
compensation from their contracting party for losses resulting from a failure 
8 Art. 3 (6), Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and 
assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay 
of fl ights; Art. 1 (4), Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 concerning the rights of disabled 
persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air; Art. 7, Regulation 
(EC) No 392/2009 on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea in the event of acci-
dents; Art. 21, Regulation (EU) No 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers when 
travelling by sea and inland waterway; Art. 2 (8), Regulation (EU) 181/2011 concerning 
the rights of passengers in bus and coach transport. These provisions refer to Council 
Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours. This 
directive has been replaced by Directive (EU) 2015/2302 on package travel and linked 
travel arrangements, which states, in Art. 29, that references to the former directive must 
be construed as references to the latter directive.
Concurrence in Secondary Union Law 133
to perform the services included in the package travel contract, even if the 
necessary conditions for awarding compensation because of a cancellation 
of the flight are not met.9 For its part, the revised Package Travel Directive 
confirms that any claim for compensation and any power to reduce the 
price granted under this directive does not affect the rights which may be 
derived from the regulations in the area of passenger rights. Passengers are 
entitled to the consequences flowing from each applicable rule, subject only 
to the requirement that the quantum of damages be adjusted in order to 
prevent a double recovery of the losses:
‘Any right to compensation or price reduction under this Directive shall not affect 
the rights of travellers under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, Regulation (EC) No 
1371/2007, Regulation (EC) No 392/2009 (…), Regulation (EU) No 1177/2010 
and Regulation (EU) No 181/2011, and under international conventions. Trav-
ellers shall be entitled to present claims under this Directive and under those 
Regulations and international conventions. Compensation or price reduction 
granted under this Directive and the compensation or price reduction granted 
under those Regulations and international conventions shall be deducted from 
each other in order to avoid overcompensation.’10
A second, distinctive example concerns the Union rules on data protec-
tion. There is one remark which appears in a great number of the legisla-
tive instruments under consideration here. The Union legislature has 
emphasised that the rules on the protection of personal data should also be 
complied with when promoting, selling and supplying goods and services 
to consumers,11 when performing transport and travel services,12 when 
9 As the Court noted in Case C-292/18, Petra Breyer and Heiko Breyer v. Sundair, ECLI:EU:
C:2018:997, at 26. It is not inconceivable that an air carrier offers different types of travel 
services for the purpose of the same trip or holiday, so that the facts fall within the scope 
of both the Package Travel Directive and Regulation (EC) No 261/2004.
10 Art. 14 (5), Directive (EU) 2015/2302 on package travel and linked travel arrangements. 
Art. 12 (1), Regulation (EC) 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and 
assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long 
delay of fl ights provides a similar rule: ‘This Regulation shall apply without prejudice 
to a passenger’s rights to further compensation. The compensation granted under this 
Regulation may be deducted from such compensation.’
11 Recital 26, Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer fi nan-
cial services; Recital 14, Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market; Art. 9 (4), Directive 2008/48/EC on credit 
agreements for consumers; Art. 18, 20, and 21, Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agree-
ments for consumers relating to residential immovable property; Art. 3 (8) and 16 (2), 
Directive (EU) 2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital 
content and digital services.
12 Recital 12, Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 concerning the rights of disabled persons 
and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air; Recital 21 and Art. 10 (5), 
Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations; Recital 29, 
Regulation (EU) No 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers when travelling by 
sea and inland waterway; Recital 26, Regulation (EU) 181/2011 concerning the rights of 
passengers in bus and coach transport; Recital 49, Directive (EU) 2015/2302 on package 
travel and linked travel arrangements.
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providing online content to travellers,13 when using electronic identification 
and trust services in the context of electronic transactions,14 when recov-
ering debts through the new European procedure for the preservation of 
bank accounts,15 and when providing online intermediation services and 
online search engines to business users and corporate website users.16 The 
mere fact that these activities are governed by these directives and regula-
tions does not mean that they are excluded from the scope of the Union 
rules on data protection.17
The e-Commerce Directive can be mentioned as a third example. The 
Union legislature has made clear that this directive does not affect the level 
of consumer protection as established by other Union rules.18 What is more, 
the eleventh recital of the preamble mentions several directives by name, 
including the directives on unfair terms in consumer contracts,19 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts,20 on misleading 
and comparative advertising,21 on consumer credit,22 on package travel, 
package holidays and package tours,23 on the protection of the users of 
13 Recitals 28 and 30, and Art. 8 (1), Regulation (EU) 2017/1128 on cross-border portability 
of online content services in the internal market.
14 Recital 11 and Art. 5 (1), Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 on electronic identifi cation and 
trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS Regulation).
15 Recital 45 and Art. 48 (d), Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 establishing a European Account 
Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and 
commercial matters.
16 Recital 35 and Art. 1 (5), Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transpar-
ency for business users of online intermediation services.
17 Most regulations and directives mentioned above refer to Directive 95/46/EC on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data. This directive has been repealed by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, which states, in Art. 94, that references to the original directive must be construed as 
references to the regulation.
18 Art. 1 (3), Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce.
19 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.
20 Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts. This 
directive has been repealed by Directive 2011/83/EU of 25 October 2011 on consumer 
rights, which states, in Art. 31, that references to the former directive must be construed 
as references to the latter directive.
21 Council Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading and comparative advertising. 
This directive has been repealed by Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising, which states, in Art. 10, that references to the former directive 
must be construed as references to the latter directive.
22 Council Directive 87/102/EEC for the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit. This direc-
tive has been repealed by Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers.
23 Council Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours. 
This directive has been repealed by Directive (EU) 2015/2302 on package travel and 
linked travel arrangements, which states, in Art. 29, that references to the former direc-
tive must be construed as references to the latter directive.
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immovable property on a time-share basis,24 on the liability for defective 
products,25 on the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees,26 and 
on distance marketing of consumer financial services.27 The Union legisla-
ture stresses that the e-Commerce Directive ‘complements’ the information 
requirements introduced by these directives.28
Such explicit statements, expressed by the Union legislature, play an 
important role once a legal dispute must be resolved. Consider the approach 
followed by the Court of Justice in a case between two competitors in the 
laser technology industry. The first company – Visys – used the corporate 
name of the second company – BEST – as part of the domain name ‘www.
bestlasersorter.com’. The content of this website was identical to the 
content of the websites of BEST. BEST alleged that the use of its corporate 
name qualified as ‘misleading advertising’.29 Visys replied that the use of a 
domain name does not fall within the scope of the Directive on misleading 
and comparative advertising, because it does not qualify as a ‘form of 
representation’ which is made ‘in order to promote the supply of goods 
or services’.30 To support this proposition, the company referred to the 
e-Commerce Directive. Under this directive, the use of a domain name does 
not qualify as ‘commercial communication’, that is a form of communication 
‘designed to promote, directly or indirectly, the goods, services or image of a 
company (…)’.31 In the view of Visys, the same approach should be taken in 
the context of misleading and comparative advertising.
Does the scope of application of the e-Commerce Directive affect 
the scope of application of the Directive on misleading and comparative 
advertising? Contrary to the Commission, but in line with the advice of 
its Advocate General,32 the Court answered this question in the negative. 
24 Directive 94/47/EC on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects on 
contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare 
basis. This directive has been repealed by Directive 2008/122/EC on the protection of 
consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale 
and exchange contracts, which states, in Art. 18, that references to the former directive 
must be construed as references to the latter directive.
25 Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and admin-
istrative provisions concerning liability for defective products.
26 Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated 
guarantees. This directive will be repealed and replaced by Directive 2019/771 on certain 
aspects concerning contracts for the sale of goods, which determines, in Art. 23, that 
references to the repealed directive must be construed as reference to the new directive.
27 Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 
2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer fi nancial services.
28 Art. 1 (3) and Recital 11, Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce.
29 The company also relied upon trade mark law, but we will not consider that issue here.
30 Art. 2 (1) of Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising; and Article 2 (a) of 
Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising.
31 Art. 2 (f) of Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services.
32 Opinion A-G Mengozzi, Case C-657/11, Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology v. Bert 
Peelaers and Visys, ECLI:EU:C:2013:195, at 36-45.
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In its reasoning, the Court first explained that the use of a domain name 
‘is clearly intended to promote the supply of the goods or services of the 
domain name holder’.33 The Court then explained that the fact that the 
e-Commerce Directive excludes this activity from its scope of application 
does not necessarily mean that the same activity is also excluded from the 
scope of application of the Directive on misleading and comparative adver-
tising.34 In the view of the Court, the two directives ‘pursue different objec-
tives’. The Court also noted that the e-Commerce Directive itself indicates 
that it is ‘without prejudice to the existing level of protection for consumer 
interests’.35 Against this background, the Court confirmed that the use of 
domain names is governed by the Directive concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising, in spite of the fact that the same activity does not 
fall within the scope of application of the e-Commerce Directive.36
Instead of mentioning the directives or regulations by name, the Union 
legislature sometimes determines that an entire area of the law should 
remain unaffected. Consider the Unfair Commercial Practices (UCP) Direc-
tive as an example. This directive prohibits commercial practices which 
limit the consumer’s ability to make an informed decision on whether to 
go ahead with a transaction proposed by a commercial trader.37 Meanwhile, 
the UCP Directive is without prejudice to ‘contract law and, in particular, 
(…) the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract’.38 In accor-
dance with this statement, the Court has confirmed that the UCP Directive 
does not affect the scope of application of the Unfair Terms Directive, which 
prohibits unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier 
and a consumer, and prescribes that such terms ‘shall (…) not be binding 
on the consumer’.39 In the view of the Court, the existence of an unfair 
commercial practice may be taken into account when assessing the unfair-
ness of contractual terms,40 but does not have a ‘direct effect’ on whether 
the contract is valid from the point of view of the Unfair Terms Directive.41
33 Case C-657/11, Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology v. Bert Peelaers and Visys, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:516, at 46.
34 Case C-657/11, Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology v. Bert Peelaers and Visys, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:516, at 50.
35 Case C-657/11, Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology v. Bert Peelaers and Visys, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:516, at 51.
36 Case C-657/11, Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology v. Bert Peelaers and Visys, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:516, at 60.
37 Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in 
the internal market.
38 Art. 3 (2), Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market.
39 Art. 6 (1), Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts.
40 Case C-453/10, Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v. SOS, ECLI:EU:C:2012:144, at 43; 
Case C-109/17, Bankia v. Juan Carlos Marí Merino and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:735, at 49.
41 Case C-453/10, Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v. SOS, ECLI:EU:C:2012:144, at 46; 
Case C-109/17, Bankia v. Juan Carlos Marí Merino and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:735, at 50.
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These are not the only examples. In many cases, the Union legislature 
indicates that the adoption of a directive or regulation does not affect the 
scope of application of other Union rules.42 We have seen that the Court of 
Justice attaches decisive importance to such statements. They form a reason 
for the Court to start from the premise that each rule must be assessed 
independently and that no rule should be excluded in advance. In principle, 
then, each directive or regulation ought to have its intended effect if the 
necessary elements have been established.
6.3 When the Union legislature remains silent about the 
relationship between Union rules
Does the same principle apply when the Union legislature remains silent 
about the relationship between secondary Union laws? Indeed, it appears 
that the scope of application of one rule is only affected by another rule if 
the Union legislature explicitly asserts that this shall be the case. Case law 
shows that, in the absence of contraindications, the Court of Justice assumes 
that each Union rule must be considered on its own merits.
The case Travel Vac v. Sanchís can be mentioned as a first example. Travel 
Vac concluded a so-called ‘timeshare’ contract with Manuel José Antelm 
Sanchís. Under the contract, Sanchís was entitled to use a furnished apart-
ment located in Valencia for one week per year. Three days after the parties 
had signed the document, Sanchís indicated that he wished to cancel the 
contract. Eventually, Travel Vac decided to claim specific performance 
before a court of law. Sanchís defended himself by arguing that he had 
legitimately cancelled the contract. He could not, however, rely upon the 
Timeshare Directive in support of this argument,43 because this directive 
had not yet been transposed into Spanish law.44 For this reason, Sanchís 
relied upon the provisions implementing the Doorstep-Selling Directive, 
which also provides the consumer with the right to withdraw from a 
42 Another important example, albeit outside the scope of the present book, is the Services 
Directive, which explicitly states that it does not affect the Union laws and national laws 
governing certain topics, such as criminal law and social security. See Art. 1 (3)-(7), Direc-
tive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market.
43 Art. 5 (1), Directive 94/47/EC on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects 
of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a time-
share basis. This directive has been repealed by Directive 2008/122/EC on the protection 
of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale 
and exchange contracts.
44 Opinion A-G Alber, Case C-423/97, Travel Vac v. Manuel José Antelm Sanchís, ECLI:EU:
C:1998:576, at 18, who notes that the deadline for the transposition of the directive had 
not yet been expired at the time of conclusion of the contract.
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contract.45 In his view, a timeshare contract must be qualified as a contract 
for the supply of services within the meaning of this directive.46
Does the Timeshare Directive affect the scope of application of the 
Doorstep-Selling Directive? The position of the Union legislature was 
not quite clear. The Timeshare Directive contained no clues at all, and 
the Doorstep-Selling Directive only mentioned that it shall not apply to 
‘contracts for the construction, sale and rental of immoveable property or 
contracts concerning other rights relating to immoveable property’.47 Yet 
the Court was not prepared to conclude that a timeshare contract is covered 
by this exception, because a timeshare contract also concerns the provision 
of ‘separate services’.48 Neither did the Court concur with the argument, 
put forward by Travel Vac,49 that the Union legislature intended to exclude 
timeshare contracts from the scope of the ‘general’ Doorstep-Selling Direc-
tive, pending the adoption of the ‘specific’ Timeshare Directive. In the 
absence of express statements to that effect, the Doorstep-Selling Directive 
remains applicable, so the Court argued:
‘Neither directive contains provisions ruling out the application of the other. 
Moreover, it would defeat the object of Directive 85/577 to interpret it as mean-
ing that the protection it provides is excluded solely because a contract generally 
falls under Directive 94/47. Such an interpretation would deprive consumers of 
the protection of Directive 85/577 even when the contract was concluded away 
from business premises.’50
The second example which must be mentioned is the case Heininger v. 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank, which concerned the conclusion by a 
consumer of a credit agreement with the aim of financing the purchase of 
immovable property. Having concluded that the former Consumer Credit 
Directive and the former Doorstep-Selling Directive may, on the face of it, 
both be applicable to such contracts,51 the Court examined whether the first 
directive takes precedence over the second directive.52 The German govern-
45 Art. 5, Council Directive 85/577/EEC on the protection of consumers in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises.
46 Art. 1 (1), Council Directive 85/577/EEC on the protection of consumers in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises. This directive has been repealed by 
Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights.
47 Art. 3 (2) (a), Council Directive 85/577/EEC on the protection of consumers in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises.
48 Case C-423/97, Travel Vac v. Manuel José Antelm Sanchís, ECLI:EU:C:1999:197, at 25.
49 Opinion A-G Alber, Case C-423/97, Travel Vac v. Manuel José Antelm Sanchís, ECLI:EU:C:
1998:576, at 13.
50 Case C-423/97, Travel Vac v. Manuel José Antelm Sanchís, ECLI:EU:C:1999:197, at 23.
51 Case C-481/99, Georg Heininger and Helga Heininger v. Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:684, at 25-35.
52 The case concerned the relationship between Council Directive 85/577/EEC concerning 
consumer contracts negotiated away from business premises and Council Directive 
87/102/EEC concerning consumer credit. The first directive has been repealed and 
replaced by Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, the second by Directive 2008/48/
EC on credit agreements for consumers.
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ment had taken this position, arguing that, in accordance with the principle 
lex specialis derogat legi generali, a consumer should not be granted a right of 
cancellation under the ‘general’ Doorstep-Selling Directive if no such right 
would be available under the ‘specific’ Consumer Credit Directive.53 The 
Court reached a different conclusion:
‘It is sufficient to observe, as regards those submissions, that the doorstep-selling 
directive is (…) designed to protect consumers against the risks arising from the 
conclusion of contracts away from the trader’s premises and, second, that that 
protection is assured by the introduction of a right of cancellation. (…) Neither 
the preamble to nor the provisions of the consumer credit directive contain any-
thing to show that the Community legislature intended, in adopting it, to limit 
the scope of the doorstep-selling directive in order to exclude secured-credit 
agreements from the specific protection provided by that directive.’54
A third example concerns the relationship between Regulation (EC) No 
1008/2008, which lays down common rules for the operation of air services, 
and the Unfair Terms Directive. The Court had to determine whether the 
terms contained in a contract of carriage by air may be qualified as ‘unfair’, 
given the fact that Article 22 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 provides 
that air carriers may ‘freely set air fares and air rates’.55 Is it possible for 
such air fares and air rates to be qualified as ‘unfair’ at all? The Court held 
that, in the absence of contraindications on the part of the Union legislature, 
the scope of application of the Unfair Terms Directive is not affected by 
Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008:
‘[I]t would be possible to find that that directive does not apply in the field of 
air services governed by Regulation No 1008/2008 only if it is clearly provided 
for by the provisions of that regulation. However, neither the wording of Article 
22 of Regulation No 1008/2008 relating to pricing freedom nor that of the other 
provisions of that regulation permits such a view, even though Directive 93/13 
was already in force on the date of adoption of that regulation. (…) Nor can it be 
inferred from the objective pursued by Article 22(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008 
that contracts of carriage by air are not subject to compliance with the general 
rules protecting consumers against unfair terms.’56
The Court adopts the same approach when it assesses the relationship 
between multiple rules contained in the same directive or regulation. This 
may be demonstrated by discussing a fourth example, which concerns the
53 Case C-481/99, Georg Heininger and Helga Heininger v. Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:684, at 37.
54 Case C-481/99, Georg Heininger and Helga Heininger v. Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:684, at 38-39.
55 Art. 22 (1), Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air 
services in the Community.
56 Case C-290/16, Air Berlin & Co. v. Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen, ECLI:EU:C:2017:
523, at 45-46.
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relationship between two provisions contained in the Copyright Direc-
tive. This directive provides for certain exceptions to the exclusive right 
of authors, performers and producers to authorise or prohibit the repro-
duction of their works. Under the so-called ‘reprography exception’, 
no authorisation is required for reproductions ‘on paper or any similar 
medium’, provided that they are ‘effected by the use of any kind of photo-
graphic technique or by some other process having similar effects’.57 Under 
the so-called ‘private copying exception’, no authorisation is required for 
reproductions ‘on any medium’, provided that they are ‘made by a natural 
person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly 
commercial’.58 Although no prior authorisation is necessary, both provi-
sions do require that the rightholders receive ‘fair compensation’ for the 
reproduction of their protected works.
The relationship between these exceptions played a central role in 
legal proceedings between Reprobel, the organisation responsible for the 
collection and distribution of the compensation payments in Belgium, and 
Hewlett-Packard Belgium, an importer of multifunctional printers. Reprobel 
and Hewlett-Packard Belgium disagreed over the amount of ‘fair compensa-
tion’ which must be paid to Reprobel on the basis of the Belgian laws imple-
menting the Copyright Directive. The Brussels Court of Appeal wondered 
whether the amount of compensation must be different depending on 
whether the reproduction is made for commercial or for non-commercial 
purposes. After all, the ‘private copying exception’ applies only to reproduc-
tions made by natural persons for private use, whereas the ‘reprography 
exception’ applies to all users. Does this mean that the commercial or non-
commercial use of a multifunctional printer is a relevant factor that should 
be taken into account when determining the level of ‘fair compensation’?
In its reply to this question, the Court of Justice first explained the 
substantive scope of both exceptions. The Court observed that the ‘reprog-
raphy exception’ applies to all users, regardless of whether the reproduc-
tion is made for commercial or for non-commercial purposes.59 The fact 
that the ‘private copying exception’ applies only to natural persons does 
not mean that these users are excluded from the scope of the ‘reprography 
exception’.60 For its part, the ‘private copying exception’ applies to ‘any 
medium’, regardless of the technique used.61 The fact that the ‘reprography 
exception’ applies only to reproductions made by using photographic tech-
niques does not mean that these reproductions are excluded from the scope 
57 Art. 5 (2) (a), Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society.
58 Art. 5 (2) (b), Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society.
59 Art. 5 (2) (a), Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society.
60 Case C-572/13, Hewlett-Packard Belgium v. Reprobel, ECLI:EU:C:2015:750, at 30.
61 Art. 5 (2) (b), Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society.
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of the ‘private copying exception’.62 Essentially, what the Court does here is 
explaining that it is impossible to generally qualify one of the rules as the 
lex specialis and the other as the lex generalis, because the differences between 
them cut both ways.
Having explained the substantive scope of both provisions, the Court 
concluded that they may be applicable concurrently to photographic repro-
ductions printed on paper and made by natural persons for private use.63 
But instead of giving one of the provisions precedence over the other, the 
Court took a step back and explained that the amount of ‘fair compensation’ 
must always be linked to the actual losses sustained by authors of protected 
works, whatever the legal basis of the claim.64 It is appropriate, therefore, to 
make a distinction between commercial and non-commercial reproductions 
when determining the amount of compensation under the ‘reprography 
exception’, so that the actual losses of the rightholders are compensated.65 
This shows, once again, that the Court is careful not to exclude one of the 
applicable rules and tries to realise the objectives underlying both rules to 
the greatest possible extent.
We can see the same principle at work in a judgment concerning the 
extent of the losses which must be compensated for under the so-called 
Enforcement Directive.66 Article 13 (1) determines that the infringer of an 
intellectual property right must pay the rightholder ‘damages appropriate 
to the actual prejudice suffered by him/her as a result of the infringement’. 
The provision goes on to determine how judicial authorities should calcu-
late the damages, offering them two different options. If they choose to 
calculate the damages in accordance with option (a), they must take into 
account ‘all appropriate aspects’, including ‘lost profits’, ‘unfair profits 
made by the infringer’, and ‘elements other than economic factors, such 
as the moral prejudice caused to the rightholder by the infringement’. If 
they choose option (b), they must calculate the damages ‘as a lump sum’, on 
the basis of elements ‘such as at least the amount of royalties or fees which 
would have been due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the 
intellectual property right in question’. Contrary to option (a), option (b) 
does not mention non-economic elements. What is more, the Union legis-
lature has qualified option (b) as the ‘alternative’ option. Does this mean 
that a rightholder who claims compensation in accordance with option (b) 
cannot claim compensation for non-pecuniary losses under option (a)?
In its reply to this question, referred by the Supreme Court of Spain, 
the Court of Justice observed that option (b) does not mention ‘moral 
prejudice’, but does not exclude this type of harm either. In fact, the Union 
62 Case C-572/13, Hewlett-Packard Belgium v. Reprobel, ECLI:EU:C:2015:750, at 32.
63 Case C-572/13, Hewlett-Packard Belgium v. Reprobel, ECLI:EU:C:2015:750, at 33-34.
64 Case C-572/13, Hewlett-Packard Belgium v. Reprobel, ECLI:EU:C:2015:750, at 35-39, refer-
ring to Case C-467/08, Padawan v. SGAE, ECLI:EU:C:2010:620, at 37, 40 and 42.
65 Case C-572/13, Hewlett-Packard Belgium v. Reprobel, ECLI:EU:C:2015:750, at 40-43.
66 Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
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legislature states that the lump sum must be calculated on the basis of ‘at 
least’ the amount of royalties or fees, leaving room for other elements to 
be taken into account.67 Moreover, option (b) should be read in conjunc-
tion with the opening sentence of Article 13 (1), which determines that the 
rightholder must be compensated for the ‘actual prejudice’ suffered. In the 
view of the Court, an exclusion of the possibility to claim compensation for 
non-pecuniary losses would go against the purpose of this provision68 and 
against the objectives of the Enforcement Directive, which aims at achieving 
a high level of protection of holders of intellectual property rights.69
It is against this backdrop that the Court concluded that the holder of 
an intellectual property right should always be ‘compensated in full’ for 
the ‘actual prejudice suffered’, including ‘any moral prejudice’.70 Because a 
lump sum calculated on the basis of hypothetical royalties merely compen-
sates for pecuniary losses,71 the rightholder who claims such compensation 
in accordance with option (b) may also, ‘in addition to the damages thus 
calculated’,72 claim compensation for any ‘moral prejudice’ in accordance 
with option (a).73 In other words: the Court determined that the claims 
are not mutually exclusive – as might be suggested by the qualification of 
option (b) as the ‘alternative’ option – but may be combined, provided that 
the conditions of each claim are fulfilled.
The foregoing demonstrates that the Court of Justice strives to realise 
the objectives of each Union rule to the greatest possible extent. The 
scope of application of one rule is only affected by the scope of applica-
tion of another rule if this is clearly provided by the Union legislature. In 
the absence of express indications, the Court assumes that the rules may 
be applicable concurrently. The question may be raised whether the same 
principle applies when it comes to the relationship between harmonising 
measures and national laws. To what extent, if at all, should the latter be 
excluded in favour of the former?
67 Case C-99/15, Christian Liffers v. Producciones Mandarina and Mediaset España Comunica-
ción, ECLI:EU:C:2016:173, at 15.
68 Case C-99/15, Christian Liffers v. Producciones Mandarina and Mediaset España Comunica-
ción, ECLI:EU:C:2016:173, at 17-18.
69 Case C-99/15, Christian Liffers v. Producciones Mandarina and Mediaset España Comu-
nicación, ECLI:EU:C:2016:173, at 20-24, referring to Recitals 10, 17 and 26 of Directive 
2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
70 Case C-99/15, Christian Liffers v. Producciones Mandarina and Mediaset España Comunica-
ción, ECLI:EU:C:2016:173, at 25.
71 Case C-99/15, Christian Liffers v. Producciones Mandarina and Mediaset España Comunica-
ción, ECLI:EU:C:2016:173, at 20.
72 Case C-99/15, Christian Liffers v. Producciones Mandarina and Mediaset España Comunica-
ción, ECLI:EU:C:2016:173, at 26.
73 Case C-99/15, Christian Liffers v. Producciones Mandarina and Mediaset España Comunica-
ción, ECLI:EU:C:2016:173, at 26-27.
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6.4 Ho w to determine whether national laws are affected 
by secondary Union rules?
Does the same principle apply when the relationship between harmon-
ising measures and national laws must be determined? After all, the very 
purpose of harmonisation is to establish common rules for the whole of the 
European market. Should we not assume, then, that harmonising measures 
necessarily exclude or replace otherwise applicable national laws? The 
reality is more complicated, however. The scope of application of directives 
and regulations is limited, because the competence of the Union is restricted 
and because the Union legislature does not regulate all issues exhaustively.
Indeed, the competence of the Union to approximate national laws may 
be restricted by the very treaty provision upon which it rests. Take social 
policy as an example. This is an area in which the Union shares competence 
with the Member States.74 Importantly, Article 153 TFEU prescribes that any 
harmonising measure which aims at protecting workers must be cast in the 
form of a directive, can only be used to introduce ‘minimum requirements 
for gradual implementation’,75 and ‘shall not prevent any Member State 
from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures’.76 
It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the Working Time Directive 
merely lays down ‘minimum safety and health requirements for the organ-
isation of working time’,77 and that the Court of Justice has confirmed that 
this directive does not affect national laws more favourable to the protection 
of workers.78
Most treaty provisions do not, however, state explicitly that the Union 
legislature may only introduce ‘minimum requirements’.79 In fact, the 
provision which forms the basis of most directives and regulations in the 
area of the internal market – the current Article 114 TFEU – only permits 
Member States to maintain or introduce national laws ‘on grounds of 
major needs’,80 or in the interest of the protection of the environment or the 
working environment.81 What is more, the provision which has been used 
to introduce common rules concerning the liability for defective products 
74 Art. 4 (2) (b) TFEU.
75 Art. 153 (2) (b) TFEU, which refers back the fi elds listed in Art. 153 (1) (a) to (i), which 
mentions the working environment, working conditions and social security.
76 Art. 153 (4) TFEU.
77 Art. 1 (1), Directive 2003/88/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of 
working time.
78 Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v. Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique, ECLI:EU:
C:2012:33, at 48-49; Case C-385/17, Torsten Hein v. Albert Holzkamm & Co., ECLI:EU:C:
2018:1018, at 30-31.
79 Art. 16, 50, 53, 81, 91, 100 (2), 114, 115, 168 (4) (c), and 352 TFEU do not contain such 
state ments. Nor does Art. 103 (1) TFEU, but this provision must be distinguished because 
the Union has exclusive competence in the area of competition law on the basis of Art. 3 
(1) (b) TFEU.
80 Art. 114 (4) in conjunction with Art. 36 TFEU.
81 Art. 114 (4)-(10) TFEU.
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and common rules governing the contractual relationship between self-
employed commercial agents and their principals – the current Article 115 
TFEU – does not mention any exception at all, but only prescribes that the 
measure must be passed unanimously by the Council and must be cast in 
the form of a directive.82 This suggests that Member States have little room 
for manoeuvre when regulating the internal market.
Yet it may be recalled that when the Union shares competence with the 
Member States, as is the case in the context of the internal market,83 the 
Member States may legislate to the extent that the Union has not exercised 
its competence to legislate, or has stopped doing so.84 The Member States 
need not be empowered by the Union to legislate, as is the case when the 
Treaties confer an exclusive competence on the Union.85 When it comes to 
the internal market, the question to consider, therefore, is whether, and to 
what extent, the Union has actually exercised its competence to legislate.86 
In the words of the Protocol on the Exercise of Shared Competence, Union 
action ‘only covers those elements governed by the Union act in question 
and therefore does not cover the whole area’.87 As a consequence, the scope 
of the exercise by the Union of a shared competence can only be determined 
by considering the wording, meaning and structure of the directive or regu-
lation at issue.88
In this regard, it is important to observe that many directives and regu-
lations assert explicitly that they are aimed at so-called ‘minimum harmoni-
sation’. The Union legislature has, for instance, made clear that Member 
States may adopt or retain a higher level of protection for consumers than 
the Unfair Terms Directive89 and the current Consumer Sales Directive90 
require, and that they may maintain or bring into force provisions more 
favourable to the creditor than the Late Payment Directive contains.91 
82 Council Directive 85/374/EEC concerning the liability for defective products; Council 
Directive 86/653/EEC relating to self-employed commercial agents (also based on 
today’s Art. 53 (1) TFEU, which does not mention any exception either).
83 Art. 4 (2) (a) TFEU.
84 Art. 2 (2) TFEU.
85 Art. 2 (1) TFEU.
86 Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 84-85.
87 Protocol No. 25 on the exercise of shared competence.
88 As the Court indicates in Case C-52/00, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:2002:252, at 16; 
Case C-402/03, Skov v. Bilka, ECLI:EU:C:2006:6, at 22.
89 Art. 8, Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, as confi rmed in 
Case C-484/08, Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid v. Ausbanc, ECLI:EU:C:2010:309, 
at 29; Case C-453/10, Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v. SOS, ECLI:EU:C:2012:144,
at 34.
90 Art. 1 (1), Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees. The situation is different under the new Directive (EU) 2019/771 
on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of goods and under Directive (EU) 
2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and 
digital services, which will be explained in section 6.5.
91 Art. 12 (3), Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions.
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Examples can also be found in the area of passenger rights. While it is true 
that only some regulations explicitly state that they establish ‘minimum 
rights for passengers’92 or provide for a ‘minimum level of protection’,93 
all regulations in this field do mention that passengers may be entitled to 
‘further compensation’.94 In accordance with these statements, the Court 
has made clear that air passengers may be entitled to compensation ‘on a 
legal basis other than Regulation No 261/2004’,95 and that rail passengers 
may be entitled to compensation ‘on the basis of the applicable national 
law’, in addition to the right to receive compensation under the regulation 
governing rail passengers’ rights and obligations.96
The Enforcement Directive, concerning the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, provides yet another example. According to the Union 
legislature, the aim of this directive ‘is not to introduce an obligation 
to provide for punitive damages’.97 But the Union legislature has also 
determined that the directive does not affect national legislation which is 
‘more favourable for rightholders’.98 Does this mean that awarding puni-
tive damages on the basis of national laws is permitted? In its reply to this 
question, asked by the Supreme Court of Poland, the Court of Justice notes 
that the Enforcement Directive aims at ensuring ‘a high, equivalent and 
homogeneous level of protection in the internal market’,99 but also observes 
that the directive is without prejudice to national laws more favourable to 
the protection of rightholders.100 Against this background, the Court holds 
that the fact that the Enforcement Directive itself does not introduce an 
obligation on the part of the Member States to provide for punitive damages 
92 Art. 1 (1), Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and 
assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay 
of fl ights.
93 Recital 2, Regulation (EU) 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers when travelling 
by sea and inland waterway.
94 Art. 12 (1), Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation 
and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long 
delay of fl ights; Art. 11, Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 on rail passengers’ rights and 
obligations; Art. 21, Regulation (EU) 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers when 
travelling by sea and inland waterway; Art. 22, Regulation (EU) 181/2011 concerning the 
rights of passengers in bus and coach transport.
95 Subject to the conditions and limits set out in Art. 29 of the Montreal Convention, see 
Case C-83/10, Aurora Sousa Rodríguez and Others v. Air France, ECLI:EU:C:2011:652, at 
38; Joined Cases C-581/10 and C-629/10, Emeka Nelson and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa 
AG (C-581/10), and TUI Travel and Others v. Civil Aviation Authority (C-629/10), ECLI:EU:
C:2012:657, at 59.
96 Subject to the conditions and limits set out in Art. 32 of the CIV Uniform Rules, see Case 
C-509/11, ÖBB-Personenverkehr, ECLI:EU:C:2013:613, at 40.
97 Recital 26, Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
98 Art. 2 (1), Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
99 Recital 10, Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
100 Case C-367/15, Oławska Telewizja Kablowa v. Stowarzyszenie Filmowców Polskich, ECLI:EU:
C:2017:36, at 22.
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‘cannot be interpreted as a prohibition on introducing such a measure’.101 
The Court concludes that awarding punitive damages in accordance with 
national laws is permitted, subject only to the requirement that the amount 
of damages does not exceed the losses suffered ‘so clearly and substantially’ 
that it constitutes an abuse of rights under the directive.102
If the Union legislature has not asserted explicitly that a directive or 
regulation is aimed at ‘minimum harmonisation’, this conclusion may none-
theless be drawn on the basis of an assessment of the wording, meaning 
and purpose of individual provisions. Take the Directive concerning 
self-employed commercial agents as an example. This directive requires 
Member States to introduce a right to compensation for commercial agents, 
so as to make good the losses suffered after termination of the agency 
contract. When implementing the directive, Member States must choose 
one of two available compensation schemes.103 They must either transpose 
the rules which entitle the commercial agent to an ‘indemnity’,104 or opt for 
the rules which entitle him to ‘compensation for the damage he suffers as a 
result of the termination’.105
If a Member State chooses the first alternative, the directive makes clear 
that the indemnity must be calculated on the basis of the benefits accruing 
to the principal as a result of the work of the agent.106 The directive also 
prescribes that the amount of the indemnity must be ‘equitable’ when 
weighed up against the commission lost by the commercial agent and 
cannot, in any event, exceed the average annual remuneration.107 Finally, 
the directive adds that the award of an indemnity shall not ‘prevent the 
commercial agent from seeking damages’.108 In the view of the Court, this 
means that the agent may also claim compensation on the basis of the 
applicable national law, ‘when that provides for the principal’s liability in 
contract or tort’.109
101 Case C-367/15, Oławska Telewizja Kablowa v. Stowarzyszenie Filmowców Polskich, ECLI:EU:
C:2017:36, at 28.
102 Case C-367/15, Oławska Telewizja Kablowa v. Stowarzyszenie Filmowców Polskich, ECLI:EU:
C:2017:36, at 31, referring to Art. 3 (2), Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights.
103 Art. 17 (1), Council Directive 86/653/EEC relating to self-employed commercial agents.
104 Art. 17 (2), Council Directive 86/653/EEC relating to self-employed commercial agents.
105 Art. 17 (3), Council Directive 86/653/EEC relating to self-employed commercial agents.
106 Art. 17 (2) (a), Council Directive 86/653/EEC relating to self-employed commercial 
agents.
107 Art. 17 (2) (a)-(b), Council Directive 86/653/EEC relating to self-employed commercial 
agents.
108 Art. 17 (2) (c), Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 relating to self-
employed commercial agents.
109 Case C-338/14, Quenon v. Citibank and Citilife, ECLI:EU:C:2015:795, at 31.
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If anything, the examples discussed in this section show that directives 
and regulations do not necessarily affect the scope of application of national 
laws.110 Sometimes, the very treaty provision upon which the competence 
of the Union legislature is based prescribes that any harmonising measure 
can only ever establish minimum requirements. In many other instances, 
the wording, meaning and purpose of the directive or regulation itself indi-
cate that the Union legislature has merely aimed at introducing minimum 
requirements. In both situations, it is clear that the scope of application of 
directives and regulations is limited and that they do not automatically 
replace or exclude otherwise applicable national laws.
6.5 The case of ‘complete’ harmonisation of national laws
Sometimes, however, the Union legislature has not aimed at introducing 
minimum requirements, but at a ‘complete’ harmonisation of the laws of 
the Member States. In fact, ‘complete’ harmonisation has gradually emerged 
as the preferred technique in the field of consumer protection.111 Does this 
mean that such measures do exclude otherwise applicable national laws? 
Again, it is appropriate to adopt a cautious approach and to avoid jumping 
to this conclusion. Although they certainly have the capacity to trump 
otherwise applicable national laws, as will be shown in section 6.7, even 
directives and regulations aimed at ‘complete’ harmonisation often do leave 
room for the application of such laws. They might exhaustively regulate 
some issues, but they cannot be wholly autonomous and self-contained.
The Product Liability Directive may serve as an illustrative example. 
According to the Court, this directive seeks to achieve ‘complete harmoni-
sation’ with regard to the matters regulated by it.112 On the other hand, 
the directive itself indicates that the harmonisation ‘cannot be total at the 
present stage’.113 Indeed, the directive leaves considerable room for the 
application of national laws. It introduces a system of strict liability, but 
it does not preclude the application of ‘other systems of contractual or 
110 Another important example, albeit outside the scope of the present book, is the Services 
Directive, which explicitly states that it does not affect the Union laws and national laws 
governing certain topics, such as criminal law and social security. See Art. 1 (3)-(7), Direc-
tive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market.
111 As observed by e.g. Faure 2008, p. 434-435; Mak 2009, p. 55-58; Whittaker 2009, p. 224-226; 
Smits 2010, p. 5-7; Weatherill 2012, p. 183-185; Giliker 2015, p. 6-7.
112 Case C-52/00, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:2002:252, at 24; Case C-154/00, Commis-
sion v. Greece, ECLI:EU:C:2002:254, at 20; Case C-402/03, Skov v. Bilka, ECLI:EU:C:2006:6, 
at 23; Case C-127/04, Declan O’Byrne v. Sanofi  Pasteur, ECLI:EU:C:2006:93, at 35; Case 
C-285/08, Leroy Somer v. Dalkia France and Ace Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2009:351, at 21; Case 
C-495/10, Centre hospitalier universitaire de Besançon v. Thomas Dutrueux and Caisse 
primaire d’assurance maladie du Jura, ECLI:EU:C:2011:869, at 20; Case C-310/13, Novo 
Nordisk Pharma, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2385, at 23; Case C-621/15, Sanofi  Pasteur and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:484, at 20.
113 Recital 18, Council Directive 85/374/EEC concerning the liability for defective products.
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non-contractual liability based on other grounds’.114 Moreover, Article 9 of 
the directive determines that the producer must compensate for damage 
resulting from death or from personal injuries and for damage to, or destruc-
tion of, an item of property intended and used for private use or consump-
tion. This means that the compensation for non-material damage115 and for 
damage to an item of property intended and used for professional purposes 
is not governed by the directive, but by the applicable national law.116
Consider also the UCP Directive, which determines that Member States 
cannot restrict the freedom to provide services or the free movement of 
goods for reasons falling within its scope.117 In the view of the Court, this 
means that the directive ‘fully harmonises’ the rules on unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices.118 Meanwhile, Article 5 makes significant 
inroads into the directive’s own scope of application. To begin with, its 
rules are ‘without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules 
on the validity, formation or effect of a contract’.119 As we have seen, the 
Court has interpreted this provision as meaning that the UCP Directive, 
which is aimed at ‘maximum’ harmonisation, does not affect the scope of 
application of the Unfair Terms Directive, which is aimed at ‘minimum’ 
harmonisation.120 It is fair to assume, then, that the UCP Directive has no 
direct effect on whether a contract is valid from the point of view of national 
114 Art. 13, Council Directive 85/374/EEC concerning the liability for defective products, 
as interpreted in Case C-52/00, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:2002:252, at 22; Case 
C-154/00, Commission v. Greece, ECLI:EU:C:2002:254, at 18; Case C-402/03, Skov v. Bilka, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:6, at 47; Case C-285/08, Leroy Somer v. Dalkia France and Ace Europe, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:351, at 23.
115 Art. 9 expressly provides that it ‘shall be without prejudice to national provisions 
relating to non-material damage’. According to the Court, this issue ‘is governed solely 
by national law’, see Case C-203/99, Henning Veedfald v. Århus Amtskommune, ECLI:EU:
C:2001:258, at 27.
116 As the Court confi rmed in Case C-285/08, Leroy Somer v. Dalkia France and Ace Europe, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:351, at 24-32.
117 Art. 4, Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial prac-
tices in the internal market.
118 Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07, VTB-VAB v. Total Belgium (C-261/07) and Galatea 
v. Sanoma Magazines Belgium (C-299/07), ECLI:EU:C:2009:244, at 52; Case C-304/08, 
Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs v. Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, ECLI:
EU:C:2010:12, at 41; Case C-540/08, Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag & Co. v. 
‘Österreich’-Zeitungsverlag, ECLI:EU:C:2010:660, at 30; Case C-288/10, Wamo v. JBC and 
Modemakers Fashion, ECLI:EU:C:2011:443, at 33; Case C-265/12, Citroën Belux v. FvF,
ECLI:EU:C:2013:498, at 20; Case C-343/12, Euronics Belgium v. Kamera Express, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:154, at 24; Case C-421/12, Commission v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2064, at 55 
(‘complete harmonisation’); Case C-295/16, Europamur Alimentación, ECLI:EU:C:2017:782, 
at 39.
119 Art. 3 (2), Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market.
120 Case C-453/10, Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v. SOS, ECLI:EU:C:2012:144, at 45-46; 
Case C-109/17, Bankia v. Juan Carlos Marí Merino and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:735, at 50.
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contract law either.121 What is more, the UCP Directive also determines that 
Member States may impose stricter requirements in relation to financial 
services and immovable property.122 This has been a reason for the Court 
to permit Member States to generally prohibit so-called ‘combined offers’, 
which include financial services, to consumers.123
The same approach has been chosen in the context of the Consumer 
Credit Directive, the Consumer Rights Directive, the revised Consumer 
Sales Directive and the newly introduced Directive concerning contracts for 
the supply of digital content and digital services. These directives gener-
ally prohibit Member States to depart from their respective provisions.124 
But they also leave important issues to the applicable national law. The 
Consumer Credit Directive does not, for instance, affect the power to 
terminate the credit agreement for breach.125 Nor does the Consumer 
Rights Directive preclude the consumer to ‘have recourse to other remedies 
provided for by national law’,126 such as claiming performance and 
compensation,127 in addition to the power of the consumer to terminate the 
contract if the trader has failed to deliver the goods in time.128 Finally, all 
these directives are without prejudice to ‘general contract law’, such as ‘the 
rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract’.129 Member States 
are permitted, for instance, to prescribe that a consumer contract is invalid 
– and may, for that reason, be declared null and void – if it has not been put 
down in writing or has not been signed by the contracting parties.130
The foregoing demonstrates that we may only reach the conclusion that 
a directive or regulation excludes otherwise applicable national laws after 
a careful assessment of the wording, meaning and purpose of the harmon-
ising measure at issue. Even if the aim of the Union legislature has been to 
exhaustively regulate some issues, the resulting harmonisation will always 
121 See e.g. Stuyck 2015, p. 743-744.
122 Art. 3 (9), Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market.
123 Case C-265/12, Citroën Belux v. FvF, ECLI:EU:C:2013:498, at 22.
124 Art. 22 (1), Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers; Art. 4, Directive 
2011/83/EU on consumer rights; Art. 4, Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain aspects 
concerning contracts for the sale of goods; Art. 4, Directive (EU) 2019/770 on certain 
aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services.
125 Recital 33, Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers.
126 Art. 18 (4), Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights.
127 As explained in Recital 53, Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights.
128 Art. 18 (2), Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights.
129 Recital 30 (‘contract law issues’) and Art. 10 (1) (‘the validity of the conclusion of credit 
agreements’), Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers; Art. 3 (5), 
Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights; Art. 3 (6), Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain 
aspects concerning contracts for the sale of goods; Art. 3 (10), Directive (EU) 2019/770 on 
certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services.
130 As the Court determined in Case C-42/15, Home Credit Slovakia v. Klára Bíróová, ECLI:EU:
C:2016:842, at 39-45, concerning the interpretation of Art. 10 (1), Directive 2008/48/EC on 
credit agreements for consumers.
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limited in scope and is almost never really complete. Rather than assuming 
that a harmonising measure excludes otherwise applicable national laws we 
should, therefore, start from the premise that each applicable rule, however 
founded, must be considered on its own merits.
6.6 The first exception: alternative rules
The previous sections have shown that directives and regulations are, by 
their very nature, limited in scope. They will overlap with other directives 
and regulations, and they will be complemented by national laws. As 
a result, a single set of facts may fall within the scope of multiple rules, 
belonging to the body of secondary Union law and to the applicable 
national law. In principle, then, the objectives underlying each rule must be 
realised to the greatest possible extent. This does not, however, mean that 
concurrently applicable rules will always coexist peacefully. An exception 
must be made when cumulative application would lead to inconsistent 
outcomes which cannot exist concurrently. In such situations, an election 
between the available alternatives is required.
It may be recalled, for instance, that it is impossible to combine termi-
nation for breach and specific performance of the same contract. After 
all, termination means that the duty to perform the obligations under the 
contract ceases to exist.131 Likewise, passengers who are confronted with 
a failure in the performance of the contract of carriage are entitled to elect 
between several alternatives. They may demand performance – often called 
‘re-routing’ – or they may, alternatively, terminate the contract, demand 
transport to their point of departure and claim ‘reimbursement’ of the ticket 
price. Article 18 (1) of Regulation (EU) 1177/2010 determines, for example, 
that if a carrier reasonably expects a cancellation or a delay in departure 
from a port terminal for more than 90 minutes, the carrier must offer the 
passenger a choice between:
‘(a) re-routing to the final destination, under comparable conditions, as set out in 
the transport contract, at the earliest opportunity and at no additional cost;
(b) reimbursement of the ticket price and, where relevant, a return service free of 
charge to the first point of departure, as set out in the transport contract, at the 
earliest opportunity.’132
131 See supra section 2.5.
132 Art. 18 (1), Regulation (EU) 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers when travel-
ling by sea and inland waterway. Similar rules can be found in Art. 8, Regulation (EC) 
No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers 
in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights; Art. 16, 
Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations; Art. 10 (3) and 
19, Regulation (EU) No 181/2011 concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach 
transport.
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The current and future versions of the Consumer Sales Directive may also 
serve as examples.133 If the goods delivered by the seller do not meet the 
requirements for conformity, these directives entitle the consumer to elect 
between several types of specific performance and termination. In the 
first instance, the consumer may require the seller to repair the goods or 
to replace them.134 The Union legislature considers repair and replacement 
to be ‘alternative remedies’.135 In the second instance, the consumer may 
elect between two types of termination. He may require ‘an appropriate 
reduction’ of the price or terminate the entire contract.136 According to the 
Court, price reduction and termination are ‘alternative remedies’.137 If the 
necessary conditions are fulfilled, it is up to the consumer to opt for the rule 
which appears to him to be the most advantageous, both in the first instance 
(repair or replacement of the goods) and in the second instance (price reduc-
tion or termination of the contract).138
These are not the only options available to the consumer. It may be 
recalled that the current Consumer Sales Directive permits Member States 
to adopt or retain a higher level of protection for consumers than the 
directive prescribes.139 In fact, the Union legislature has determined that 
the rights flowing from the Consumer Sales Directive ‘shall be exercised 
without prejudice to other rights which the consumer may invoke under 
the national rules governing contractual or non-contractual liability’.140 
133 Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associ-
ated guarantees, which will be repealed by Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain aspects 
concerning contracts for the sale of goods.
134 Art. 3 (3), Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods 
and associated guarantees; Art. 13 (2)-(3), Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain aspects 
concerning contracts for the sale of goods. It must be noted that the consumer cannot opt 
for either repair or replacement if this is ‘impossible or disproportionate’.
135 Art. 3 (3), Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees; Art. 13 (2), Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain aspects concerning 
contracts for the sale of goods.
136 Art. 3 (5), Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees; Art. 13 (4), Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain aspects concerning 
contracts for the sale of goods. Note that the latter directive mentions several circum-
stances which are not mentioned in the former directive.
137 Joined Cases C-65/09 and C-87/09, Gebr. Weber (C-65/09) v. Jürgen Wittmer, and Ingrid 
Putz (C-87/09) v. Medianess Electronics, ECLI:EU:C:2011:396, at 72.
138 It must be noted that the rules are not entirely similar, for termination of the contract 
cannot be obtained when the lack of conformity is minor, according to Art. 3 (6), Directive 
1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, 
and Art. 13 (5), Directive 2019/771 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of 
goods. See also Case C-32/12, Soledad Duarte Hueros v. Autociba and Automóviles Citroën 
España, ECLI:EU:C:2013:637, at 28.
139 Art. 8 (2), Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees.
140 Art. 8 (1), Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees.
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By contrast, the future Consumer Sales Directive explicitly prohibits 
Member States to maintain or introduce provisions diverging from the 
provisions laid down by the directive.141 Still, the directive only ‘fully’ 
harmonises the rules governing the conformity of the goods.142 It does not 
deal with ‘aspects of general contract law’, such as ‘the rules on the validity, 
formation or effect of a contract’.143
This means that there may be other alternatives available to the 
consumer, in addition to the possibilities to demand repair or replace-
ment and to reduce the price or terminate the contract for breach. Under 
the Dutch law of obligations, for instance, the consumer may be entitled 
to rescind the sales contract for pre-contractual misrepresentation,144 or 
to claim compensation for losses resulting from the misrepresentation.145 
The consumer may also be able to rescind the contract if the seller has 
committed an unfair commercial practice.146 Moreover, it might be possible 
for the consumer to request a court to modify or terminate the contract 
because of unforeseen circumstances.147 Even though the necessary condi-
tions of all these rules can be satisfied concurrently on a single set of facts, 
the legal consequences differ and cannot be awarded cumulatively. It is fair 
to assume, then, that the consumer must choose which avenue appears to 
him to be the most advantageous.
Can two liability rules ever lead to inconsistent outcomes, so that an 
election between them is required? It may be remembered that most differ-
ences can be bridged at the stage of assessing the quantum of damages. 
After all, awarding compensation on the basis of one rule may reduce or 
even completely remove the damage which is relevant in the context of 
another applicable rule.148 It is fair to assume that the same solution can 
and should be adopted in the context of secondary Union law. Consider, for 
instance, the relationship between the rights of passengers and travelers. 
141 Art. 4, Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of 
goods.
142 As the Union legislature emphasises in Recitals 10, 11 and 47, and in Art. 1, Directive (EU) 
2019/771 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of goods.
143 Art. 3 (6), Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of 
goods.
144 Art. 6:228 BW.
145 On the basis of Art. 6:162 BW. See Hijma 2018, p. 570-571.
146 Art. 6:193j BW. Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market defi nes what commercial practices must be 
considered ‘unfair’, but does not, at present, require the national legislature to introduce 
the possibility to rescind the contract for that reason, with retroactive effect. In the near 
future, a right to termination for breach of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive will 
have to be made available by the Member States, see Art. 3 of the Directive concerning 
the better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules.
147 Art. 6:258 BW.
148 See supra section 2.5.
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We have seen that these rights are not mutually exclusive, but complemen-
tary.149 The Union legislature does not, however, require the claimant to 
elect between the rules, but only prescribes that the compensation or price 
reduction granted on one legal basis and the compensation or price reduc-
tion granted on another legal basis ‘shall be deducted from each other in 
order to avoid overcompensation’.150
Overcompensation is also avoided, as much as possible, by the Court 
of Justice. It will be remembered that the Court has determined that the 
amount of ‘fair compensation’ which must be paid for the use of protected 
works must always be linked to the actual losses sustained by the authors of 
those works, regardless of the legal basis of the claim.151 The same reasoning 
has been followed by the Court with regard to the amount of compensation 
which must be paid by the principal to his commercial agent after termina-
tion of their contract. Even though the agent is, in principle, entitled to claim 
damages on the basis of the applicable national law,152 this may not result 
‘in the agent being compensated twice for the loss of commission following 
termination of that contract’.153 Consider also the Late Payment Directive, 
which entitles the creditor both to a ‘fixed sum of EUR 40’ to compensate 
the creditor’s ‘own recovery costs’154 and also to ‘reasonable compensa-
tion’ for ‘any recovery costs exceeding that fixed sum’.155 The Court has 
made clear that these claims may be combined, provided that the award 
of ‘reasonable compensation’ does not cover the costs which have already 
been compensated for by way of the fixed sum of EUR 40.156
If we wish to avoid both under- and overcompensation we should, 
indeed, examine carefully whether the applicable rules are aimed at 
repairing the same type of loss. This is not an easy task, as may be demon-
strated by examining Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 in more detail. Article 
12 (1) of this regulation permits air passengers to claim ‘further compensa-
tion’ on the basis of national and international laws,157 in addition to the 
149 See supra section 6.2.
150 Art. 14 (5), Directive (EU) 2015/2302 on package travel and linked travel arrangements.
151 Case C-572/13, Hewlett-Packard Belgium v. Reprobel, ECLI:EU:C:2015:750, at 35-39, refer-
ring to Case C-467/08, Padawan v. SGAE, ECLI:EU:C:2010:620, at 37, 40 and 42.
152 Art. 17 (2) (c), Council Directive 86/653/EEC relating to self-employed commercial agents, 
as interpreted in Case C-338/14, Quenon v. Citibank and Citilife, ECLI:EU:C:2015:795, at 31.
153 Case C-338/14, Quenon v. Citibank and Citilife, ECLI:EU:C:2015:795, at 35.
154 Art. 6 (1), Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions. 
The precise conditions under which the liability itself is created are laid down in Art. 3-4, 
Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions.
155 Art. 6 (3), Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions.
156 Case C-287/17, eská pojišovna v. WCZ, ECLI:EU:C:2018:707, at 30-31; Case C-131/18, 
Vanessa Gambietz v. Erika Ziegler, ECLI:EU:C:2019:306, at 22-25.
157 Case C-83/10, Aurora Sousa Rodríguez and Others v. Air France, ECLI:EU:C:2011:652, at 
38; Joined Cases C-581/10 and C-629/10, Emeka Nelson and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa 
AG (C-581/10), and TUI Travel and Others v. Civil Aviation Authority (C-629/10), ECLI:EU:
C:2012:657, at 59; Case C-354/18, Rusu and Rusu v. SC Blue Air – Airline Management 
Solutions, ECLI:EU:C:2019:637, at 36.
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compensation which must be paid by the carrier on the basis of the regu-
lation.158 According to the Court, the purpose of this provision is to ensure 
that passengers ‘are compensated for the entirety of the damage that they 
have suffered due to the failure of the air carrier to fulfil its contractual obli-
gations’.159 Meanwhile, the same provision determines that the compensa-
tion granted under the regulation ‘may be deducted’ from the compensation 
owed on another legal basis.160 But when should this solution be applied?
The question to consider is whether the applicable rules are aimed 
at repairing the same type of loss. The Court itself has explained that 
the compensation granted under the regulation is aimed at repairing the 
‘inconvenience’ resulting from the ‘loss of time’ suffered by all passengers 
whose flights are delayed.161 The regulation is not aimed at repairing the 
‘individual damage’ of each passenger, which requires an assessment of 
the circumstances of each case.162 If we follow this reasoning and assume 
that the rules are aimed at repairing different types of loss, then surely 
we cannot conclude that the amount of compensation should always be 
adjusted.163 Such a solution would prevent overcompensation in some 
cases, but may lead to undercompensation in other cases.
Indeed, the Court of Justice has recently confirmed that Article 12 (1) 
permits, but does not oblige, the national courts to deduct the compensation 
granted under the regulation from the compensation granted on another 
legal basis.164 Bearing in mind that the purpose of Article 12 (1) is to ensure 
that the entirety of the damage is compensated, it should remain possible, 
158 Art. 4-7, Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation 
and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long 
delay of fl ights, as interpreted in Joined Cases C-402/07 and C-432/07, Sturgeon v. Condor 
Flugdienst, ECLI:EU:C:2009:716.
159 Case C-83/10, Aurora Sousa Rodríguez and Others v. Air France, ECLI:EU:C:2011:652, at 38.
160 Passengers are not, therefore, ‘free to receive double recovery’, as Dempsey & Johansson 
2010, p. 219, observe.
161 Case C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, ECLI:EU:C:2006:10, at 43; Joined Cases C-581/10 and 
C-629/10, Emeka Nelson and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG (C-581/10), and TUI Travel 
and Others v. Civil Aviation Authority (C-629/10), ECLI:EU:C:2012:657, at 51-53.
162 Case C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, ECLI:EU:C:2006:10, at 43; Joined Cases C-581/10 and 
C-629/10, Emeka Nelson and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG (C-581/10), and TUI Travel 
and Others v. Civil Aviation Authority (C-629/10), ECLI:EU:C:2012:657, at 53.
163 This conclusion has also been drawn by Radoševic 2013, p. 106; Van der Bruggen 2016, 
p. 597-599. Doubts have also been expressed by De Vos 2012, p. 173-174.
164 Case C-354/18, Rusu and Rusu v. SC Blue Air – Airline Management Solutions, ECLI:EU:
C:2019:637, at 44-47.
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then, to combine the claims, subject only to the requirement that the 
passenger is not compensated twice for the inconvenience resulting from a 
loss of time.165
6.7 The second exception: exclusive rules
The previous section has demonstrated that, although each rule must be 
considered on its own merits, an election is nonetheless required if the rules 
lead to outcomes which cannot exist concurrently. The underlying reason 
is that the objectives of one rule cannot be realised if the other rule is also 
applied. For the same reason, Union law sometimes dictates that one of 
the rules takes priority, so that no election can be made at all. If the Union 
legislature has intended a particular rule to govern a particular situation 
exhaustively, it should not be possible to avoid the application of this rule 
by relying upon another applicable rule.
Consider the Product Liability Directive as an example. It may be 
remembered that this directive seeks to achieve a ‘complete harmonisa-
tion’ of the strict liability of producers and suppliers for certain damage 
caused by the defective products they have produced or supplied.166 The 
Court has confirmed that it is not possible to change the conditions under 
which these parties can be held strictly liable. Member States may not, for 
instance, provide that damage to an item of property intended and used 
for private use or consumption must always be compensated, because 
the directive itself sets a threshold of EUR 500.167 Member States may 
165 The same solution has been proposed by Van der Bruggen 2016, p. 600-602, who, like 
Dempsey & Johansson 2010, p. 219, considers the compensation granted by the regula-
tion to be part of the total compensation owed on the basis of Art. 19 of the Convention 
for the Unifi cation of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (‘Montreal Conven-
tion’), even though the Court has ruled that the compensation under the regulation 
cannot be qualifi ed as ‘damage occasioned by delay’ within the meaning of Art. 19 of the 
Montreal Convention (see Joined Cases C-581/10 and C-629/10, Emeka Nelson and Others 
v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG (C-581/10), and TUI Travel and Others v. Civil Aviation Autho-
rity (C-629/10), ECLI:EU:C:2012:657, at 49). The relationship between Regulation No 
261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in 
the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of fl ights and the Montreal 
Convention is not examined here, but forms the subject of De Graaff 2014b.
166 Case C-52/00, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:2002:252, at 24; Case C-154/00, Commis-
sion v. Greece, ECLI:EU:C:2002:254, at 20; Case C-402/03, Skov v. Bilka, ECLI:EU:C:2006:6, 
at 23; Case C-127/04, Declan O’Byrne v. Sanofi  Pasteur, ECLI:EU:C:2006:93, at 35; Case 
C-285/08, Leroy Somer v. Dalkia France and Ace Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2009:351, at 21; Case 
C-495/10, Centre hospitalier universitaire de Besançon v. Thomas Dutrueux and Caisse primaire
d’assurance maladie du Jura, ECLI:EU:C:2011:869, at 20; Case C-310/13, Novo Nordisk 
Pharma, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2385, at 23; Case C-621/15, Sanofi  Pasteur and Others, ECLI:EU:
C:2017:484, at 20.
167 Art. 9 (b), Council Directive 85/374/EEC concerning the liability for defective products, 
as interpreted in Case C-52/00, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:2002:252, at 26-35.
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not require the producer to prove that he has taken appropriate steps to 
avert the consequences of a defective product either, if such action is not 
required in order to benefit from the exemptions laid down in the direc-
tive.168 Nor are Member States permitted to provide that a supplier can 
generally be held liable under the same conditions as the producer, because 
the directive deliberately allocates the strict liability for damage caused by 
defective products to producers and only shifts this burden to suppliers in 
exceptional cases.169 Finally, Member States are not permitted to extend the 
limitation period applicable to the right to claim compensation beyond the 
periods provided for under the directive.170
However, directives and regulations aimed at ‘complete harmonisation’ 
do not always have priority. It may be recalled that such instruments may 
leave room for the application of other rules.171 In the present context, it 
must be observed that such rules may even take precedence over a regime 
aimed at complete harmonisation. Consider the UCP Directive, which fully 
harmonises the rules on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices. 
Member States are not permitted, therefore, to depart from the provisions of 
the directive when determining whether a commercial practice is unfair.172 
But Article 3 (4) of the UCP Directive also states:
‘In the case of conflict between the provisions of this Directive and other Com-
munity rules regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices, the latter 
shall prevail and apply to those specific aspects.’173
168 Art. 7 (d) and (e), Council Directive 85/374/EEC concerning the liability for defective 
products, as interpreted in Case C-52/00, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:2002:252, at 
42-48.
169 Art. 3 (3), Council Directive 85/374/EEC concerning the liability for defective prod-
ucts, as interpreted in Case C-52/00, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:2002:252, at 
36-41; Case C-402/03, Skov v. Bilka, ECLI:EU:C:2006:6, at 22-45; Case C-127/04, Declan 
O’Byrne v. Sanofi  Pasteur, ECLI:EU:C:2006:93, at 35-38; Case C-495/10, Centre hospitalier 
universitaire de Besançon v. Thomas Dutrueux and Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie du Jura, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:869, at 24-26.
170 Art. 10, Council Directive 85/374/EEC concerning the liability for defective products, as 
interpreted in Case C-358/08, Aventis Pasteur v. OB, ECLI:EU:C:2009:744, at 37-44.
171 See section 6.5.
172 Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07, VTB-VAB v. Total Belgium (C-261/07) and Galatea 
v. Sanoma Magazines Belgium (C-299/07), ECLI:EU:C:2009:244, at 52-68; Case C-304/08, 
Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs v. Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, ECLI:EU:
C:2010:12, at 41-54; Case C-540/08, Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag & Co. v. 
‘Österreich’-Zeitungsverlag, ECLI:EU:C:2010:660, at 29-41; Case C-288/10, Wamo v. JBC 
and Modemakers Fashion, ECLI:EU:C:2011:443, at 32-40; Case C-206/11, Georg Köck v. 
Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb, ECLI:EU:C:2013:14, at 34-50; Case C-343/12, 
Euronics Belgium v. Kamera Express, ECLI:EU:C:2013:154, at 23-31; Case C-421/12, Commis-
sion v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2064, at 55-78; Case C-295/16, Europamur Alimentación, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:782, at 39-43.
173 Art. 3 (4), Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market.
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Surely this statement should not be taken to mean that other Union rules 
must always be applied at the expense of the UCP Directive. To begin with, 
Article 3 (4) only applies when other Union rules govern ‘specific aspects 
of unfair commercial practices’. Consider the Universal Services Directive 
as an example. This directive determines the information which must be 
inserted in a contract concluded between a consumer and an electronic 
communications services provider and gives the consumer the power to 
withdraw from the contract when the conditions change.174 The directive 
does not, however, determine that non-compliance with these information 
requirements constitutes an unfair commercial practice. What is more, the 
provisions of the directive apply ‘without prejudice to Community rules 
on consumer protection’.175 For these reasons, the Court has determined 
that the Universal Services Directive does not regulate ‘specific aspects’ 
of unfair commercial practices. If the facts of the case fall within the scope 
of the Universal Services Directive, the UCP Directive may nonetheless be 
applicable.176
What is more, Article 3 (4) merely determines that ‘specific’ rules shall 
prevail where they ‘conflict’ with the UCP Directive. In the view of the 
Court, the term ‘conflict’ indicates that there must be a ‘divergence which 
cannot be overcome by a unifying formula enabling both situations to exist 
alongside each other’.177 In principle, then, the specific rules should be 
applied cumulatively with the provisions of the UCP Directive, provided 
that the necessary conditions have been fulfilled.178 In accordance with 
this principle, the Court has tried to realise the objectives underlying the 
UCP Directive and the Directive concerning the advertising of medicinal 
products to the greatest possible extent.179 Even though the Court quali-
fied the first directive as the lex generalis and the second directive as the 
lex specialis,180 it also observed that the directives have a ‘complementary 
174 Art. 20 (2)-(4), Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive).
175 Art. 20 (1), Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to elec-
tronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive).
176 Joined Cases C-54/17 and C-55/17, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v. Wind 
Tre (C-54/17) and Vodafone Italia (C-55/17), ECLI:EU:C:2018:710, at 65-70.
177 Joined Cases C-54/17 and C-55/17, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v. 
Wind Tre (C-54/17) and Vodafone Italia (C-55/17), ECLI:EU:C:2018:710, at 60, referring to 
Opinion A-G Campos Sánchez-Bordona, Joined Cases C-54/17 and C-55/17, Autorità 
Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v. Wind Tre (C-54/17) and Vodafone Italia (C-55/17), 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:377, at 124 and 126.
178 Also observed by Keirsbilck 2011, p. 173-195.
179 Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human 
use.
180 Joined Cases C-544/13 and C-545/13, Abcur v. Apoteket and Farmaci, ECLI:EU:C:2015:481, 
at 80.
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nature’.181 After all, the Union legislature itself has determined that a 
commercial practice may be qualified as misleading, and hence as ‘unfair’ 
within the meaning of the UCP Directive,182 if the specific rules concerning 
the advertising of medicinal products have not been complied with.183
According to the Court, a conflict is present only when the ‘specific’ 
rules impose obligations upon undertakings ‘which are incompatible with 
(…) Directive 2005/29’ and leave them ‘no margin of discretion’ at all.184 
This was the case with the information requirements concerning the energy 
consumption of products. Before the Antwerp Commercial Court, the 
company Dyson had complained that its competitor BSH had not accurately 
informed consumers about the efficiency of its vacuum cleaners. Dyson 
argued that BSH should have provided consumers with information on the 
conditions under which the products had been tested in order to determine 
their efficiency. BSH replied that it had merely followed the Union rules 
governing energy labelling, which did not require such testing conditions to 
be mentioned.185 Indeed, the Court confirmed that these Union rules govern 
‘specific aspects’ of unfair commercial practices186 and that they establish 
‘an exhaustive list of information’ which must be brought to the attention of 
consumers.187 No additional information requirements may be imposed on 
the basis of the UCP Directive.188
What if a particular situation has not been exhaustively regulated by the 
Union legislature? It may be recalled that, in such situations, the Member 
States are permitted to go beyond the requirements introduced at the 
European level. The discretion granted to them is not, however, unlimited. 
Member States must, in any event, ensure the level of protection prescribed 
181 Joined Cases C-544/13 and C-545/13, Abcur v. Apoteket and Farmaci, ECLI:EU:C:2015:481, 
at 78, referring to Opinion A-G Szpunar, Joined Cases C-544/13 and C-545/13, Abcur v. 
Apoteket and Farmaci, ECLI:EU:C:2015:136, at 61.
182 Art. 7 in conjunction with Art. 5 (4) (a), Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-
to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market.
183 Joined Cases C-544/13 and C-545/13, Abcur v. Apoteket and Farmaci, ECLI:EU:C:2015:481, 
at 78. The Court refers to Art. 7 (5), Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices in the internal market, which determines that informa-
tion requirements fl owing from Union law in relation to commercial communication 
‘shall be regarded as material’. In Annex II, which contains a non-exhaustive list of 
such requirements, reference is made to Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code 
relating to medicinal products for human use.
184 Joined Cases C-54/17 and C-55/17, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v. Wind 
Tre (C-54/17) and Vodafone Italia (C-55/17), ECLI:EU:C:2018:710, at 61.
185 Directive 2010/30/EU on the indication by labelling and standard product informa-
tion of the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products, 
and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 665/2013 supplementing Directive 
2010/30/EU with regard to energy labelling of vacuum cleaners. The current framework 
is established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1369 setting a framework for energy labelling.
186 Case C-632/16, Dyson v. BSH Home Appliances, ECLI:EU:C:2018:599, at 33.
187 Case C-632/16, Dyson v. BSH Home Appliances, ECLI:EU:C:2018:599, at 44.
188 Case C-632/16, Dyson v. BSH Home Appliances, ECLI:EU:C:2018:599, at 46.
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by the directive or regulation at issue.189 And if they adopt or retain more 
protective rules, these rules must still comply with the rules belonging to 
the body of primary Union law.190 In practice, this means that the defendant 
may argue that the national rule upon which the claimant relies must be set 
aside because it is contrary to treaty provisions pertaining to, for instance, 
the prohibition of discrimination191 or the free movement of workers, the 
freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services.192
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the relationship between rules originating from 
harmonising measures and the relationship between these measures and 
otherwise applicable national laws. In this context, it is generally assumed 
that harmonising measures introduce uniform legal regimes embracing all 
the Member States and replace or exclude otherwise applicable laws. This 
chapter has aimed to provide a more complete and nuanced account of the 
relationship between these rules.
A careful assessment of the statements made by the Union legislature 
and by the Court of Justice of the European Union has shown that the 
existence of one rule does not, in principle, affect the scope of application 
of another rule. On the contrary, the assumption is that each rule must 
be assessed independently and that no rule should be excluded from the 
outset. The Union legislature has regularly expressed itself in favour of this 
assumption by holding explicitly that the adoption of a directive or regula-
tion shall not affect the scope of application of other harmonising measures 
and national laws. The Court, for its part, strives to realise the objectives 
underlying each rule to the greatest possible extent. In the absence of 
express statements by the Union legislature, the Court assumes that each 
rule ought to have its intended legal effect. Accordingly, rules may be appli-
cable concurrently if the conditions of each rule have been established.
189 See e.g., in the context of Council Directive 87/102/EEC concerning consumer credit, 
Case C-429/05, Max and Marie-Jeanne Rampion v. Franfi nance, ECLI:EU:C:2007:575, at 47; 
Case C-76/10, Pohotovosť v. Iveta Korčkovská, ECLI:EU:C:2010:685, at 66.
190 E.g. Case C-322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband, ECLI:EU:C:2003:664, at 64; Case 
C-205/07, Lodewijk Gysbrechts v. Santurel Inter BVBA, ECLI:EU:C:2008:730, at 34, both 
concerning the interpretation of Art. 14 (1), Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts. See also Case C-265/12, Citroën 
Belux v. FvF, ECLI:EU:C:2013:498, at 31, concerning the interpretation of Art. 3 (9), Direc-
tive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the 
internal market.
191 Laid down in Art. 18 TFEU, protected as a fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Charter 
and recognised as general principle of Union law. See supra sections 4.3 and 5.2.
192 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:
772, at 33, with references to earlier case law. See supra section 4.3.
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This does not mean that concurrently applicable rules will always 
coexist peacefully. This chapter has shown that an exce ption must be made 
when cumulative application would lead to inconsistent outcomes. In such 
situations, an election between the available alternatives is required. The 
underlying reason is that the objectives of one rule cannot be realised if 
the other rule is also applied. For the same reason, Union law sometimes 
dictates that one of the rules applies exclusively, so that no election can be 
made at all. If the Union legislature has intended a particular rule to govern 
a particular situation exhaustively, it should not be possible to avoid the 
application of this rule. 
Meanwhile, it is clear that the existence of alternative and exclusive 
rules is an exception which requires justification. The applicability of one 
rule is only affected by another rule to the extent that this is necessary in 
order to realise the intentions of the Union legislature. Rules with a higher 
constitutional rank do not, therefore, automatically exclude the application 
of rules lower down the hierarchy. Nor do measures aimed at achieving 
‘complete harmonisation’ automatically replace other rules, originating 
from harmonising measures or from the applicable national law.
It flows from the foregoing that the party concerned – usually the 
claimant – may rely on the most advantageous rule – usually a specific 
cause of action – unless the rules are incompatible or one of them applies 
exclusively. We have seen that the benefit of this choice may nonetheless be 
affected, because the content of one rule might affect the content of another 
rule. The existence of an unfair commercial practice may, for instance, be 
taken into account when assessing the unfairness of contractual terms. This 
does not mean that the rules are identical in all respects, nor that one of the 
rules is swallowed up by the other. The rules continue to exist side by side, 
in accordance with the principle that the objectives underlying each rule 
should be realised to the greatest possible extent.
7  General Conclusion
7.1 Concurrence all over the place
Private relationships are governed by many different rules, ranging from 
open-textured standards of general application to detailed rules aimed at 
specific situations. These rules originate from various sources of law. They 
are embedded in the national systems of private law, each with their own 
features and preferences.1 But private relationships are also, and increas-
ingly so, governed by the rules of the European Union. These rules are 
contained in binding agreements concluded by the Member States, such 
as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. Some rules have been developed by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union as part of the unwritten body of Union law. 
And many rules have their origins in directives and regulations governing 
areas as diverse as social policy, consumer protection, competition law, 
transport, public health, and the internal market more broadly.2
In this multi-level legal order, it is not unusual for a single set of facts 
to fall within the ambit of multiple Union rules nor is it uncommon that, on 
the face of it, national laws may provide protection as well. Such a concur-
rence of rules does not give rise to problems as long as their application 
produces the same outcome. We have seen, however, that the rules may 
vary in important ways, both in terms of their conditions and in terms of 
their consequences, which may lead to different outcomes. In such situ-
ations, the question that arises is whether the law permits the interested 
party to elect the rule of his choice. This question can only be answered by 
considering the relationship between the underlying rules. Does one legal 
rule affect the scope of application of another legal rule? Can the rules be 
applied cumulatively, or must one of them be excluded in favour of the 
other? Does the law permit a choice between the rules?
If we wish to find the appropriate answers to these questions, it is 
important to first specify which categories of rules we are focusing on. 
Indeed, this has been the first leg of our journey.3 Carrying out this task 
required us to steer a middle course between the categories used within 
the national legal systems and the categories used within the Union legal 
1 Section 1.2.
2 Section 4.2.
3 Sections 1.3 and 2.2-2.3.
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order.4 Given the ultimate objective of this book, which is to examine 
whether the scheme of analysis conceived and fostered in the context of the 
national systems of private law can be valued as a source of understanding 
of the laws of the European Union, we have not pressed the whole of the 
law into the moulds of one of the existing systems of private law. Although 
the book does examine Dutch, English, French and German law, we have 
not chosen one of these systems as our leading model. The aim to achieve 
an autonomous interpretation has not, however, led us to adopt uncritically 
the vocabulary used by the Union legislature and by the Court of Justice 
either. We have tried to avoid using indiscriminate ‘rights and duties’-talk 
where possible and have instead sought to inform the reader, as accurately 
as appropriate in the context of this book, about the kinds of rights and 
duties we are focusing on.
To this end, we have taken advantage of the works of Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld (1879-1918). In line with his structure of correlatives, we have used 
the term claim to refer to rules which entitle a person to some performance 
from another person. Prominent examples include the claim for specific 
performance and the claim for compensation. We have used a different term 
– power – to refer to the capacity of a person to unilaterally create, modify or 
extinguish a legal position or relationship, and so to create, modify or extin-
guish claims and powers. The examples which have been discussed include 
the termination of a contract for breach and the rescission of a contract for 
pre-contractual misrepresentation. In line with Hohfeld’s guiding thesis 
– legal problems can only be understood in terms of legal relations – we 
have also paid attention to the rules beneficial to the persons affected by 
the enforcement of a claim and the exercise of a power. They may be able 
to contest the proposition that a valid claim or power exists by relying, for 
instance, on grounds of justification and exemption. We have used the term 
defence to refer to these rules.5
This book has shown that current Union law contains a great number 
of claims, powers, and defences. Private conduct may, under certain 
circumstances, be assessed against the general prohibition of discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality, against certain free movement provisions, 
and against competition rules. In fact, the Court of Justice has worked out 
several claims in great detail. The claim for compensation in respect of 
losses resulting from infringements of EU competition law is well-known. 
Recently, the Court has also developed two claims on the basis of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: the claim for an allowance in lieu of annual 
leave not taken upon termination of the employment relationship, and the 
claim for compensation for losses resulting from unequal treatment.6
4 Sections 1.2-1.3.
5 Sections 1.3 and 2.3.
6 Section 4.3.
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As far as secondary Union law is concerned, this book has provided 
an overview of the directives and regulations which enable individuals to 
claim some form of performance from another individual, such as specific 
performance and monetary compensation. In addition, several directives 
and regulations enable individuals to create, modify or extinguish a legal 
position or relationship. The power of the consumer to withdraw from a 
contract is a case in point. Adopting the angle of view of the person affected, 
the book has also shown that Union law provides individuals with a range 
of defences, such as the state-of-the-art defence against a claim for compensa-
tion in respect of losses caused by a defective product and the passing-on 
defence against a claim for compensation in respect of losses resulting from 
an infringement of competition law.7
7.2 Fundamental assumptions challenged
The relationship between these claims, powers, and defences is often 
explained and understood on the basis of three fundamental assumptions: 
Union laws have precedence over national laws, harmonising measures 
replace national laws, and specific rules have priority over general rules.8 
What these assumptions have in common is that precedence is given to one 
of the rules on the basis of a formal criterion. This book has questioned this 
approach and has submitted that the substance of the rules should be taken 
into account, and not merely their formal relationship.
Consider the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali, well-known in the 
systems of private law and Union law alike. Many lawyers contend that 
a specific rule should prevail over a general rule if both relate to the same 
subject matter. However, this book has warned that this maxim is not self-
evident. To begin with, the maxim can only be relied upon when one rule 
is really general and another rule is truly specific. It is submitted that this is 
only the case when the specific rule contains all the elements of the general 
rule and at least one additional element. In other words, the general rule 
must embrace all the cases falling within the scope of the specific rule, but 
the specific rule may not embrace all the cases falling within the scope of 
the general rule. If the differences between the rules cur both ways, it is 
impossible to generally qualify one of them as the lex specialis and the other 
as the lex generalis.9
The latter point has been illustrated by examining the relationship 
between Article 18 TFEU and the provisions governing the free movement 
of persons and services in more detail. It is generally assumed that Article 
18 TFEU is the lex generalis and that the free movement provisions must be 
7 Section 4.4.
8 Section 1.1.
9 Sections 2.4, 5.2.4, 6.3, and 6.7.
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considered leges speciales. And it is true that the Court of Justice has repeat-
edly held that the general prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of 
nationality has been given ‘specific expression’ by these free movement 
provisions, and has added that the violation of one of these free movement 
rights implies that Article 18 TFEU has been violated too.10 However, this 
book has argued that Article 18 TFEU cannot be characterised as the all-
embracing lex generalis anymore. The reason is that the Court of Justice has 
replaced the concept of discrimination with the broader concept of restric-
tion in the context of the law of free movement,11 but has so far refused to 
adopt the same approach in the context of Article 18 TFEU.12 It is against 
this backdrop that we have argued that the free movement provisions can 
no longer be considered the leges speciales as compared with the general 
prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality. Not every 
restriction of free movement is governed by Article 18 TFEU anymore.
But even if a general rule does embrace all the cases falling within the 
scope of a specific rule, there is really no compelling reason why the specific 
rule should automatically trump the application of the general rule. The 
overlap can be considered harmless if the specific rule merely complements 
the general rule. We have seen, for instance, that the directives regulating 
specific aspects of unfair commercial practices complement the general 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, so that both may be applicable to 
a single set of facts.13 An exception must be made, however, when general 
and specific rules conflict. In such situations, one of the rules should be 
excluded in order to do justice to the objectives underlying the other rule. 
Whether that is the case, and whether the specific or the general rule should 
then prevail, is a question of interpretation which must be answered by 
considering the substantive importance of the rules at issue, in the light of 
the circumstances of each individual case.14
Likewise, we should avoid jumping to the conclusion that Union law 
sets aside otherwise applicable national laws. It must be stressed at once 
that this book has not questioned the capacity of Union law to produce this 
effect. In fact, we have paid much attention to the exclusionary effects of 
Union law. However, the book has also warned that Union rules do not 
automatically trump rules lower down the hierarchy. The principle of 
primacy is essentially a rule of conflict. It does tell us which law must have 
priority in the event of conflicts, but it does not tell us how we should deter-
mine whether a conflict actually exists. This is a question of interpretation 
which cannot be answered by merely referring to the formal relationship 





14 Sections 2.4, 5.2.5, 6.3, and 6.7.
15 Section 4.5.
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Equally, we should proceed with caution when determining the rela-
tionship between the directives and regulations adopted by the Union 
legislature and otherwise applicable laws. It cannot be denied, of course, 
that these harmonising measures aim to introduce a uniform legal regime 
embracing all the Member States. But this does not mean that these 
measures necessarily replace or exclude otherwise applicable laws. This 
book has shown that the scope of application of directives and regulations 
is limited, because the competence of the Union is limited and because the 
Union legislature does not regulate all issues exhaustively. Sometimes, the 
very treaty provision upon which the competence of the Union legislature 
is based prescribes that any harmonising measure can only ever establish 
minimum requirements. In many other instances, the wording, meaning 
and purpose of the directive or regulation itself must be examined in order 
to determine the extent by which the Union legislature has actually exer-
cised its competence to legislate.16
7.3 A shared scheme of analysis
How should we, then, establish whether the law permits the interested 
party to elect the rule of his choice? Inspired by the experiences gained from 
examining several national systems of private law, this book has offered a 
method of interpretation which can be used to answer this question. Indeed, 
one of our conclusions is that the systems of private law which have been 
considered – Dutch, English, French, and German law – share a scheme of 
analysis by which questions of concurrence can be debated and solved.17
In accordance with this scheme, the existence of one rule does not, in 
principle, affect the scope of application of another rule. The underlying 
reason is that the objectives of each rule should be realised to the greatest 
possible extent. It is assumed, therefore, that each rule ought to have its 
intended legal effect if the necessary elements have been established. It 
flows from this reasoning that concurrently applicable rules may be applied 
cumulatively as soon as the conditions of each rule have been established. 
We have seen that lawyers from different jurisdictions refer to this solution 
with the terms ‘cumulation’ and ‘combination’. Indeed, they start from the 
premise that claims, powers, and defences can be accumulated if the party 
concerned so wishes.
However, rules cannot always coexist peacefully. This book has shown 
that an exception must be made when cumulative application would lead 
to inconsistent outcomes. The underlying reason is that the objectives of one 
rule cannot be realised if the other rule is also applied. One simply cannot 
blow hot and cold. It may be recalled, for instance, that it is impossible 
16 Sections 4.5, 6.2-6.5.
17 Section 2.5.
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to combine termination for breach and specific performance of the same 
contract. As termination means that the duty to perform the obligations 
under the contract ceases to exist, the exercise of this power implies that 
specific performance of these obligations cannot be claimed anymore. In 
such situations, an election between the alternatives is required. Lawyers 
from different jurisdictions refer to this situation with terms such as 
‘option’, ‘alternativity’, and ‘election’.
These examples indicate that another persistent theme runs through this 
scheme of analysis. In principle, it is up to the party concerned to rely upon 
the rule of his choice, be it a claim, a power, or a defence. Even if the rules 
cannot be applied concurrently, because this would lead to inconsistent 
outcomes, the law permits the party concerned to make an election. One 
reason why the law does not impose a choice may be that it is impossible to 
generally qualify one of the rules as more advantageous to the claimant or 
defendant, precisely because the conditions and consequences of each rule 
differ. But we can also think of another, more fundamental explanation. It is 
for reasons of party autonomy that the law does not, and should not, decide 
which rule must be applied. In principle, it is up to the person concerned to 
opt for the rule which appears to him to be the most advantageous.
We have seen that the benefit of this choice may nonetheless be affected, 
because the content of one rule might influence the content of another rule. 
Standards applicable in one context may be adopted in another context, 
and time limits restricting the enforcement of one right may also restrict 
the enforcement of another right. It may be recalled that this technique 
has been used by the supreme courts in all the jurisdictions under consid-
eration. Rather than excluding one of the applicable rules altogether, the 
courts prefer to adjust their respective scopes of application. They permit 
the claimant to benefit from the application of the rule of his choice, but 
also take into account the arguments put forward by the defendant, even 
if the rules belong to a different legal regime. This does not mean that the 
rules are identical in all respects, nor that one of the rules is swallowed up 
by the other. The rules continue to exist side by side, in accordance with the 
principle that the objectives underlying each rule should be realised to the 
greatest possible extent.18
Sometimes, however, the law does dictate that one of the rules takes 
priority, so that no election can be made at all. If the legislature has intended 
a particular rule to govern a particular situation exhaustively, it should not 
be possible to avoid the application of this rule by relying upon another 
rule. Lawyers from different jurisdictions refer to this situation with terms 
such as ‘exclusivity’ and ‘exclusion’. Their writings indicate that this solu-
tion is applied with great restraint. A total rejection of concurrence is consid-
ered to be an unnecessarily blunt instrument. The applicability of one rule 
is only affected by another rule to the extent that this is necessary in order 
18 Section 2.5.
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to do justice to the intentions of the legislature. Our analysis shows that the 
courts tend to reduce the restrictions imposed by the prioritised rule to a 
minimum and retain as much of the other rule as possible.
Of course, every case may spark a debate about whether the law 
permits a choice between the rules. The outcome may differ depending 
on the content of the rules and the structure of the legal system. This book 
has illustrated this point by discussing a classic example: the relationship 
between the laws of contract and tort.19 How to explain that only French 
courts generally exclude the possibility to claim in tort if the damage 
is caused by or related to the performance, or non-performance, of a 
contractual obligation? It may be recalled that this choice has not only been 
made out of a genuine concern for the freedom of contract and the will of 
the legislature, but also to protect contracting parties against the general 
strict liability for things conceived and fostered by the courts themselves. 
Likewise, the German, Dutch and English courts have sought to offer 
contracting parties additional protection on the basis of the law of tort when 
the law of contract appeared to be too rigid.
The example shows that a legal problem which appears, on the face of it, 
to be the same may turn out to have a different nature and scope in different 
jurisdictions. It is submitted that this finding does not call into question our 
scheme of analysis as such. Rather, the example illustrates that questions of 
concurrence are questions of interpretation which may be answered differ-
ently, depending on the scope and structure of the relevant rules.
7.4 Understanding the laws of the European Union
Can this scheme of analysis, conceived and fostered within the systems 
of private law, be valued as a source of understanding of the laws of the 
European Union? This was the principal question which this book aimed to 
answer. To this end, the book has carefully examined the statements issued 
by the Union legislature and by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
about the availability of the claims, powers, and defences relevant to private 
parties. Can we see the same principles at work?
We have seen that the conduct of individuals which falls within the 
scope of Union law is, in principle, subject to all the requirements flowing 
from the treaty provisions pertaining to non-discrimination, free movement 
of persons and services, and competition law.20 In fact, a host of judgments 
shows that the applicability of one treaty provision does not, in principle, 
affect the scope of application of another treaty provision. The Court has 
made clear, for instance, that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are not mutually 
exclusive, but complementary.21 Likewise, the Court has determined that 
19 Chapter 3.
20 Sections 5.2.4 and 5.4.3.
21 Section 5.3.5.
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the scope of application of the provisions governing the free movement of 
persons and services is not affected by the rules in the area of competition, 
and vice versa.22 It is against this backdrop that we may conclude that the 
Court proceeds from the assumption that the rules of primary Union law 
may be applicable concurrently, provided, of course, that the necessary 
conditions have been fulfilled.
The same theme runs through the body of secondary Union law. We 
have seen that the Union legislature regularly confirms that the adoption 
of a directive or regulation shall not affect the scope of application of other 
harmonising measures. This book has shown that such explicit statements 
play an important role once a legal dispute must be resolved. They form a 
reason for the Court of Justice to assume that each rule must be assessed 
independently and that no rule should be excluded in advance.23 In fact, the 
Court has made clear that the scope of application of one rule will only be 
affected by another rule if this is clearly provided by the Union legislature. 
In the absence of express indications on the part of the Union legislature, the 
conclusion must be that each rule ought to have its intended legal effect.24 
It flows from this reasoning that harmonised rules may, in principle, be 
applicable concurrently if their respective conditions have been established.
This book has submitted that this principle does not only apply when 
the relationship between rules originating from harmonising measures must 
be determined, but also when the relationship between these measures 
and otherwise applicable national laws must be determined. After all, 
the competence of the Union to legislate is restricted by the Treaties and 
the Union legislature does not regulate all issues exhaustively. In fact, we 
have seen that many directives and regulations are only aimed at so-called 
‘minimum’ harmonisation, which means that Member States may adopt 
or retain a higher level of protection in their national legal systems. This 
book has shown that this regulatory technique leaves considerable room 
for the application of claims, powers, and defences based on the applicable 
national law.25
An examination of the substance of the rules involved should also be 
conducted if the directives and regulations aim at a ‘complete’ harmonisa-
tion of the laws of the Member States. These harmonising measures are also 
limited in scope. They might exhaustively regulate some issues, but they 
cannot be wholly autonomous and self-contained. The Product Liability 
Directive, for instance, fully harmonises the strict liability of producers and 
sellers, but still leaves considerable room for the application of national 
systems of contractual and non-contractual liability. Likewise, the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive, the Consumer Credit Directive, the 






newly introduced Directive concerning contracts for the supply of digital 
content and digital services generally prohibit Member States to depart 
from their respective provisions, but also leave important issues to the 
applicable national law, such as the rules on the validity, formation or effect 
of a contract.26 Rather than assuming that measures aimed at ‘complete’ 
harmonisation exclude otherwise applicable national laws, we should, 
therefore, start from the premise that each rule, however founded, must be 
considered on its own terms.
This does not mean that concurrently applicable rules will always 
coexist peacefully. As is the case in the national systems of private law, 
an exception must be made when cumulative application would lead to 
inconsistent outcomes. On the basis of a host of examples derived from 
various harmonising measures, we may conclude that it is impossible, also 
as a matter of Union law, to combine termination for breach and specific 
performance of the same contract. In such situations, Union law requires an 
election between the available alternatives. The underlying reason is that 
the objectives of one rule cannot be realised if the other rule is also applied. 
It is submitted that this is generally not the case when a single set of facts 
falls within the scope of multiple liability rules. Of course, the claimant 
should not be able to recover double damages for the same loss. But there is 
no need to force the claimant to make an election, because most differences 
can be bridged at the stage of assessing the quantum of damages.27
It flows from the foregoing that the party concerned should, in prin-
ciple, be free to elect the rule which appears to him to be the most advan-
tageous. Consider, for instance, the case of anticompetitive contractual 
arrangements entered into by undertakings which together hold a domi-
nant position on the relevant market. It will be remembered that Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU are complementary, not mutually exclusive.28 We may 
safely assume, therefore, that the aggrieved party may have a good claim 
for compensation against the dominant undertakings with respect to any 
of the infringements, provided that there is a causal relationship between 
the infringement in question and the harm suffered. It is readily arguable, 
then, that this party will have a choice to claim compensation for any of the 
infringements, subject only to a prohibition of double recovery of the same 
losses.29
As is the case in the national systems of private law, the content of one 
rule might affect the content of another rule. For instance, the nature and 
terms of an anti-competitive agreement may support the conclusion that 
a collective dominant position exists. We have also seen that the fact that 
certain conduct does not appreciably restrict competition under Article 






Article 102 TFEU either.30 Likewise, the existence of an unfair commercial 
practice within the meaning of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
may be taken into account when assessing the unfairness of contractual 
terms within the meaning of the Unfair Terms Directive.31 This does not, 
however, mean that one of the rules is excluded. Any solution must be 
found through an interpretation of the rule at issue and cannot, therefore, 
ignore the outer limits of that legal framework. Indeed, our analysis shows 
that the Court of Justice favours a convergent interpretation of concurrently 
applicable rules where possible, but is also careful not to conflate the legal 
texts.
Sometimes, Union law does dictate that one rule takes priority, so that 
no election can be made at all. If the drafters of the Treaties or the Union 
legislature have intended a particular rule to govern a particular situation 
exhaustively, it should not be possible to avoid the application of this rule 
by relying upon another rule. Within the body of primary Union law, the 
relationship between the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of nationality and the free movement provisions governing persons and 
services provides a case in point. It may be recalled that we have argued 
that Article 18 TFEU cannot, in all situations, be considered the lex generalis 
and that the free movement provisions cannot, in all situations, be consid-
ered the leges speciales.32 However, the book has also shown that if the facts 
do fall within the scope of application of one of the free movement provi-
sions, the Court of Justice tends to assess the case only in the light of these 
provisions. To that extent, the scope of application of Article 18 TFEU is 
affected by the free movement provisions.33
The book has also demonstrated that it is not possible to avoid the appli-
cation of a rule adopted by the Union legislature if this rule exhaustively 
regulates a certain situation of fact. It may be remembered, for instance, 
that the Product Liability Directive fully harmonises the strict liability of 
producers and sellers. In the view of the Court, it is not possible, therefore, 
to change the conditions under which these parties can be held strictly 
liable. Several other directives, such as the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive, the Consumer Credit Directive, the Consumer Rights Directive, 
and the revised Consumer Sales Directive, also prohibit Member States to 
depart from their respective provisions.34
Such statements should not, however, lead the reader to believe that the 
discretion granted to Member States by harmonising measures which aim 
at providing a ‘minimum’ level of protection is unlimited. Member States 
must, in any event, ensure the effectiveness of the directive or regulation 







have to comply with the rules belonging to the body of primary Union 
law. From the perspective of the individuals involved, this means that the 
rule upon which one of them relies may be set aside if it is contrary to the 
treaty provisions governing, for instance, the free movement of persons and 
services.35
In conclusion, our enquiry into the statements issued by the Union 
legislature and by the Court of Justice has revealed that the scheme of anal-
ysis, conceived and fostered within the systems of private law, can indeed 
be valued as a source of understanding of the laws of the European Union. 
In accordance with this scheme, we should start from the premise that 
each applicable rule, however founded, should be realised to the greatest 
possible extent. In principle, then, each rule ought to have its intended 
legal effect once the necessary conditions have been established. It flows 
from this reasoning that the party concerned should have a free choice as 
to which rule to rely upon. Two exceptions must be made, however. Union 
law requires an election between the available alternatives if cumulative 
application would lead to inconsistent outcomes which cannot exist concur-
rently. And sometimes Union law prescribes that one of the rules applies 
exclusively, so that no election can be made at all. The foregoing indicates 
that these exceptions are not self-evident, but can only be accepted after a 
careful enquiry into the wording, meaning and purpose of the provisions 
at issue.
7.5 Lessons learned and questions raised
This book started with the observation that scholars of private law and 
Union law tend to view the structure of the legal system from different 
angles. Many jurists specialised in private law, especially continental 
scholars, are thinking in terms of the institutional model inherited from 
Roman jurists. They seek to understand the world of persons and things, 
and the relations between them. By contrast, many scholars specialised in 
Union law are thinking in terms of the vertical structure of the legal order 
conceptualised by Hans Kelsen. For them, the core question is whether a 
rule, laid down by national law or Union law, can be validated, ultimately, 
by the constituent Treaties and by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.36
We have tried to find a middle ground between these two ultimate 
positions. Inspired by the works of Hohfeld, we have focused on the legal 
relations between individuals and not on the institutional or hierarchical 
structure of the legal system as a whole. This book has demonstrated that 
Hohfeld’s structure of correlatives can be used as a foundation for a more 




the laws of the European Union. By providing a comprehensive overview 
of the claims, powers, and defences currently available as a matter of 
Union law, the book has shown that the impact of Union law on the legal 
relationships between individuals is profound. Our analysis confirms the 
trend, already observed in previous research, that the private enforcement 
of Union law is increasingly governed by Union law itself.37
If we wish to understand the relationship between these claims, 
powers, and defences, we should use a method of interpretation crafted 
with private relationships in mind. Inspired by the experiences gained from 
examining several national systems of private law, this book has offered 
a scheme of analysis which can be used to this end. Our inquiry into the 
statements issued by the Union legislature and by the Court of Justice has 
demonstrated that this scheme can be valued as a source of understanding 
of the laws of the European Union. The scheme accepts and accommodates 
the situations in which Union laws replace or exclude national laws, and 
the situations in which specific rules set aside rules more general in scope. 
Crucially, the scheme also absorbs the many situations in which rules do 
apply concurrently and provides a model by which the questions which 
may arise as a result of their overlap can be debated and solved. It is 
submitted that this scheme provides a complete and nuanced account of the 
impact of the laws of the European Union on private relationships, and of 
their interaction with the national systems of legal protection.
These findings are relevant to scholars and practitioners of private law 
and Union law alike. For them, it is important to understand how questions 
of concurrence are debated and solved. Practitioners, for instance, should 
be aware of the principle that the objectives underlying each rule should 
be realised to the greatest possible extent. It is against this backdrop that 
they should carefully examine all the legal possibilities before advising their 
clients, filing their court documents and drafting their decisions. For legisla-
tive lawyers, it is particularly important to be aware of the fact that a rule 
will generally only be excluded if an express derogation to that effect has 
been inserted in the legislative texts or if the overall meaning and purpose 
of the provisions at issue necessitate this conclusion. In the light of these 
findings, it is advised that the relationship with other legislative instru-
ments is considered carefully when preparing legislative proposals.
Our findings may also be of interest for those participating in the 
ongoing debate about the nature of the Union legal order. It may be 
recalled that the Court of Justice has consistently held that the precedence 
of Union law is ultimately based on and limited by the founding Treaties 
of the Union. We have also noticed that this position has been challenged 
by a great number of supreme and constitutional courts. In their view, the 
precedence of Union law is ultimately based on and limited by the national 
37 See e.g. Dougan 2011, p. 430 and 435-437; Wilman 2016, p. 890-896; Ackermann 2018, 
p. 758-763; De Graaff & Verheij 2019.
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constitutions.38 The Lisbon Treaty has contributed little to the resolution of 
this conflict, because the primacy of Union law was dealt with in a separate 
Declaration and not in the text of the Treaty itself.39 And so the question as 
to who is to decide the ultimate boundaries of Union competences remains 
contentious, even though some authors try to calm the feelings by pointing 
out that, in practice, the Court of Justice and the national courts rarely 
deliver conflicting judgments.40
Not only has the precedence of Union rules over conflicting national 
rules been broadly accepted by the national courts, this book has shown 
that such conflicts are not as common as might be imagined. In practice, 
Union rules and national rules will often be applicable concurrently to a 
single set of facts without creating any conflicts whatsoever. In fact, we 
have found few examples of rules producing inconsistent outcomes. And 
even if the outcomes do differ, so that an election is required, we have seen 
that it will principally be up to the party concerned to rely upon the rule of 
his choice.41 What is more, our findings confirm that the exclusive applica-
tion of Union law can only be accepted on the basis of an inquiry into the 
wording, meaning and purpose of the provisions at issue. When viewed 
from the perspective of the individuals involved, therefore, the exclusion of 
one of the concurrently applicable rules appears to be the exception rather 
than the rule.42
Another point may be added. A large part of this book has been devoted 
to the legal reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union, a topic 
which has received considerable scholarly attention over the past decades. 
Several authors have submitted that the Court tends to expand rather than 
restrict the scope of application of Union law.43 Beck, for instance, has 
argued that the Court suffers from a ‘communautaire predisposition’, caused 
by the vague expressions and sweeping mission statements inserted into 
the Union legal texts.44 In his view, it is ‘more likely than not that the Court 
will adopt a communautaire solution to the question it has been asked’.45 Our 
findings point in a different direction. We have seen that the Court leaves 
considerable room to the laws of the Member States, also when the Union 
legislature has not explicitly stated that the harmonising measure at issue 
is aimed at providing only a ‘minimum’ level of protection.46 And even if 
the Union legislature has aimed at achieving a ‘complete’ harmonisation, 
national laws are only excluded by the Court if they clearly touch upon 
38 Section 4.5.
39 Declaration No. 17 concerning primacy.
40 See e.g. De Búrca 2012, p. 454-455.
41 Section 6.6.
42 Section 6.7.
43 Bredimas 1978, p. 179; Rasmussen 1986, p. 561; Conway 2012, p. 21-50.
44 Beck 2012, p. 437.
45 Beck 2012, p. 330.
46 Section 6.5.
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the topics which have been exhaustively regulated by the harmonisation 
scheme at issue.47 When measured against the canon of interpretative 
techniques used by the supreme courts of the Member States, the approach 
adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union does not seem to be 
overly activistic.
This book also raises a number of broader questions. We have examined 
the judgments delivered by the General Court and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in order to discover how Union law answers the questions 
of concurrence raised.48 National courts also play an important role within 
the Union judicial system. As organs of the Member States, they are under 
a duty to apply Union law in its entirety and to protect the rights which it 
confers on individuals.49 From a practical perspective, moreover, most legal 
proceedings concerning the interpretation and application of Union law are 
ultimately resolved by the national courts.50 It may be useful, therefore, to 
know whether they use the same scheme of analysis when they are asked 
to answer questions of concurrence in cases involving one or more Union 
rules. It is fair to assume that they will adopt the same approach. There 
are also some indications which point in this direction. The Supreme Court 
of the Netherlands has determined, for instance, that a contract which 
involves the purchase of a mobile phone in instalments may fall both within 
the scope of the rules governing instalment sale adopted by the Dutch legis-
lature and the rules implementing the Consumer Credit Directive.51 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has confirmed that the consumer has a free choice as to 
which rule to rely upon.52 Further research is needed, however, to establish 
whether the approach taken by national courts, acting as Union courts, is 
indeed in conformity with the approach outlined in this book.
Furthermore, this book raises the question of whether the same scheme 
of analysis may be used to debate and solve questions of concurrence 
arising in the context of vertical relationships, between an individual and an 
organ of a Member State or an institution of the Union. One could argue that 
the fundamental features of interpretation are universal and not bound to 
specific contexts.53 It should not make a difference, then, whether the legal 
relationship involves a public authority or a private individual. However, 
it is also arguable that a public authority should not be granted the same 
freedom of choice as a private individual. In the Netherlands, for instance, 
public authorities may not escape the safeguards provided by public-law 
47 Section 6.6.
48 See, on the scope and methodology of the present research, supra section 1.5.
49 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49, at 
14-16.
50 As observed e.g. by Rosas 2012, p. 105.
51 HR 13 June 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1385, NJ 2015/477, note J. Hijma (Lindorff Purchase 
BV/Statia), at 3.5.2.
52 See explicitly HR 12 February 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:236, NJ 2017/282, note J. Hijma 
(Lindorff BV/Nazier), at 3.7.2. The same conclusion has been drawn by Van Boom 2014, p. 828.
53 See e.g. Conway 2012, p. 5.
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arrangements by making use of their private-law powers.54 The question 
of whether public authorities may rely upon the rule which appears to 
them to be the most advantageous may also be raised in jurisdictions which 
principally exclude such authorities from the scope of application of private 
law and subject them to the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. In 
both contexts, the question that arises is how, if at all, the general principles 
governing the administrative activities of such public authorities limit their 
freedom of choice.
Another factor may influence the resolution of a legal dispute. It has 
been observed that if a matter is taken to court, it is up to the claimant to 
allege the elements of the relevant rule of law in order to obtain the result 
sought and up to the defendant to put forward a reasoned defence. To some 
extent, the courts are bound to the facts and arguments submitted by these 
parties. However, the courts are also under a duty to assess and apply 
certain rules of their own motion. This duty may flow from the applicable 
law of civil procedure, but may also be imposed on the basis of the principle 
of effectiveness of Union law. Indeed, the Court of Justice has required 
national courts to apply Article 101 TFEU55 and certain provisions contained 
in Union directives in the field of consumer law of their own motion.56 
These judgments do not call into question our findings, because they do not 
concern the relationship between the underlying rules as such. But they do 
suggest that the choice between the alternatives will not always be entirely 
up to the parties to the proceedings, but must sometimes be made by the 
court.57 Further research is needed to establish the precise scope of the duty 
to examine Union law ex officio and the impact, if any, of the principle of 
effectiveness on the choices which can be made by the interested party in 
accordance with our scheme of analysis.58 What if, for instance, one of the 
54 HR 26 January 1990, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:AC0965, NJ 1991/393, note M. Scheltema (Staat/
Windmill), at 3.2.
55 Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands and Others v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, at 49, with references to Case C-126/97, Eco 
Swiss China Time v. Benetton International, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, at 36 and 39; Joined Cases 
C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, at 31 and 39.
56 Case C-377/14, Ernst Georg Radlinger and Helena Radlingerová v. Finway, ECLI:EU:C:2016:
283, at 62. See also, with references to earlier case-law, Case C-488/11, Asbeek Brusse v. 
Jahani, ECLI:EU:C:2013:341, at 49-50; Case C-497/13, Froukje Faber v. Autobedrijf Hazet 
Ochten, ECLI:EU:C:2015:357, at 42.
57 See e.g. Case C-32/12, Soledad Duarte Hueros v. Autociba and Automóviles Citroën España, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:637, at 43, where the Court held that a national court is obliged ‘to grant 
of its own motion an appropriate reduction in the price of goods which are the subject 
of a contract of sale in the case where a consumer who is entitled to such a reduction 
brings proceedings which are limited to seeking only rescission of that contract and such 
rescission cannot be granted because the lack of conformity of those goods is minor (…)’.
58 See Castermans & Krans 2019, p. 117-119, who discuss questions of concurrence from 
a civil procedural law perspective. See about the duty to apply Union law ex offi cio also 
Ancery & Krans 2019, p. 131-135.
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rules appears to him to be the most advantageous, but the national court is 
required to apply another rule as a matter of public policy?
Even though this book has not explicitly addressed these questions, 
it is submitted that our scheme of analysis may contribute to finding the 
appropriate answers. In accordance with this scheme, we should start from 
the premise that the objectives underlying each rule, however founded, 
should be realised to the greatest possible extent. In principle, then, each 
rule ought to have its intended legal effect once the necessary conditions 
have been established. In the interest of legal certainty, one rule should 
only affect the scope of application of another rule if a careful consideration 
of the wording, meaning and overall purpose of the provisions at issue 
necessitates this conclusion. It flows from this reasoning that the person 
concerned should, in principle, be free to elect the rule which appears to 
him to be the most advantageous.
Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
Samenloop in het Europees privaatrecht
Samenloop in privaatrechtelijke rechtsverhoudingen
Privaatrechtelijke rechtsverhoudingen worden door veel verschillende 
regels beheerst. Sommige regels zijn algemeen of open geformuleerd, 
andere regels zijn gesloten of specifiek van aard. Sommige regels zijn 
geworteld in een van de nationale systemen van vermogensrecht, andere 
regels vloeien voort uit het recht van de Europese Unie. De invloed van 
deze laatste categorie is de afgelopen decennia toegenomen. Het Unierecht 
dat betrekking heeft op non-discriminatie, mededingingsrecht, vrij verkeer 
en de interne markt roept rechten en verplichtingen in het leven die door 
private partijen tegenover andere private partijen kunnen worden afge-
dwongen.
In deze meergelaagde rechtsorde is het niet ongebruikelijk dat een 
privaatrechtelijke rechtsverhouding tegelijkertijd binnen de reikwijdte valt 
van verschillende EU-regels en daarnaast wordt beheerst door het toepas-
selijke nationale vermogensrecht. De toepassing van deze regels kan tot 
uiteenlopende resultaten leiden, bijvoorbeeld als de voorwaarden en rechts-
gevolgen van de regels verschillen. Dan rijst de vraag of de belanghebbende 
mag kiezen op welke rechtsregel of -regels hij een beroep wenst te doen. 
Kunnen de regels naast elkaar worden toegepast, moet een keuze worden 
gemaakt of staat zelfs kiezen niet vrij en gaat een regel altijd voor?
In dit boek heb ik deze vragen van samenloop onderzocht. Het doel was 
de invloed van het recht van de Europese Unie op privaatrechtelijke rechts-
verhoudingen beter te begrijpen. Vanwege dit Europeesrechtelijke perspec-
tief heb ik er niet voor gekozen de terminologie van een van de bestaande 
systemen van vermogensrecht een-op-een over te nemen. Duits, Engels, 
Frans en Nederlands recht worden wel onderzocht, maar niet als model 
gehanteerd. Tegelijkertijd heb ik er niet voor gekozen de terminologie van 
de Uniewetgever en het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie een-op-een 
over te nemen. De Uniewetgever hanteert geen consistent begrippenappa-
raat en het Hof van Justitie spreekt slechts in algemene termen over rechten 
en verplichtingen zonder te preciseren welk type rechten en verplichtingen 
aan de orde is. Op dit punt is het Unierecht nog volop in ontwikkeling.1
1 § 1.2 en 4.2.
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Aan deze ontwikkeling heb ik met dit boek een bijdrage willen 
leveren. Op basis van het begrippenapparaat dat is bedacht door Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld (1879-1918) en aan de hand van voorbeelden afkomstig 
uit de verschillende rechtsstelsels, heb ik uitgelegd over welke rechten en 
verplichtingen we eigenlijk spreken en schrijven als we spreken en schrijven 
over samenloop in het privaatrecht. De term claim wordt gebruikt om te 
verwijzen naar regels die een persoon een aanspraak geven op een prestatie 
van een andere persoon, zoals de vordering tot nakoming en de vordering 
tot schadevergoeding. De term power wordt gebruikt om te verwijzen naar 
de bevoegdheid van een persoon om een rechtstoestand of rechtsverhou-
ding te creëren, te wijzigen of teniet te laten gaan. Te denken valt aan de 
ontbinding wegens tekortkoming of de vernietiging wegens dwaling. Ten 
slotte wordt aandacht besteed aan de verweermiddelen die ten dienste 
staan van de persoon die door het bestaan van een claim of het inroepen van 
een power wordt geraakt. In dit verband wordt de term defence gebruikt.2
Dit boek laat zien dat het geldende Unierecht inmiddels een aanzien-
lijk aantal claims, powers en defences in het leven roept. Private partijen 
mogen, bijvoorbeeld, niet discrimineren op grond van nationaliteit, het vrij 
verkeer van personen en diensten niet beperken en de mededinging niet 
verhinderen, beperken of vervalsen. Schending van deze regels – die zijn 
opgenomen in het VWEU – resulteert, als aan de desbetreffende vereisten 
is voldaan, in een vordering tot schadevergoeding. Tegen deze vordering 
kan de aangesproken partij zich op zijn beurt met verschillende middelen 
verweren. Ook in de door de Uniewetgever aangenomen verordeningen 
en richtlijnen vinden we talrijke claims, powers en defences terug. Dit boek 
brengt deze rechten en verplichtingen in kaart en biedt daarmee een over-
zicht van de Unierechtelijke regels die voor private partijen relevant zijn.3
Niet de vorm, maar de inhoud is bepalend
Hoe moet de verhouding tussen deze claims, powers en defences worden 
bepaald? Het is verleidelijk om deze vraag te beantwoorden op basis van 
een formeel criterium. Men hamert er bijvoorbeeld op dat het Unierecht 
voorrang heeft op het nationale recht, dat richtlijnen en verordeningen in de 
plaats komen van nationale regels en dat speciale regels voorrang hebben 
op algemene regels. In dit boek heb ik onderschreven dat Unierecht voor-
rang kan hebben op het nationale recht, dat richtlijnen en verordeningen in 
de plaats kunnen komen van nationale regels en dat speciale regels voorrang 
kunnen hebben op algemene regels. Tegelijkertijd heb ik betoogd dat de 
2 § 1.3 en 2.3.
3 § 4.3-4.4.
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vraag of een regel voorrang heeft een vraag van uitleg is die niet op basis 
van een formeel criterium kan worden beantwoord. De hiervoor geschetste 
benaderingen moeten daarom worden genuanceerd. Niet slechts de formele 
verhouding tussen de betrokken regels is van belang, ook hun inhoud moet 
worden beoordeeld.4
Neem het bekende adagium lex specialis derogat legi generali. Met een 
beroep op deze slagzin neemt menig jurist aan dat een bijzondere regel 
voorrang heeft op een algemene regel als beide op hetzelfde feitencomplex 
van toepassing zijn. Dit boek laat zien dat de werkelijkheid weerbarstiger 
is, zowel in de nationale stelsels als in het Unierecht. Om te beginnen moet 
er daadwerkelijk sprake zijn van een algemene regel en een bijzondere 
regel. Het boek laat zien dat dit slechts het geval kan zijn als de algemene 
regel alle gevallen bestrijkt waarop de bijzondere regel van toepassing is, 
maar de bijzondere regel niet alle gevallen bestrijkt waarop de algemene 
regel van toepassing is. Alleen dan is werkelijk sprake van een lex specialis.5 
Dit betekent dat, bijvoorbeeld, artikel 18 VWEU over non-discriminatie op 
basis van nationaliteit niet langer als lex generalis kan worden gezien ten 
opzichte van de verdragsbepalingen op het gebied van het vrij verkeer van 
personen en diensten. Sinds het Hof van Justitie heeft geoordeeld dat ook 
non-discriminatoire beperkingen in strijd kunnen zijn met het vrij verkeer 
kan niet langer worden volgehouden dat artikel 18 VWEU alle beperkingen 
op het vrij verkeer beheerst.6
Zelfs als sprake is van een lex generalis en een lex specialis, dan is dit geen 
dwingende reden om aan te nemen dat de laatste regel exclusieve werking 
toekomt. Mogelijk vult de bijzondere regel de algemene regel slechts aan, 
zoals het geval is met de richtlijnen die specifieke aspecten van oneerlijke 
handelspraktijken regelen.7 Duidelijk is wel dat een uitzondering zal 
moeten worden gemaakt als de regels conflicteren. Dan moet een van beide 
regels wijken. Maar de vraag of dit het geval is, en welke regel dan buiten 
toepassing moet worden gelaten, is een vraag van uitleg die moet worden 
beantwoord aan de hand van de aard en strekking van de betrokken regels 
en de verdere omstandigheden van het geval.8
Net zo min als bijzondere regels noodzakelijkerwijs voorrang hebben op 
algemene regels hebben Unierechtelijke regels noodzakelijkerwijs voorrang 
op nationale regels. Het beginsel van voorrang van Unierecht is in essentie 
een conflictregel. Het vertelt ons slechts welke regel voorrang moet hebben, 
niet of sprake is van een conflict dat moet worden opgelost. Ook deze 
laatste vraag is een vraag van uitleg die niet kan worden beantwoord door 
te wijzen op de formele of hiërarchische verhouding tussen de betrokken 
4 § 1.1.
5 § 2.4, 5.2.4, 6.3 en 6.7.
6 § 5.2.2-5.2.5.
7 § 6.7.
8 § 2.4, 5.2.5, 6.3 en 6.7.
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regels.9 Hetzelfde geldt voor de vraag of een richtlijn of verordening in 
de plaats komt van het nationale recht. Dat deze wetgevingsinstrumenten 
zijn gericht op harmonisatie betekent niet dat ze de toepassing van andere 
regels noodzakelijkerwijs uitsluiten. De bevoegdheid van de Uniewetgever 
om de interne markt te harmoniseren is immers beperkt en de door hem 
aangenomen regels zijn niet steeds uitputtend bedoeld.10
Een gedeeld interpretatiemodel
Hoe zouden we dan wél moeten bepalen of het recht de belanghebbende 
toestaat om zich op de regel van zijn keuze te beroepen? Dit boek laat zien 
dat de stelsels die zijn bestudeerd – Duits, Engels, Frans en Nederlands 
recht – deze vraag op dezelfde wijze benaderen en oplossen.11 Het boek laat 
ook zien dat dezelfde benadering wordt gevolgd door de Uniewetgever en 
door het Hof van Justitie.
In al deze stelsels geldt het uitgangspunt dat elke regel zoveel mogelijk 
tot zijn recht moet komen. In beginsel wordt het toepassingsbereik van een 
regel daarom niet door een andere regel beperkt. Zo moet het handelen 
van particulieren dat valt binnen het toepassingsbereik van het Unierecht 
in overeenstemming zijn met alle verplichtingen die voortvloeien uit de 
verdragsbepalingen op het gebied van non-discriminatie, vrij verkeer van 
personen en diensten, en mededingingsrecht.12 De toepasselijkheid van een 
verdragsbepaling leidt er in beginsel niet toe dat een andere verdragsbe-
paling buiten toepassing dient te blijven.13 Hetzelfde uitgangspunt wordt 
gehanteerd bij het bepalen van de verhouding tussen regels van secundair 
Unierecht,14 en tussen secundair Unierecht en nationaal recht.15 Steeds geldt 
dat de regels naast elkaar kunnen worden toegepast als aan de vereisten 
van de regels is voldaan. In dit verband spreken juristen in de verschillende 
stelsels over het cumuleren of combineren van de regels. De belanghebbende 
mag in deze gevallen kiezen op welke regel of regels hij een beroep wenst 
te doen.
Soms kunnen de rechtsgevolgen van de regels niet gelijktijdig intreden, 
omdat dit tot logisch of praktisch onaanvaardbare resultaten zou leiden. 
Zo kan men er niet voor kiezen de overeenkomst te ontbinden en tevens 
nakoming te vorderen van de verbintenissen uit dezelfde overeenkomst. 
9 § 4.5.
10 § 4.5, 6.2-6.5.
11 § 2.5.
12 § 5.2.4 en 5.4.3.




In dergelijke gevallen is het maken van een keuze tussen de regels vereist 
en verplicht. Men spreekt ook wel van het hebben van een optie en over 
alternativiteit. In beginsel is het, zowel in de nationale stelsels als in het 
Unierecht, aan de belanghebbende om te kiezen voor de regel die in zijn 
ogen het meest gunstig is, hetgeen goed tot uitdrukking komt in de Engelse 
term ‘election’.16
Soms is er geen ruimte voor een keuze, omdat de ene regel de andere 
regel geheel of gedeeltelijk verdringt. Als de wetgever een bepaalde situ-
atie uitputtend heeft willen regelen, dan kan het niet zo zijn dat via een 
omweg toch een ander resultaat wordt bereikt. Men spreekt ook wel van 
exclusiviteit. Dit boek laat zien dat deze oplossing met terughoudendheid 
moet worden toegepast. Het toepassingsbereik van een regel wordt slechts 
beperkt voor zover dit nodig is om de exclusieve regel tot zijn recht te laten 
komen. Voor exclusieve werking moeten bovendien duidelijke aanwij-
zingen bestaan, bijvoorbeeld omdat de regels dit met zoveel woorden voor-
schrijven of onvermijdelijk meebrengen. Dat een richtlijn of verordening 
‘maximumharmonisatie’ beoogt, wil daarom niet zeggen dat andere regels 
niet gelden. Steeds zal, op basis van de bewoordingen, aard en strekking 
van de betrokken regels, moeten worden onderzocht of de richtlijn of 
verordening exclusieve werking heeft.17 Is dit niet het geval, dan kunnen 
de regels naast elkaar worden toegepast of mag een keuze tussen de regels 
worden gemaakt.18
De conclusie van het boek luidt dat het interpretatiemodel dat is 
ontwikkeld in de nationale stelsels van vermogensrecht kan zorgen voor 
een beter begrip van de invloed van het Unierecht op privaatrechtelijke 
rechtsverhoudingen. In dit model wordt het uitgangspunt gehanteerd 
dat elke regel zoveel mogelijk tot zijn recht moet komen. Dit betekent dat 
elke regel op zijn eigen merites moet worden beoordeeld en steeds kan 
worden toegepast zodra de noodzakelijke vereisten zijn vervuld. Hieruit 
vloeit voort dat de belanghebbende vrijelijk mag kiezen op welke regel of 
regels hij een beroep wenst te doen. Er zijn slechts twee uitzonderingen. 
De belanghebbende moet een keuze maken tussen de beschikbare alter-
natieven als gelijktijdige toepassing van de regels tot logisch of praktisch 
onaanvaardbare resultaten zou leiden. En soms mag hij geen keuze maken, 
omdat een van de regels exclusieve werking heeft. Deze uitzonderingen 
behoeven rechtvaardiging, omdat ernaar moet worden gestreefd elke regel, 
ongeacht zijn grondslag, zoveel mogelijk tot zijn recht te laten komen.
16 § 2.5 en 6.6.
17 § 6.7.
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